Robert E. Lee

With his replacement as Commander of the Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside was reassigned to command of his old unit - the 9th Corps. This corps had recently been transferred from the camps on the Rappahannock to Newport News, VA. The movement of the Corps transpired between February 6 and 10.

General Lee first received reports that the Union Ninth Corps was on transports steaming down the Potomac River on February 14. While Lee was not certain of their destination, he believed that it would be one of three locations: Charleston, SC, Wilmington, NC or southern Virginia. If the destination was southeastern Virginia, the objective might be Richmond or the railroad leading to it from the south. Lee issued orders the next day for Major General George E. Pickett's division to start for the Rebel capital at Richmond. Additional intelligence indicated the Federal troops were headed for the Peninsula, east of Richmond, so Lee, on February 17, directed Major General John Bell Hood and his division to follow Pickett. Finally, when further information placed more Federal units moving, the commanding general assigned Lieutenant General James Longstreet to personally take command of his two First Corps divisions. (5)

James Longstreet

A brief look at the overall period of operations is warranted before discussing any of the controversies. With the transfer of Pickett's and Hood's divisions to the vicinity of Richmond and growing intelligence that additional Federal forces were on the move, General Lee assigned Lt. Gen. Longstreet to command the two detached First Corps divisions. Longstreet and his staff departed their camp along the Rappahannock on February 19. With orders to place Pickett south of the James River to protect the Petersburg area and Hood near the Chickahominy, Longstreet was also informed that he must retain them along the railroad in order to speed their return to the Army of the Northern Virginia should Hooker take the offensive. (6)

On February 25, the scope of Longstreet's responsibility was increased as he was assigned to command the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. The department's previous commander, Major General G. W. Smith, had just resigned the post and Longstreet was conveniently available. This department was comprised of the Department of Richmond commanded by Major General Arnold Elzey, the Department of South Virginia under Major General Samuel G. French, and the Department of North Carolina assigned to Major General Daniel Harvey Hill. Also within the Department of North Carolina was the Department of Wilmington under Brigadier General W. H. C. Whiting. This was not the most congenial group of officers. (7) Initially, Longstreet was assigned two missions. The first was to protect Richmond. This mission was a high priority with President Davis. The relocation of Pickett and Hood basically accomplished this mission, especially when the Union Ninth Corps was transferred to the west, reducing the threat. The second mission, of significant importance to General Lee, was to keep the two divisions near the railroad. Thus being prepared to return to Lee quickly if an emergency arose on the line of the Rappahannock. The trip south from Fredericksburg had taken Hood's division six days of hard marching through the Virginia mud. Hopefully, if the anticipated emergency arose, adequate railroad assets would be available to speed the return journey. On March 16, General Lee wrote Longstreet:

From the present indications it is fair to presume that we shall be called upon to engage him [the Federals] first on the Rappahannock, and I desire you to be prepared for this movement, and make endeavors to keep yourself advised of the disposition and preparation of the enemy on your front for moving the troops recently detached from the First Corps, or such of them or others as may be necessary in that direction. As our numbers will not admit of our meeting him on equality everywhere we must endeavor, by judicious dispositions, to be enabled to make our troops available in any quarter where they may be needed, after the emergency passes in one place to transfer them to any other point that may be threatened. Please let me hear from you on this subject. (8)

John Bell Hood

However, this idea of the supply gathering was not new. Initially, Secretary of War James A. Seddon pushed this plan. He got the idea from Maj. Gen. French, who had been conducting small-scale raids into the Union held territory in southeastern Virginia since the fall of 1862. So now Longstreet had a third mission. (11)

A fourth mission was quickly added. Since Longstreet was in the area, why not capture the garrisons of Union troops in eastern North Carolina and southeastern Virginia? These would be the Federal forces located at Washington, NC, New Berne, NC, and Suffolk, VA. In a message sent on March 5 to Longstreet via Arnold Elzey, Secretary of War Seddon recommended, that "a close reconnaissance (be) made of Suffolk with the view of attacking and carrying it, if you think it advisable and it can be done with advantage." Thus, James A. Seddon, not Longstreet, Lee or Davis, was the father, as it were, of the Suffolk campaign. (12)

