Charles P. Stone

Among the questions I hope to answer are: Why was there a battle at Ball's Bluff? This was hardly a suitable area for tactical maneuvers. Who was responsible for the battle?; who was to be blame and who was punished for the battle?; and finally, why would the battle create such a stir and have so much more meaning for the War, than all the other senseless and misdirected engagements of the war?

The center of the controversy is the village of Leesburg, VA, located approximately 35 miles up the Potomac River from Washington City. Neither Major General George B. McClellan, commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, or General Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Confederate Army intended to take the offensive during the fall of 1861. Johnston believed his force was numerically inferior to the demands of an offensive. McClellan was still trying to rebuild the demoralized Union forces from the previous disaster at Bull Run.

On October 18th, Gen. Johnston pulled his advance lines back to Centerville, VA from the hills overlooking Washington. This left an isolated brigade at Leesburg to guard the myriad of important Potomac River crossings and to serve as a link between the main Confederate army located at Centerville and the detached forces at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley.

George B. McClellan

The events for the Union began on October 19, when Brig. Gen. George McCall, with approximately 12,000 troops, made a reconnaissance in force towards Dranesville, VA. ~assignment was to screen a group of Yankee topographers on a map-making expedition. McCall's advance forced Confederate Colonel Nathan G. "Shanks" (so called due to his skinny legs) Evans to establish a defensive position with his brigade, of approximately 2,300, behind Goose Creek, 4 miles south of Leesburg. A Union signal station located on Sugar Loaf Mountain notified General McClellan that Leesburg was being evacuated.

The next day, October 20th, Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone with his division (known as the Corps of Observation) located at Poolesville, MD received the following order from Army Headquarters: "General McCall occupied Dranesville yesterday, and is still there. Will send out a heavy reconnaissance today in all directions from that point. The general desires that you keep a good lookout upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them."

So Brig. Gen. Stone that same afternoon moved most of his 10,000 soldiers from their camps near Poolesville, MD to Conrad's Ferry, Harrison's Island and Edwards Ferry. On the afternoon of the 20th, Stone had his artillery shell the Virginia shore across Edwards Ferry, then sent three boats of 35 men each across the river. These men were withdrawn by evening. At this point~ General Stone had met the intent of McClellan's order to make a slight demonstration. However, Stone's intention was to make a feint at Edwards Ferry with Brig. Gen. Gorman's force, and then deliver the "coup de grace" with a flanking movement some 3 and 1/2 miles upriver at Smart's Mill Ford. Gen. Stone had personally scouted this crossing and had staked out positions for artillery covering fire from the Maryland shore. Only a scouting party was to be at Ball's Bluff opposite Harrison's Island. At Smart's Mill Ford, which was located 3/8ths of a mile north of Ball's Bluff, men could have walked across the shallow river. To cross at Ball's Bluff, boats were required, since the river was 18 feet deep at this point.

As is often mistakenly assumed, the battle at Ball's Bluff was not the result of McClellan's order for a slight demonstration. This was satisfied by Stone's actions on the 20th. Ball's Bluff was the result of McClellan's original orders given to General Stone on August 11, the day before he assumed command:

You will keep the main body of your force united in a strong position near Poolesville, and observe the dangerous fords with strong pickets that can dispute the passage until reinforced.... Should you see the opportunity of capturing or dispersing any small parties by crossing the river, you are at liberty to do so, though great discretion is recommended in making such a movement. The general object of your command is to observe and dispute the passage of the river and the advance of the enemy.... I leave your operations much to your own discretion, in which I have the fullest confidence."

Locating a scouting party on Harrison's Island opposite Ball's Bluff was nothing new. (For the record, the bluff was named after a former owner, the family of George Washington's mother, Mary Ball Washington.) Gen. Stone had established a routine of moving a scouting party to Harrison's Island every day and then withdrawing them each evening. On the night of October 20th, the scouting party did not withdraw. Based on the information learned from the previous expeditions, Gen. Stone knew the Rebels did not maintain a picket at Ball's Bluff, due to the difficulties in crossing by boat from Harrison's Island and the deterrent posed by the nearly 100 foot high bluff, which is studded with rocks and covered with tangles of mountain laurel.

The scouting party on October 20th consisted of 20 men from H Company, 15th Massachusetts Voluntary Infantry Regiment commanded by Captain Chase Philbrick. Sometime near dusk, the party paddled across the 60 yard wide channel of the Potomac and made the arduous assent of the bluff. Capt. Philbrick then led his men inland for about a mile following a cow path. On this bright moonlit night, Captain Philbrick observed a Confederate encampment of about 30 tents without proper sentries posted. The expedition returned to Harrison's Island near 10:00 PM and he quickly sent a report of his findings by Lieutenant Church Howe, an adjutant, to General Stone. The reconnaissance should have been conducted during daylight hours, but due to a delay in issuing the proper orders by Colonel Charles Devens, because he had gone to church, Capt. Philbrick did not depart until after sunset. The 15th Mass. appears to have been an exceptionally religious regiment holding services on Sundays and Wednesdays and prayer meetings every evening.

Colonel Charles Devens was a Harvard graduate and attorney. He would emerge from the war as a major general though severely wounded at Fair Oaks and again at Chancellorsville. At Cold Harbor, he would be so crippled by inflammatory rheumatism that he would have to be carried into battle. After the war he would become a judge on the Massachusetts Supreme Court and serve as Attorney General under Rutherford B. Hayes.

Imagine yourself, as an inexperienced junior officer away from home for the first time in your life. Here you are leading a small band (20 men) through the foggy moonlit night in enemy territory. This is your first combat patrol. Your orders specify that you are to remain undetected. You have been proceeding slowly, for what seems to be an eternity, along this old cow path. You know up ahead somewhere are the Rebs. Finally, on the ridge line across a small, fog blanketed valley, your fears are realized. There is the enemy. You quickly insure that your reconnaissance party is out of sight. Then from a less than aggressive observation point, you quickly try to count tents, about 30, and note that you don't see any sentries posted. What luck! Of course you aren't really surprised because you have been told that pickets were not usually posted in the area. You have successfully completed the first objective of your mission. Now you must get back and report on your findings. So you hurriedly ~ your steps back to the bluff and cross over to the safety of the island. To complete the mission successfully you have an adjutant, Lt. Church Howe, rush your report to Gen. Stone at Edwards Ferry.

In his eagerness to perform well, Captain Philbrick had made a mistake. The moonlight streaming through the trees on to a field of haystacks had been seen as tents in an encampment. However, Gen. Stone was given the false impression that the reconnaissance party had succeeded in its mission and that only handful of unprepared Confederates were north of Leesburg. With this information in hand1 Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone planned a more aggressive double reconnaissance in force. He would personally supervise one crossing at Edwards Ferry and send Colonel Charles Devens, commander of the 15th Massachusetts, to Ball's Bluff for a second crossing.

Earlier on October 20th, fate had graced "Shanks" Evans with some very useful information. About midday along the Leesburg-Alexandria Pike, the Confederates captured a Union courier bearing dispatches from Gen. McCall to Brig. Gen. George Meade. These captured dispatches provided Col. Evans with all the details of McCall's advance and would prove invaluable the next day while reacting to Gen. Stone's movements.

Upon receipt of orders, Col. Devens proceeded from his position on Harrison's Island to follow the route of Capt. Philbrick. Devens began crossing 4 companies (300 men) of the 15th Massachusetts using 3 small boats that could carry only 10 men each in the early morning hours of October 21st. Four hours were required to complete the crossing. He advanced along the cow path use by Capt. Philbrick's party. Following Col. Devens across the Potomac was Colonel William Raymond Lee with 2 companies (102 men) of the 20th Mass. (Known as the Harvard Regiment because so many of its members were from that institution). Lee's two companies would remain near the top of the bluff to cover Devens' return. Colonel Lee was a member of the West Point class of 1829, but resigned two weeks prior to graduation to search for his father, who had disappeared after a "brain attack".

When Col. Devens reached the earlier vantage point of Captain Phubrick and saw the haystack dotted valley, he quickly realized the Captain's error. So, he decided that a further reconnaissance was in order. With only Captain Philbrick and his aid Lt. Howe, Col. Devens moved to a ridge overlooking the village of Leesburg. There below him he saw 4 tents and no sign of the enemy. At about 6:30 AM, Devens sent Lt. Howe, who as we shall see is a very well traveled individual, to report to Gen. Stone that the previously reported encampment did not exist and that he could remain where he was undetected until reinforced. Unknown to Devens, there were Confederates around him. A detachment from K Company (the Magnolia Guard) of the 17th Mississippi was stationed less than a mile upriver from Ball's Bluff at Smart's Mill Ford. They had detected sounds of the crossing, and now the 40 man detachment was enroute to Leesburg to avoid being cut off by the Union thrust. The two parties stumbled across each other around 7:00 AM. The Confederate officer in charge of the detachment, Captain William Duff, conducted a brilliant surprise attack on Devens, which is surprising since he reported Devens 300 men as a large Union force. But when you only have 40 men, 300 looks extremely large. However, this was not the opening of the Battle of Ball's Bluff. The covering force established by Colonel William R. Lee at the top of the Bluff had been accidentally discovered earlier. Adjutant Charles Pierson of the 20th Mass. with a sergeant and three men from Company I peered incautiously into a gully on the right of their position and stumbled upon Duff's picket. Shots were exchanged and 29-year old first Sergeant William Riddle of Boston was hit by a bullet in his right elbow, becoming the first casualty of the battle. Duff sent Lieutenant Harten to "Shanks" Evans in Leesburg where he arrived at 6:00 AM.

Back to Col. Devens. The surprised Union soldiers recoiled with the attack coming from the north. Caught of fguard by these veterans of Manassass, Col. Devens with his green troops, having never seen the elephant, fell back a short distance along the cow path in the direction of the bluff. In fact, none of General Stone's units had been under fire before today, unless you count Colonel Edward Baker's California Regiment which received its baptism of fire - not from the Confederates, but from the 4th Michigan, which on September 28 had fired on it by mistake, killing four and wounding fourteen. Also to make matters worse for Devens, the Union troops were armed with outdated smoothbore Austrian muskets, while the Rebs had rifled ones. With the weapons available, there was no way the Union soldiers could hit most targets.

Colonel Devens slowly regrouped his command after the initial attack and eventually withdrew to the covering position Col. Lee had established at the top of the bluff. After meeting with Lee, Devens proceeded to advance again to the position he had recently departed. At this time Lt. Howe reappeared. He brought the information that Lieutenant Colonel George Ward, deputy commander of the 15th Mass. was to reinforce Devens via Smart's Mill Ford. Which was in accordance with Gen. Stone's original plan. And that 10 Union cavalrymen were crossing at Smart's Mill Ford to serve as a flank guard, scouts and couriers. For some unknown reason this detachment failed to show. Captain Kendee, the officer assigned to lead the cavalry unit, crossed the river at Ball's Bluff, held a brief discussion with Colonel Lee, returned to the Maryland shore, and was not seen for the remainder of the engagement.