D.H. Hill

In a letter to General Lee dated March 21, Longstreet reported that an abundance of supplies were available but that he required an additional division to help secure the supplies. (14) Also Longstreet expressed the desire to meet with Lee prior of any move. Longstreet was to guide operations around Suffolk using Hood's division, the three remaining brigades of Pickett's division and two brigades commanded by Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins. On March 27th, as part of his proposed plan of operation, Longstreet asked General Lee to assist in obtaining the support of the Confederate Navy. In particular, he desired the ironclad CSS Richmond move to the mouth of the Nansemond River opposite Newport News, VA to protect his flank and to prevent reinforcements from reaching Suffolk. Lee agreed to this request but informed Longstreet not to expect cooperation from the Navy. (15)

The Suffolk campaign began on April 9. Lt. Gen. Longstreet quickly decided that the capture of the garrison was not worth the effort but a siege at Suffolk would free the surrounding counties of Union troops allowing for the gathering of commissary and quartermaster supplies. This supply gathering operation was highly successful. (16) On April 18th, Secretary Seddon notified Longstreet: "I regret not having been able to receive the co-operation of the Navy, but the President has not deemed it wise not to open the obstructions without fuller information as to the effect on the remaining obstructions, and the consequences that might ensue in case of sudden attack. The subject was still under investigation by the engineers, and their report was awaited before a final decision. The main object of your expedition is, I am happy to believe, being fully accomplished". (17)

John J. Peck

Peck moved the majority of his infantry to defend his southern front. The river flank is left to the Navy gunboats to protect. Picket assaults the Federal position on both the 12th and 13th but determines that the fortifications are too strong. The fighting centers for control of the Brothers House. The Federals tried to burn the house on several occasions but failed. The house remained standing for the rest of the siege. Longstreet estimates that he could reduce the garrison in 2 to 3 days but doubted if he could afford the expenditure of powder and ball. A massed assault would also be at a cost of 3,000 to 5,000 casualties.

In the early morning hours of April 11, Union Brig. Gen. Michael Corcoran killed LT COL Edgar Kimball of the 9th NY (Hawkins Zouaves). Kimball, who was on his way to report to Gen. Peck, joined a picket in demanding the countersign from a group of horsemen. General Corcoran and his staff were in a hurry and refused to give the countersign. Kimball, who probably had been drinking, drew his sword and placing his hand on his pistol approached the horsemen. Gen. Corcoran fired. A court of inquiry was held on May 7 and exonerated Corcoran stating he fired in self-defense.

On the morning of April 13, Hood's men opened fire of the gunboat Stepping Stones. The rebels quickly learned that the gunboats were capable of accurate firing at over 2 miles and that you didn't fire at one without adequate protection. General Hood, after the encounter with the gunboat, went to the camp of the 4th Texas to speak with Colonel John Key. Noting one of the characters in the regiment, Bill Calhoun standing nearby, Hood winked at Key and in a loud tone said, "Detail an officer and twenty-five of your men, Colonel, and have them report to me at my headquarters within the hour. I have my heart on securing possession of one of those gunboats on the Nansemond, and I feel sure that many men can easily capture it." Bill heard the challenge, stepped forward, touched his hat in salute, looked Hood straight in the eye and said, "Now look here, General Hood, eff you've got to have a gunboat, speak up like a man an' say so, an' the 4th Texas will buy you one. But it ain't goin' ter go foolin' roun' any o' them big boats down on the river, fur they say the durn things are loaded. Besides, hit'll take swimmin' ter get at 'em , and there's mighty few of us kin do it."

However, all did not go well for the gunboats especially on the upper Nansemond. The Mount Washington and the Stepping Stones ran aground about one mile below Norfleet's Point on the night of the 13th. On the morning of the 14th, the boats floated free but on the trip up river a Confederate battery opened on the boats. The Mount Washington was hit in the starboard boiler and was run into the riverbank. The Stepping Stones managed to tow her free and they headed back down the river. Around 11:30 AM, the Mount Washington ran aground on the sand bar at Hill's Point. The rebels opened fire from the Hill's Point battery and proceeded to pound the Mount Washington until 6:00PM when the Stepping Stones was able to drag it off the sand bar to safety.