Upon making his report concerning the reinforcements, Lt. Howe was again dispatched to Gen. Stone with a report of the morning's skirmish. Lt. Howe probably was spending more time riding boats than if he had volunteered for the Navy. On the return trip, Lt. Howe intercepted Lt. Col. Ward and the 2nd battalion of the 15th MA on Harrison's Island. The overly-excited Howe, told Ward that Devens was being cut up and needed help immediately. Therefore, Ward should abandon the crossing at Smart's Mill Ford and cross instead at Ball's Bluff. The entire axis of the planned operation was shifted to funnel all Union infantry and artillery into the battle at the worst possible crossing site. It must be remembered that at this time over 400 Union soldiers were facing a mere 40 Rebs. Devens had hardly been cut up, just stunned by the unexpected aggressive Confederate response.

Colonel Evans had not been idle during the morning. At the same time that Lt. Harten was reporting the Union forces discovered at Ball's Bluff, he received word of the crossing at Edward's Ferry. He moved his headquarters from Leesburg to Fort Evans in order to keep an eye on the Union troops at Edward's Ferry, which he considered the greatest threat at the moment. From his position at Fort Evans on the road from Edwards Ferry to Leesburg, he could observe the crossing by General Stone. Based upon the information captured the day before, Shanks knew that McCall's force was not a threat, in fact, Gen. McCall had been recalled to Darnestown on the Maryland side of the river by General McClellan and departed Dranesville at around 8:30 AM. Therefore, at around 9:00 AM, Col. Evans decided he was free to strip Fort Evans of troops to meet the advance from Edwards Ferry and Ball's Bluff From Captain Duff's report, he knew of the flank maneuver. Therefore, he dispatched four companies (two from the 18th Mississippi and one each from the 13th Mississippi and 17th Mississippi) plus three companies of Virginia cavalry under the overall command of Lieutenant Colonel Walter H. Jenifer to reinforce Duff. Evans held back the bulk of his three regiments at Fort Evans in order to confront the Union advance from Edwards Ferry.

Lieutenant Colonel Jenifer had entered West Point in the same year, 1841, as General Stone, but only lasted seven months. However, he still become an army officer and made a name as the designer of a saddle that was widely used in the army until superseded by the saddle developed by George McClellan.

Edward Baker

According to Lincoln's secretary, John Hay, Senator Baker had come to Washington, in early October, to settle his affairs due to a premonition of death. On the day before the battle at Ball's Bluff, Baker had stopped at the White House and stretched out on the lawn for a chat with the President. As he left to join his brigade at Poolesville, MD, Mrs. Lincoln handed him a bouquet of late autumn flowers. "Very beautiful", said Baker. Then he added a strange, unforgettable remark: "These flowers and my memory will wither together."

Gen. Stone impulsively placed Colonel Baker in charge of the Harrison's Island venture. However, General Stone was at a disadvantage in his relation with Colonel Baker. Stone had been a former junior officer who left the military to become a not-so-successful businessman. Baker was a U.S. Senator and personal friend of President Lincoln. Exactly one month earlier, September 21st, Baker had been appointed a major general, but he had not yet decided whether to accept or refuse the appointment. Therefore, he could at any moment he chose accept the promotion and instantly become Stone's superior.

Baker's instructions gave him wide discretion. He was instructed to observe the situation first hand. If he thought Devens should retire, he was authorized to order a retreat. If an attack on Leesburg was feasible, he had the authority to order one. Baker would depart for Harrison's Island sometime between 9:00 and 9:30 AM. Lt. Howe says he passed Colonel Baker approaching Harrison's Island along the towpath around 10:00 AM.

It is natural to wonder why General Stone did not proceed personally to Ball's Bluff in light of Howe's exaggerated report. However, Stone believed that Colonel Baker was a capable subordinate. Col. Baker had seen previous service in the Mexican War. With Baker upriver at Ball's Bluff, General Stone would be free to maintain his centralized position at Edwards Ferry between McCall and Baker, thereby, allowing him better control of his forces. He was unaware that McCall was not advancing on Leesburg as he thought based upon the orders from McClellan.

At approximately 10:00 AM, the four companies of Confederate infantry and the three companies of cavalry came to support Capt. Duff's detachment. Lieutenant Colonel Jenifer quickly organized a combined infantry and cavalry charge against Devens advanced position, but Jenifer could see that he did not have a sufficient number of troops to drive Devens away. This time, upon the request of Lt. Col. Jenifer, Shanks pulled three companies of the 8th Virginia from the right flank and sent them double timing towards Ball's Bluff. Around noon, the 3 companies of Colonel Eppa Hunton's 8th Virginia arrived. The Virginians, 375 strong, became the right of the line Jenifer had established. Now, Col. Hunton, a former militia officer with no combat experience became the tactical commander of the battle.

At approximately 12:30 PM, with additional reinforcements now at hand, Lt. Col. Jenifer, who now controlled the center and left of the Confederate line, attacked the 15th MA forcing Col. Devens to abandon his advanced position and retreat to the top of the bluff. Here Devens felt more secure as he was rejoined with Colonel Lee's 20th MA. Five more companies of the 20th had reached the bluff under the command of Major Paul Revere, grandson of the Revolutionary War hero plus two 12-pounder mountain howitzers of Battery B, Rhode Island Light Artillery. Near 2:30 PM, more Confederate units arrived on the scene, in the form of the 18th Mississippi. The last Confederate reinforcements would arrive at about 4:00, which were the remainder of the 17th Mississippi.

When Colonel Baker reached Harrison's Island, his aggressive and yet romantic nature led to romantic and aggressive decision. Without bothering to find out what was happening on the bluff, he ordered his own two regiments, the 1st California (This unit was made up of mostly prominent Philadelphians who chose this name because the original recruits were men who had once lived in California. Company G was recruited in New York and Company R in Washington, D.C. They would be redesignated the 71st Pennsylvania after the battle when units actually formed in California became active) and the predominantly Irish 42nd New York, known as the Tammany Regiment, across the river. Baker then proceeded to spend the next hour and a half supervising the crossing of these two regiments, which could and should have been performed by a subordinate. Then he wasted an additional hour overseeing the removal of a large boat from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal in order to increase his water transportation from the Maryland shore to Harrison's Island.