John Getty

In the aftermath of the capture, Captains Terrell and Cussons of General Law's staff reported that Col. John Connally and the 55th NC were responsible for the loss of the fort. Col. Connaly and the officers of the 55th challenged Terrell and Cussons to a duel. Terrell chose shotguns at 40 paces while Capt. Cussons chose Mississippi rifles also at 40 paces. The two duels took place 150 yards apart, with Major Belo of the 55th and Capt. Cussons starting first. The first rounds were fired. Major Belo was unhurt. Capt. Cussons was left standing with a large hole in his hat. Belo was not satisfied. The rifles were reloaded and a second round was fired. This time Belo missed, but Cussons managed to put a gash in Major Belo's neck. Belo was still not satisfied. The rifles were reloaded. But before the third rounds were fired word was received that Connally and Terrell had settled their differences.

From April 11 to April 19, there had been skirmishing every day or more and on the 13th, 14th , 15th and 17th on two or more front simultaneously. After the 19th, however, until May 3 only 5 small actions occurred. At Chuckatuk on April 22, the southern front on the 24th, along the river on the 27th and again on the 30th. Finally on the western front on May 1. Every skirmish was initiated by the Federals a reversal of the roles prior to the 19th.

Major General Henry Halleck visited Suffolk on April 21-22 to encourage the troops and to supply reinforcements. Secretary of State Seward visited on April 29-30 to boost cooperation between the Navy and the Army.

George E. Pickett

The one mishap that did occurred during the siege at Suffolk happened on April 19, when Union forces crossed the Nansemond River and captured Fort Huger along with Stribling's battery and 130 men. A confused Confederate chain of command contributed to the problem along with a failure to carry out orders. Maj. Gen. French received the brunt of the criticism for the incident. (18)

On April 29, Lee telegraphed Richmond requesting the return of Hood and Pickett in response to Union Maj. Gen. Hooker's advance, a movement that began on April 27. This message was relayed to Longstreet on the 30th. The orders to return to Lee were modified on May 1 to state that Longstreet was to transfer Hood and Pickett to the line on the Rappahannock without incurring the loss of the supply trains or unnecessary hazard to the troops. (19)

Lt. Gen. Longstreet lifted the siege of Suffolk on May 3. Longstreet's soldiers marched to the nearest location at Franklin, VA to board trains for Richmond and Petersburg on May 6. Hood and Pickett did not reach Lee in time to participate in the battle of Chancellorsville.

During his return to the line of the Rappahannock, Longstreet stopped in Richmond for a visit with Secretary of War Seddon. Among the topics discussed was Confederate grand strategy. The issue of the crisis in the Western Theater was mentioned. Seddon suggested that Longstreet could take a portion of Lee's army and unite with General Joseph E. Johnston to relieve Vicksburg. Instead, Longstreet proposed that he reinforce Bragg and attack Maj. Gen. William Stark Rosecrans. With the hope of eventually moving north to the Ohio River. This would hopefully cause Grant to lessen his hold on Pemberton at Vicksburg in order to support Rosecrans. Both Seddon and Longstreet agreed that the problem would be getting General Lee to part with any portion of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee had his own plan for relieving Vicksburg by advancing north of the Potomac. This is the plan that Longstreet agreed to support after his discussion with Lee. (20)

The controversies concerning the Suffolk campaign did not surface until after the war. Most contemporary writings and even most post-war accounts written by participants tended to overlook the Suffolk campaign entirely. Historians like Douglas S. Freeman, H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad, Emory Thomas and Thomas W. Cutrer were the primary instigators of any controversy.

In approaching the many controversies, we first need to address the issues of command. Did Longstreet have a separate or an independent command? His initial orders from General Lee issued on February 18, 1863 were to join his two divisions, and position them to defend Richmond and report to the Secretary of War. One sentence in his orders might arouse expectations; "should the movement of the enemy from the Potomac render it expedient your other Divisions will be ordered to join you."(21) Here is where the idea of an independent command may have had its roots. On February 25, Longstreet was appointed to command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. The question may be asked was separate to be synonymous with independent? Longstreet was always subject to Lee orders. However, during March of 1863 Longstreet was not exactly sure, since Lee initially told him to report to the War Department. On April 1, 1863 the dilemma was solved as the War Department stated that Longstreet's command was under the supervision and general direction of General Lee. (22) Therefore, Longstreet was never independent of Lee; at best, his command was separate. However, Lt. Gen. Longstreet, even in his capacity as Department Commander, obtained guidance and affirmation from General Lee prior to any action. According William Garrett Piston, "The blurred lines of authority and responsibility with which he had to contend did not make his task any easier. Although still subordinate to Lee, Longstreet was ordered to report directly to the War Department. The limits of his authority were unclear, for his department was actually three separate ones". (23)

E.P. Alexander

Many writers jump on the idea that Lee preferred to camp near Longstreet and not Jackson because Longstreet was such a poor independent commander. Lee had to be near at hand to prod him into action. If Suffolk was Longstreet's first independent command, then how did anyone know his capabilities prior to May 1863? I believe that Lee chose to camp near Longstreet because he was a more congenial associate than Jackson was. This certainly was the general impression of Longstreet in the pre-war army. It has been well documented that Jackson could be a rather somber and strange individual. The only officer who could comfortably associate with Jackson seemed to be JEB Stuart. Longstreet's command also represented the bulk of Lee's army, thus providing another reason for Lee to keep his headquarters closer to Longstreet. As for prodding Longstreet into action, this was never a problem before. Longstreet had shown he was a fighter at First Manassas, Williamsburg, Seven Pines and the Seven Days. He would have fought more at First Manassas but was restrained by the Confederate command of Johnston and Beauregard. Longstreet was prepared to attack the Federals during the retreat at Centerville.

The next question to be addressed is what mission or missions were actually assigned to Longstreet and who was the driving force behind each mission. Again, controversy has developed around this question. The easiest one to address is the first mission assigned. In a message from General Lee to Secretary of War Seddon on February 14, 1863, "I have directed General Pickett's division to march tomorrow for Richmond and Gen. Hood's division to be held in readiness - based on reports of the movements of the Federal Ninth Corps to Suffolk." (26) Longstreet's orders from Lee followed on February 18th. The transfer of a portion of the Federal Army of the Potomac to Hampton Roads has rendered it necessary to move two divisions of your corps towards James River. I desire you to join them and place them in position where their comfort will be secured and whence they can be readily moved to resist an advance upon Richmond by the enemy from his new base. It is reported that he has been largely re-enforced at Suffolk. It will therefore be prudent for you to change the present order for General Pickett to halt on the Chickahominy, and to let him proceed to Falling Creek, on the south side of James River, or to some better point; from which you can readily defend Petersburg, & c. So Longstreet's first mission was the defense of Richmond. For this mission, President Jefferson Davis was the primary driver. (27) This mission was accomplished by positioning Pickett and Hood in the vicinity. In the words of John B. Jones written in his diary concerning Longstreet's assignment to command, "Richmond is safe." (28)

Longstreet's next mission came as a response to General Lee's desires. Lee instructed Longstreet to keep Hood and Pickett close enough to the railroad for their quick return, in an emergency, to the battlefront of the Army of Northern Virginia. The mission is reiterated in a message from Lee to Longstreet on March 16, 1863, "From the present indications it is fair to presume that we shall be called upon to engage him first on the Rappahannock, and I desire you to be prepared for this movement, and make endeavors to keep yourself advised of the disposition and preparation of the enemy on your front for moving the troops recently detached from the First Corps, or such of them or others as may be necessary in that direction. As our numbers will not admit of our meeting him on equality everywhere we must endeavor, by judicious dispositions, to be enabled to make our troops available in any quarter where they may be needed, after the emergency passes in one place to transfer them to any other point that may be threatened. Please let me hear from you on this subject". (29)

Moxley Sorrell

Longstreet's fourth mission came from Secretary of War Seddon. In a March 5 dispatch to Longstreet via Maj. Gen. Arnold Elzey, Seddon recommended "a close reconnaissance (be) made of Suffolk with the view of attacking and carrying it, if you think it advisable and it can be done with advantage." Thus, James A. Seddon, not Longstreet, was the instigator of the Suffolk campaign. (33)

A fifth mission is also mentioned at times. This involved preventing the Federal forces in the southeastern Virginia area from reinforcing Hooker and with the additional hope of drawing more troops to the southeastern Virginia and eastern North Carolina area. While no additional forces were withdrawn from Hooker, the Suffolk command was reinforced from other assets in the area. No forces were sent to Hooker from Suffolk, therefore, this mission even though the lowest priority was accomplished. (34)