It was 2:15 PM when Col. Baker finally arrived at the top of the bluff and found Col. Devens. His comments were "I congratulate you upon the splendid manner in which your regiment has behaved this morning. I think we better form a line and prepare to receive them here, and you shall have the right of the line." Col. Baker had no idea of the tactical situation at the time or had any familiarity with the nature of the field. His first order was for Colonel Devens to withdraw his troops from the woods where the only Confederate approach would be across a large open field and proceed to the edge of the small clearing at the top of the bluff. Before Colonel Devens could voice his disapproval of the order, Colonel Baker had flitted off to another area of the field.

Baker then proceeded to form his troops in an open field of about 10 acres in extent and roughly in the shape of a trapezoid, perhaps 800 feet deep and 600 feet wide at its broadest point, which was at the end away from the river. The line as formed had a dog leg on the right that extended forward, shaped like an "L" with the regiments facing inward at a right angle. The point was at the bluff. This position was a masterpiece of incompetence for it had no depth. To the left front, across a ravine, rose a cluster of wooded hills that formed a ridge commanding the Union position. Colonel Baker failed to grasp the significance of this ridge. Also ravines on both flanks limited his maneuverability.

The position had other problems. Col. Baker placed his reserves behind the battle line in a position that was fully exposed to sniper fire. These snipers, hidden in the tree line that surrounded three sides of the cleared field soon began to take their toll. At around 2:30 PM, Colonel Baker spotted Colonel Milton Cogswell of the Tammany Regiment (42nd NY) coming along the cow path. Being ever the romantic, he gaily sang out a verse from Sir Walter Scott's poem "The Lady of the Lake": "One blast upon your bugle horn is worth a thousand men," Cogswell was not impressed. He, being a West Pointer and the only professional soldier on the Federal side, ignored Baker's poetry and quickly surveyed the line and spotted the defects in Baker's troop deployment. He immediately suggested that they advance the units to the high ground to the left. However, Baker chose to ignore Cogswell advice. Twenty minutes later Confederate skirmishers took advantage of Baker oversight and occupied the position. They quickly opened a sharp fire on the Union left.

Now, near 3:00 PM, the Battle of Ball's Bluff had begun in earnest. Colonel Baker was filled with dash and ardor, but very little else. He was seen moving about the field, helping with a shoulder on the wheel of a recalcitrant field piece and encouraging the troops. In this flurry of energy the one thing Baker failed to display was any military management skill. The weakness in the Federal position was quickly evident to the Southern marksmen as they took on the work of destruction. Colonel Hunton was unable to bring up any artillery, but as events proved, it was not necessary. For Col. Baker had committed another blunder, his artillery was placed in front of the Union line without the proper support. Most of the artillerists manning the three Union field pieces (the two mountain howitzers and a James rifle) fell within a few minutes, their guns having only fired eight rounds before falling silent. At about 4:00 PM, the 18th Mississippi charged forward and nearly captured the two howitzers. The charge cost the 18th MI its commander, Col. Erasmus Burt, who was shot from his horse. In a letter written after the battle Lt. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. of the 20th MA and future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, remarked, "at 4:30 PM, I was hit. I felt as if a horse had kicked me. First Sergeant Smith grabbed me and lugged me to the river and opened my shirt and ecce! two holes in my breast. Some Federal units, especially two companies of Baker's own 71st PA grew demoralized and simply laid down and refused participate in the battle.

According to Captain Francis Young, Baker's aid and brigade quartermaster, "Near 5:00 PM, Colonel Baker fell. He was standing near the left of the woods. It is believed he was shot with a cavalry revolver by a private, who after Baker fell, crawled on his hands and knees to the body and was attempting to take his sword when Captain Bieral with 10 of his men rushed up, shot the private in the head and rescued the body."

A command crisis developed when there was confusion over who should be in charge. At first Colonel Lee claimed to be senior, Devens concurred, and the two decided a retreat was in order. Colonel Cogswell then arrived and took command, claiming seniority. Again Devens agreed. Seems that he was agreeable with anyone who wanted to take over control of the situation. Once Cogswell established his right to command, he any attempt to retreat across the river. He knew the Confederates would reach the bluff before the Federals could cross the river with the limited transportation available. This was a very true statement. Cogswell's plan was to have the entire force cuts its way through the Confederates in the direction of Edwards Ferry where Gorman's brigade could cover their withdrawal.

As a first step, Colonel Devens was ordered to shift his 15th MA from the Union right flank to a position behind the 20th MA on the left. Then, the assault column would advance on the Mississippians holding the Confederate right. At this time one of those strange and unusual events that always seem to occur at untimely moments and turn the tide of battle took control. The event instilled confusion in the ranks and with confusion -disaster. An officer mounted on a gray horse dashed on to the field in front of the column. The officer was Lt. Charles B. Wildman, a Confederate brigade staff officer. Mistaking the Federals for his own men he ordered them to charge. The 42nd NY and two companies of the 15th MA, believing Wildman was a Union officer, rushed forward with eagerness, but were promptly recalled by their own officers who were unaware of any plans to attack. Seeing the confusion in the Union ranks, the Rebels seized the initiative and counterattacked, driving back the 42nd NY and 15th MA companies. The sudden surge and retreat of these units unhinged the green Union column. In the midst of the chaos that he had created in the Union column, Lt. Wildman rode away unharmed.

This is the usually accepted story of the start of the Federal route. Elijah White, who would later form his own band of partisan rangers refer~d to as Comanches, positively identified Lt. Wildman as the Confederate officer in question. White also added that Wudman was too drunk to know what he was doing that day. However, Colonel Evans singled out Wudman in his after action report for special commendation for the manner in which he served as his aide, directing the 18th regiment to their position and carrying orders under heavy fire.

Some people believe that the officer was a phantom, a creature from the spirit world, who deliberately led the Tammany boys to their death. To this day, boys and girls for the area avoid the Ball's Bluff battlefield at night, although as you who may have visited the site know, being tucked away at the end of a dead-end road, it would be an ideal lovers lane. Many believe the place is still haunted by the phantom.

However, the truth is more mundane. Because of his capture and imprisonment, Colonel Cogswell did not submit his after action report until a year later. By that time there was not so much interest in the insignificant action in light of the more ferocious battles that had occurred. So Cogswell's account has largely been ignored. According to his report "Having given these orders for the breakout towards Edwards Ferry, I preceded to the front and finding our lines pressed severely, I ordered an advance of the whole force on the right of the enemy line. I was followed by the remnants of my two companies and a portion of the California Regiment, but, for some reason unknown to me, was not joined by the 15th or 20th Mass. regiments." Although its a shame to ruin an extraordinary story, the charge was ordered by neither a Confederate officer or a pied-piper style phantom, but the luckless Milton Cogswell.

The spirit of the defeat was quickly evident; even to the Confederates. The Union line melted away. With their backs to the river and few boats available, all hell broke loose. As Private Randolph Shotwell of the 8th VA remembered; "Then ensued an awful spectaclel A kind of shiver ran through the huddled mass upon the brow of the cliff; it gave way; rushed a few steps; then, in one wild, panic-strickened herd, rolled, leaped, tumbled over the precipice! The descent is nearly perpendicular, with ragged, jutting crages, and water laved base. Screams of pain and terror filled the air. Men seemed suddenly bereft of reason, leaped over the bluff with muskets still in their clutch, threw themselves into the river without divesting themselves of their heavy accoutrements. Others sprang down upon the heads and bayonets of those below. A gray-haired private of the 1st California was found with his head mashed between two rocks by the heavy boots of a ponderous "Tammany" man, who had broken his own neck by the fall. The side of the bluff was worn smooth by the numbers sliding down." A very graphic picture of the events occurring all around.

Back at Edwards Ferry, General Stone thought that everything was going well. That is, until he was notified, sometime after 5:00 PM, that Baker was dead. It seems that Baker had failed to inform him otherwise. General Stone, with 2,250 men on the Virginia shore, could have moved to the aid of the units at Ball's Bluff. However, three things stopped him. First, the 13th Mississippi was blocking the way. While this unit had only 500 men, to Stone they appeared much stronger. Second, a strong Confederate position was reported between Edwards Ferry and Ball's Bluff. Stone described this as breastworks and a masked battery. However, the existence of this battery was never confirmed. Finally, at the same time he learned of Baker's death, he also received exaggerated reports about4~onfederate strength around Leesburg. The reports told of as many as 10,000 Confederates were in the area. Therefore, instead of moving upriver on the Virginia side and forcing an additional confrontation with Evans, he chose to withdraw his force back across Edwards Ferry. He then rode upstream to take personal command of the forces on Harrison's Island and the Maryland shore.

Once on the scene, about 6:00 PM, General Stone wired McClellan asking for support from McCall. General Stone had not been informed that McCall had been withdrawn earlier in the day. In one of the many command communication mishaps that plagued the Army of the Potomac, McClellan had failed to notify Stone of this crucial fact, even after ordering him to take Leesburg. I guess that it is fortunate that while Stone received the order to take Leesburg, he was never able to understand it. The telegram had been sent in cipher and Gen. Stone was never provided the appropriate key to decode it. When McClellan received Stone's reply that he "had the box but not the key", he failed to understand the message and sent an aide to Stone's residence looking for the key.

At Ball's Bluff things were chaotic. Two of the small boats had disappeared, a metal skiff was so riddled with bullets that it sank and a large flatboat laden with 30 or more of the wounded capsized when the able-bodied tried to jump aboard. Fortunately, some of the junior officers kept their heads. Captains William Bartlett of the 20th MA and Timothy O'Meara of the 42nd NY took some of their men up the bluff for one last skirmish. Bartlett then led a group of about 80 along the shore to Smart's Mill Ford and escaped. O'Meara remained as a rear guard was overwhelmed and captured. Colonel Devens ordered the members of the 15th MA to discard their weapons and swim; however many of the soldiers having just been issued new weapons and were reluctant to part with them and attempted to swim with their rifles. It became a question of swim or die for no one on the Union side tried to surrender, and strangely enough, none of the Confederates demanded it. Rebels atop the bluff watched the river overwhelm the screaming, dying men until darkness closed over the sight.

As an interesting side light, consider the possessions that people are not willing to abandon to save their own lives in moments of danger. Colonel Devens had no qualms about throwing away his sword, but was reluctant to part with his coat for it had a button that had been crushed by a bullet and he fancied wearing it as a medal. Lt. Macy stripped himself naked except for his hat, which he kept because he carried a miniature of his fiancee inside it. Macy also tried to carry his sword, but was forced to drop it. Capt. Casper Crowninshield tried to save his watch for which he was sentimentally attached, by carrying it in his mouth. Being a powerful swimmer, for he had been a stroke oar on the Harvard team, he was successful. That night he slept on a pile of straw with his watch beside him. In the morning, he got up and walked off without it.