Was James Longstreet late in returning to the Army of Northern Virginia? As a follow on question if he was late whose responsibility was it? Douglas S. Freeman in his epic biography R. E. Lee refers to Longstreet as being slow, "Longstreet, to be sure, was slow in collecting supplies and failed to take advantage of his opportunities of meeting the Federals on even terms. His stay in southside Virginia did him no credit." (35) Let's look at this statement closely. First, he says Longstreet was slow in collecting supplies. This statement is unsubstantiated. In Longstreet's Chief of Commissary, Major Raphael J. Moses judgment, this operation "accomplished all that had been contemplated. - Enough bacon and grain to feed Lee's soldiers and animals for an estimated two months. When General Lee learned of the amounts he was completely satisfied with the results." Moses only abandoned the collections when Longstreet recalled the wagons.(36) Longstreet on April 10, 1863 informed Secretary Seddon that the supply operation would probably occupy two weeks of time to haul out the subsistence and quartermaster supplies. (37) On April 19, 1863 this estimate was revised "from present appearances we shall be occupied some two weeks longer in drawing off the supplies from the counties east of the Chowan." (38) Concerning the supply operation Lee wrote to Longstreet on April 27, " I am glad to learn by your letter received yesterday by special courier that you are getting everything out of North Carolina as rapidly as possible." (39) This is not the statement of a commander who thinks his subordinate is performing too slowly.

As far as taking advantage of meeting the Federals on even terms. This would be understandable if the Union forces could be drawn away from their defenses at Suffolk. However, the Federals were holding a strong position and were not tempted to move. Standard civil war doctrine called for a two to one advantage when attacking fortified positions. For this reason alone, Longstreet was justified in establishing only a siege position opposite Suffolk. Lee again responded with "as regards your aggressive movement upon Suffolk, you must act according to your good judgment. If a damaging blow could be struck there or elsewhere of course it would be advantageous, but if the place was taken, I doubt whether we could spare a garrison to hold it and storming his works might cost us dear." (40) The capture of Suffolk was not a prize the South could afford. The position was of no direct value.

Some criticism has been laid at Longstreet's feet for his inability to arrive at Chancellorsville with his corps in time to participate in the battle of May 3rd. No critic could expect more than was done. It was beyond human ability for him to have been with Lee at any time during the battle. Longstreet was 130 miles away from Fredericksburg, he was nowhere near the railroad, and as was seen, there were inadequate railroad cars available to transport the troops once they reached Franklin, VA. General Lee who, on May 7th, admitted that he had expressed a wish rather than a hope that one of Longstreet's divisions could have cooperated in the attack supported this view. (41) Lee continued, "I did not intend to express the opinion that you could reach me in time, as I did not think it practicable." (42) Maj. Gen. Hood wrote, "Longstreet, after receiving the order to join General Lee, made every effort to accomplish this great end, but his wagons were, unfortunately out in search of forage, and the march was consequently delayed; for which reason we failed to reach Chancellorsville in time to participate in the battle. (43) Even Hood, who had a great desire to return to Lee as quickly as possible, did not fault Longstreet for his efforts to rejoin Lee.

Louis T. Wigfall

Longstreet was not setting himself up with an independent command. In all instances, he would become part of another command. While Longstreet may have hoped to eventually replace Bragg, there is no indication of this based on his comments. Of course there is nothing wrong with desiring command. In any military organization this should be the goal of all officers.

When analyzing Longstreet's performance during the Suffolk campaign, first you need to have a firm understanding of the criteria used to define success. What exactly was Longstreet expected to accomplish. Yes, the campaign lacked the dramatic battles and great media play the Seven Days or Jackson's Valley campaign produced. There were no great battles with their associate long casualty lists. Longstreet decided early in the campaign that he had neither the numerical advantage required to capture Suffolk nor the support of the Confederate Navy that was required to make the capture of the Federal garrison advantageous.

Longstreet decided that he could still accomplish his mission without capturing Suffolk. At times the best command decision is the decision not to fight, especially when the gain does not justify the lost. The South could ill afford to win battles at any cost. Manpower was too precious to waste on targets of no real strategic value. This was Suffolk. Longstreet's performance has been described as fruitless and ineffective. Historians claim he did little. The gathering of supplies, while hardly a glamorous mission, was required. An army needs to eat in order to function or at least survive. For the Confederacy, survival of the army was everything. There is no glory in the mundane but it is still essential. The quantity of bacon and corn that was accumulated can certainly be described as a fruitful accomplishment. It definitely met the requirements of Longstreet's mission.