At least one man was more concerned with cash and comfort. An Irishman in Company D of the 15th Mass. threw off his coat and pants and successfully swam through the current under a hail of bullets to Harrison's Island; then he remembered that he had left $18.25 in the pocket of his coat, along with his pipe. So he swam back to retrieve them. When a reporter asked him about the incident his remark was, "Oh, yes sir, it was all I'd saved from my three months service and I'm very fond of me pipe."

Capt. Philbrick swam the river with his money in his mouth. One Confederate soldier reported finding the body of a Union officer with $126 in gold in his pockets that had cost him his life.

As late as 10:00 PM General Stone was still being ordered by General McClellan to hold on to his position on the Virginia shore at all hazards. Major General Banks, at Darnestown, was ordered to send support to Harrison's Island and then at 10:45 PM, he was ordered to proceed there and take command.

533 Federal prisoners were rounded up. These included Colonels Cogswell and Lee, and Major Paul Revere. In Washington, the report was 49 dead on the field, 158 wounded and 161 missing and presumed drowned. The Federals lost 53 and 1/2 percent of the 1720 engaged. The Confederates reported only 36 killed, 117 wounded and two missing out of a total of 1709 participants. But from all indications the number of Federal dead exceeded 200. The Confederates had one soldier taken prisoner by the Union. First Lt. J. Owen Berry of Company G, 8th Va. was captured when he inadvertently rode into the lines of the California Regiment.

While the Federal loses were small compared to the casualties from Bull Run and to those that would occur in later battles, for such an insignificant little fight, the numbers were appalling. A major "inquest" was inevitable. Almost immediately a search for the culprit began.

In a message, sent to all Division Commanders in the Army of the Potomac on October 24th, Major General George McClellan stated, "The disaster was caused by errors committed by the immediate commander - not General Stone." To his wife, Mary Ellen, George wrote on the 25th, "The affair at Leesburg on Monday last was a terrible butchery - the whole thing took place some 40 miles from here without my orders or knowledge - it was entirely unauthorized by me and I am in no manner responsible for it." Already he appears to have forgotten his orders to General Stone to take Leesburg. He continued, "The man directly to blame for the affair was Colonel Baker... - he was in command, disregarded entirely the instructions he had received from Stone and violated all military rules and precautions." At least he was correct on this point.

That same evening, in a meeting with a group of angry Senators, McClellan disclaimed any responsibility for the defeat at Ball's Bluff. He managed to divert the wrath of the Senators by arguing that General-in-Chief Winf ield Scott was the real problem. Now, George was using the disaster for his own personal gain. He implied that the old general was an impediment to active operations and made proper coordination of forces impossible. Sounds vaguely familiar. The Senators put pressure on President Lincoln and within the week the President accepted Scott's resignation. The resignation had been originally submitted in August but Lincoln have not accepted it until now.

William S. Seward

The confrontation was over Andrew's interference in Stone's command. Governor Andrew had learned that the 20th MA had found two runaway slaves and that Lt. Col. Francis Palfrey, in obedience to standing orders regarding such fugitives, had returned the slaves to their Maryland owner. Andrew, a firm abolitionist, rebuked Colonel William Lee, the commander of the 20th MA regiment. When Stone learned of the rebuke, he wasted no time in firing off a heated letter telling the Governor to stay out of Army business. Andrew, in a rage, gave the letter to Republican Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, who quickly denounced Stone on the floor of the Senate.

General Stone then fired off a blistering letter to Sumner. This was placed by Sumner before Lincoln. Stone's letter went as follows: "Please accept my thanks for your speech in which you used my name. There can hardly be better proof that a soldier in the field is faithfully performing his duty, than the fact that while he is receiving the shot of the public enemy in front, he is at the same time receiving the retuperation of a well known coward from a safe distance in the rear." The support given to Stone by the President was mild and failed to sway the Radical Republicans. To them, Stone represented everything that was wrong with the war up to this point. He was a professional soldier, unhappy with civilian interference in military matters, a Democrat, who opposed abolition of slavery, and a blunderer who had consigned hundreds of men including their esteemed colleague, Senator Baker, to capture and death. They wanted his head.

Representative Roscoe Conkling of New York introduced a resolution on December 2 asking for the Secretary of War to provide information on the responsibility for the defeat at Ball's Bluff; the resolution quickly snowballed into a committee to investigate other disasters, and finally, into a permanent panel to investigate military operations in general. Dubbed the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, the panel consisted of three Senators and four Representatives. The dominating members of the committee were the Radical Republicans, Senator Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, the chairman, and Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, who authored the final resolution for the makeup of the committee. These two names alone came to strike as much fear in a Yankee general as any brigade of Rebels in a battle formation. The remaining members were Senator Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and Representatives D. W. Gooch of Massachusetts, John Covode of Pennsylvania, George W. Julian of Indiana, and M. F. Odell of New York. Their first report of the Committee would be submitted on April 6, 1863.

Benjamin Wade

Hearings began on December 27, and lasted until January 5. General Stone was the last to testify. A second series started on January 9. In all the Committee interviewed 23 individuals. Of that number 19 were not even in the battle. One witness was Lt. Young, Baker's aid. Another witness was Colonel George W. B. Tompkins who was under arrest at the time charged with "misbehavior before the enemy" at the Battle of Bull Run. General Stone was never allowed to see the testimony or know who the witnesses were or cross examine them. The second series of sessions centered on the question of his loyalty. This was based on allegations of communications with the enemy. Wade and the committee seized on the allegations even though many were blatant lies from disgruntled subordinates. Some of Stone's officers alleged that just before Ball's Bluff a mysterious conference with Confederate officers was held under a flag of truce and that messages from Confederate officers crossed the Upper Potomac in Stone's sector.

During the hearings, the testimony centered on a few areas. The first was the contact between Brigadier General Stone and the Confederates during the months of November and December. Numerous exchanges of packages were made. According to Colonel Devens, Lt. Howe and General Stone the reason for all the exchanges was to send money and supplies to the wounded and captured from Ball's Bluff. General Stone said he knew that the Confederates were not prepared to care for the number of wounded that had been left on the field. Unfortunately, many witnesses testified to additional contact between General Stone and the secessionists in the area. Major J. J. Dimmick stated "It is a standing joke among us that this is a very civil war" when he was asked to related his knowledge of Stone's communications with the Rebels. General Stone was accused of being too well liked by the secessionists of Maryland.

Transportation was blamed as the primary cause of the disaster. Brigadier General Stone contended that it was Colonel Baker's responsibility to insure that adequate means of transporting his force was available. The boats used were not properly operated because no boat crews were ever assigned. The cross t~nd especially the retreat was carried on in a random and haphazard manner. Also Colonel Baker insisted on transporting 3 guns to the top of the bluff that were essentially useless, since they were fired no more than times. General Stone was of the opinion that Colonel Baker could have had 3,000 additional troops across the river and in position by 2:00 PM if he had not transported the cannon. Lt. Young agreed that the problem at Ball's Bluff was transportation, but he blamed General Stone for not providing an adequate number of boats. According to Captain C. M. Merritt of the 19th Mass., a bridge should have been placed across the river either the day before or on the morning of the 21st. It was his opinion that this could have been accomplished in two or three hours. This is probably correct; however, there were no pontoons available in the area. Further, testimony from General Stone, given after his release in July, 1862 revealed that there were no materials available to build a bridge in the time frame allocated for the operation.

The next area that was covered heavily in the testimony was whether the units at Ball's Bluff could have been reinforced from the troops at Edwards Ferry. The major point in the testimony centered around the existence of a Rebel battery in the area between Ball's Bluff and Edwards Ferry and if General Stone should have either bombarded it into submission or captured it. Several witnesses including Brig. General F. W. Landers, who was in Washington, D.C. on October 21st, felt that there was no obstacle and that support could have been sent as early as 10:00 AM to arrive at Ball's Bluff at 11:30. However, at this time the only fighting at Ball's Bluff was the initial skirmishing and Colonel Devens had the situation under control. Testimony provided by many witnesses was definitely in error. Later knowledge shows that Confederate Col. Shanks Evans was prepared to stop any advance from Edwards Ferry. There was a battery as General Stone asserted and based on the testimony from reliable artillery officers, of which General Stone was one, the battery was not in a position to be materially harmed from the Union artillery position of the Maryland shore at Edwards Ferry.

Another area of contention was the orders provided by General Stone to Colonel Baker. According to Captain Francis G. Young, who was a quartermaster in the California Regiment and serving as Colonel Baker's aide, General Stone had provided Colonel Baker with direct orders to cross the Potomac at Harrison's Island and to attack the Confederates at Leesburg. He further stated that Colonel Baker was only given command of the troops on the Virginia side of the river, even though there were 7,500 soldiers in sight of Ball's Bluff. Captain Young went on to say that Colonel Baker was told that he would receive 5,000 reinforcements from General Gorman at Edwards Ferry. Finally, the enemy that Colonel Baker was to attack was 4,000 - 5,000 strong. The order that Captain Young claimed that Colonel Baker received from General Stone was never produced in the Committee Hearings. In further testimony Captain Young added that General Stone was not regarded as a loyal man and that he was very popular with all the secessionists in Maryland. Based on testimony from Colonel Devens, by 11:30 AM on the 21st only 625 soldiers and 28 officers were on the Virginia side of the river. Colonel Baker failed to reach Ball's Bluff until 2:15 PM because he became involved with providing transportation for the California Regiment. Now, if Colonel Baker, who received his orders at approximately 9:00 AM that morning, was only in command of the forces physically on the Virginia side1 why would he spend the first few hours at Harrison's Island supervising another command? General Stone testified that Colonel Baker received discretionary orders for the operations at Ball's Bluff and his official correspondence concurs.

Major General George McClellan provided some testimony at the hearing in which he failed to provide any support for General Stone. McClellan basically said that he never ordered General Stone to cross the river, even though, he continually urged Stone to capture Leesburg. How do you accomplish one without the other?

My conclusion from reading the curious testimony is that witnesses were selected only to provide sufficient evidence to incriminate General Stone or at least confuse the issue. Of those that were actually at Ball's Bluff: Colonel Devens Colonel Lee, and Lt. Howe, they all felt that Colonel Baker had been given sufficient latitude and forces to carry out his orders and that he alone was responsible for the disaster.

At first, McClellan staunchly defended his subordinate. He even rescinded the first arrest order when it arrived from the newly appointed Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton on January 31, 1862. But soon afterward a black refugee from the Leesburg area entered Union lines. He told a tale that seemed to corroborate the earlier stories concerning communications with the enemy.

Brigadier General Charles P. Stone was arrested on orders from Maj. Gen. McClellan on the morning of February 9. He was confined at Forts Lafayette and Hamilton in New York harbor. He was held for 189 days. No formal charges were even filed. He became a casualty of Ball's Bluff just as if he had fallen there. It is interesting to note that in the arrest order sent to Provost Marshal Brig. Gen. Andrew Porter on February 8, 1862, the phrase to await trial was crossed out.

Ben Wade and his colleagues were out to make this fight a war to the knife, and General Stone was their warning to anyone who might think otherwise. The arrest of Stone had the opposite effect from that desired by the Committee on Gen. McClellan. Instead of bowing to the wishes of the Radical Republicans for a more vigorous pursuit of the war, George became even more cautious. As we already have seen General Winfield Scott was a casualty since this was the final straw that spelled the end of his active career. Other outcomes of the battle were a poem written by Herman Melville simply titled "Ball's Bluff". The battle was the inspiration for the song "The Vacant Chair". President Lincoln's son Willie even entered the poetic circle with his version of the bravery of Colonel Baker. His poem which he sent to the editor of the National Republican goes as follows:

There was no patriot like Baker
So noble and so true;
He fell as a soldier in the field,
His face to the sky of blue.