Criticism is levied against Longstreet for the way in which he handled his subordinates and that he did little. Again, Longstreet at least did something. While the end result may not have been the most smoothly functioning organization, in the time given, Longstreet at least attempted to make a contribution. He tried to get officers with a history of squabbling to work together. Even Lee had failed in this regard. Longstreet wished to use Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins to command the two brigades from the Department of Southern Virginia that were on the Blackwater River. Unfortunately, Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French was the department commander and he chose to go to the front rather than stay back at his headquarters in Petersburg. Longstreet was not in a position to relieve French of his department. There was no justification to do it and Longstreet did not have the authority. General French cannot be faulted for wanting to be where the action was. In time of war the battlefield is where promotions come quickly. French was trying to enhance his career, an understandable and desirable trait in a career officer. However, Longstreet saw potential in Jenkins and he wished to exploit those qualities of this young officer, especially if there was to be a fight. Also Micah Jenkins was the more experienced combat officer.

While Longstreet had no strong objection to French, it was his desire to use Jenkins. He tried to manage the situation by assigning Sam French, an artillerist, to command of his artillery. However, General French chose not to cooperate. He refused to accept the assignment to serve as Longstreet's Chief of Artillery, only agreeing to provide guidance. French expected to command the brigades from his department. This created a breakdown in the chain of command that resulted in the fall of Fort Huger and the capture of Stribling's battery. Twice Longstreet had ordered French to position the 700 man 55th NC in close support of Stribling's battery. Col. John Kern Connally, an unseasoned officer, kept his regiment a mile in the rear. Gen. French stayed in bed on the 19th due to illness and did not follow up his command to Connally. (45) This was certainly not the first time a subordinate had failed to do his job. If every commander were faulted for the less than satisfactory performance of every subordinate, there would be no commanders. Every officer has had some subordinate fail at some point. The question is how they, the commander, responds to the situation created. In this case Longstreet retained his composure and wisely refrained from ordering a costly counter attack that would only have resulted in the loss of more men and materials. The Federals were not in a position to maintain control of Fort Huger and therefore, retreated back across the river. All the Confederates had to do was wait. Situations like this are where commanders learn their jobs. Longstreet had tried to support a promising young officer. In this case the results were less than desired, but Jenkins did show he possessed the skills that Longstreet had identified.

As for the lack of success at New Berne and Washington, NC, Longstreet again tried to work with the officers he had been given. Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill was certainly a proven fighter; therefore, asking him to lead the assaults was a logical decision. Also the targets in question were located in Hill's department. If Hill, as the on scene commander, determined not to attack because of the tactical situation and the failure of Brig. W. H. C. Whiting to cooperate, Longstreet was not in a position to demand more. Since the primary mission was to contain the Federals in order to gather supplies, Hill still accomplished his portion of the job.

Every ambitious commander desires to produce spectacular results. I'm sure Longstreet was the same. There is nothing wrong with being ambitious. However, for the good of the Confederacy, Longstreet chose to accomplish his mission in a more sedate and mundane manner, but considering the mission assigned, his choice was just as, if not more, effective. That is why the Suffolk campaign received such little attention during the war. Only after the war when historians try to over analyze every action, with the advantage of 20-20 hindsight, has this simple period in Longstreet's career been placed under the microscope. Longstreet's performance should be measured on the same criteria as his contemporaries. Not based on his political views after the war. Longstreet was just ahead of his time in accepting the inevitable. Nor should he be judged on the basis of his poor performance when responding to the post-war criticism of the Lost Cause contingent headed by Jubal Early and William Pendelton. Davis, Seddon, and Lee were satisfied with Longstreet's performance. His assignment was considered successful. Who are we to dispute the judgement of those closest to the scene in 1863?

March 5: Secretary of War James Seddon suggests that Longstreet attack Suffolk " if ... it can be done with advantage." Peck informs Dix that Longstreet is at Petersburg with two of Lee's divisions; first accurate US information about Longstreet's movement.

March 8: Hill begins operation against New Bern.

March 16: Hill, unable to capture New Bern abandons operation.

March 21: Longstreet gets Lee's approval to use Pickett and Hood in campaign against Suffolk.

March 23: Corse's brigade of Pickett's division marches to Ivor Station.

March 27: Longstreet asks Lee to secure naval cooperation for movement against Suffolk.