After being released in July, 1862, General Stone again testified before the Committee. When asked why he had failed to provide more detailed answers concerning the incidents at Ball's Bluff and his actions after the battle, he stated that he was never questioned regarding the matters of the bridge, transportation, and the excess correspondence with the Confederates at the original hearing. The Committee never allowed him to know who testified and concerning what subjects. Now, for my opinion, the blame for the disaster at Ball's Bluff was placed on the wrong shoulders. General Charles Stone can hardly be praised for his actions, since he did make too many errors in his handling of the operation. He by no means was responsible. Colonel Baker had been provided with appropriate instructions Had he followed them or in this case, even attempted to follow the intent of his instructions, disaster could have been averted. Colonel Baker made incompetent and numerous mistakes from his enthusiasm for the cause, especially in not utilizing the experience of his subordinates. With a little attention to the advice of Colonel Cogswell, the situation may have been different. There is no way to absolve Ned Baker of his responsibility for the disaster.

Major General George McClellan has been able to sidestep the responsibility. But he never assigned an overall commander for the operation. Major General Nathaniel P. Banks was to provide support for Stone; however, being the junior, Stone could not dictate his wishes. There was never any coordination between General McCall's operation and Stone's demonstration. This should have been McClellan's job. He ordered the demonstration and then failed to inform General Stone of the order recalling General McCall. He then even ordered Stone to take Leesburg. However, due to one of the many communications glitches General Stone could never decipher the order.

Later in the war we would see better generalship displayed. Robert E. Lee was once described as being able to get inside the head of his opponent and discern his intentions. U. S. Grant decided on a plan of action and then carried it out to completion with the firm resolve of a man who would not be stopped. However, we do not see these qualities in George McClellan. Had he considered the makeup of Shanks Evans, he would have known that a slight demonstration would not move him. At Manassass, Evans had thrown his undersized brigade in the face of the Union flanking column hoping to buy time for the rest of the Confederates to respond even though a heavy demonstration was occurring in his front at the Stone Bridge. Therefore, if McClellan wanted to occupy Leesburg, he should have organized a suitable force with proper command and made sure there was no doubt has to his intent. He certainly had sufficient forces in the area.

So you see, there are several excellent candidates available to shoulder the blame and certainly enough to go around. This battle was blown completely out of proportion to its real significance. Certainly mistakes were made that could and should have been prevented, especially with the number of inexperienced officers that were allowed to have command responsibility. Whose fault was this? The blame for the general level of training and the appointment of these incompetent officers lies with the very people most involved with adjudicating blame, Congress. Who was pressuring McClellan to step of the tempo of operations? Here would have been the perfect opportunity for George to prove his point; that the Army of the Potomac was not ready for active operations and that officers need to have experience prior to assignment to field commands. General Stone a professional soldiers who had proved his loyalty in the early days of the Administration when Washington was extremely vulnerable, became the scapegoat for the Radical Republicans to prove that they were going to dominate the military during the war for their own purpose. Here is where the real blame for the failure at Ball's Bluff belongs. In fact, one of their own, Colonel/Senator Baker represented their interests as well as could be expected.

Some final points of interest concerning the battle. Ball's Bluff may have been the first battle in which blacks took up arms and fought. One free black, Lewis A. Bell of Washington D.C., was serving as Colonel Cogswell's orderly,took part in the action. On the Confederate side, one of Eppa Hunton's 8th Va.'s "brave boys" included a 19-year old girl. Or so claims Loreta Janita Valezquez. According to her story, she was born in Havanna, Cuba in 1842 and the age of l3 married a U. S. Army officer. When the war broke out she convinced her husband to resign his commission and fight for the Rebs. Since she had always been fond of dressing like a man, she tried to persuade her husband to let her go to war as one of his men When he refused, she claims to have disguised herself as a Confederate officer, recruited 235 men in Arkansas and marched them to Pensacola where she turned them over to her husband. Shortly thereafter he died accidentally In June, 1861, dressed as Lt. Harry T. Buford, she acquired a slave named "Bob" in Alabama and made her way to Virginia where she took part in the battle of First Manassas. She was so thrilled by the experience of combat that she moved to Leesburg and tried to join with Colonel Evans forces. He refused. However, during the battle of Ball's Bluff, she claims to have taken charge of a company of the 8th Va. which had lost all of its officers. She further adds the her slave, Bob, acquired a musket and took part in the fighting. Loreta Valezquez even went so far as to discribe her feelings (perhaps imagined) as she watched the men being shot in the water during the Federal retreat.

For those of you that have not been there, the site of the battle can still be seen. There is a historical marker along Route 15 north of Leesburg which directs you to the bluff. A narrow road leads you through a heavily wooded area to a small clearing. There you will find a low wall surrounding twenty-five headstones. This is the smallest of all the national cemeteries. Only one records a name. This grave belongs to Private James Allen, a 22-year old shoemaker from Northhampton, Ma., a member of the 15th Ma. In a grassy area outside the walls of the cemetery stands a memorial to a Southern color bearer who fell in battle and a stone that supposedly marks the spot were Colonel Baker was killed. Except for these and the additional growth of trees, the battlefield is much like it was in 1861. You can follow a path to the top of the bluff and seen Harrison's Island and the Maryland shore. I found it a very pleasant spot to rest and reflect, but a very terrible choice to fight a battle.