April 7: US ironclads attack Fort Sumter, S.C., prompting Beauregard to ask Longstreet for reinforcements; Longstreet suggests aborting Suffolk operation to cooperate with Beauregard.

April 8: Seddon insists that Longstreet proceed with Suffolk campaign.

April 10: Peck receives more warnings of imminent CS attack.

April 11: Pickett's division crosses Blackwater at South Quay, Hood's division crosses at Franklin. At 6:00 PM Hood's advance hits Providence Church driving videttes back into Suffolk. Peck blows up the bridge over the Nansemond River at Suffolk.

April 12: US boats from Hampton Roads arrive in Nansemond - the Mount Washington, Cohasset, and Commodore Barney.

April 13: Foster's infantry drives Armistead back 2 miles to original US picket line near Brothers house, which Foster occupies for the rest of the siege. Hood's marksmen fire on US boat Stepping Stones. CS construct gun battery on the river at Norfleet's farm 2 miles below Suffolk.

April 14: CS batteries at Norfleet's and Hill's Point drive three of Lamson's boats from the upper Nansemond and cripple the Mount Washington; US river flank is virtually unprotected until morning of April 16. Dix returns to Suffolk. French arrives from Petersburg and is assigned to command of the CS artillery at Suffolk; he refuses command but accepts role as "advisor" of artillery placement. CS attacks Smith Briggs at anchor; US artillery drives them off. Getty constructs Batteries Morris and Kimball on the upper river across from Norfleet's.

April 16: Stribling's battery takes position inside old Battery Huger at Hill's Point.

April 19: Around sunset, Getty and Lamson with sailors and troops assault and capture Hill's Point and 130 rebels of Stribling's battery. Connally's feeble attempt to rescue Stribling is driven back; Getty reinforces and entrenches Hill's Point throughout the night.

April 20: Longstreet refrains from attacking Battery Huger. Getty and Peck decide to evacuate Battery Huger. Lamson takes his boats out of the upper river, not to return until the morning of April 30.

April 21: Dix and Lee resume paper feud over Navy's role.

April 24: 5,000 troops under Corcoran and Foster recon in force down White Marsh Road, 1,200 under Buehler recon down Somerton Road.

April 27: Lee writes Longstreet of Hooker's activities but gives no specific date for withdrawal from Suffolk.

April 28: Navy Department at request of President Lincoln urges Admiral Lee to cooperate with army on the Nansemond; Admiral Lee agrees and visits lower Nansemond to consult with Cushing and Lamson though he continues his feud with Dix over the Navy's role.

April 29: Lee, finally aware of Hooker's offensive, wires War Department for reinforcements, not mentioning Longstreet specifically at first. Cooper sends detailed message to Longstreet via courier - not telegraph - to return to Lee as soon as possible.

April 30: That evening Longstreet receives Cooper's message.

May 1: Longstreet orders a stop to forage operations in N.C.

May 2: Longstreet orders withdrawal from Suffolk for the evening of May 3.

May 3: At 9:00 AM, Getty's 5,000 infantry cross bridge at foot of Main Street and move down Providence Church Road; drive Law's Alabama troops from first line of trenches; then waits until evening to advance. Incurs highest US casualties of the siege at 70 killed, wounded and missing. Longstreet doe not alter withdrawal timetable. Withdrawal begins at 9:00 PM with last pickets leaving at midnight.

May 4: At noon, after 14 hours of marching, Pickett crosses the Blackwater at South Quay, Hood at Franklin.

Endnotes:

fn (1) Freeman, Douglas Southall, R. E. Lee A Biography, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), II, 494-495; United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (hereinafter referred to as OR) ser. I, Vol. XXI (Washington, D.C.: 1880-1901) 1088.

fn (2) McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1988), 638-639.

fn (3) Alexander, Edward Porter, Military Memoirs of a Confederate A Critical Narrative, (reprinted ed., Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House Inc., 1990), 317.

fn (4) O.R., Vol. XXI, 1110; Freeman, R. E. Lee, II, 492, 494-495.

fn (5) Wert, Jeffery D., General James Longstreet The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier A Biography, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 228-229; Freeman, R. E. Lee, II, 492.

fn (6) Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee's Lieutenants, 3 vols., (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), II, 477.

fn (7) Ibid., 469; O.R., Vol. XVIII, 921.

fn (8) O.R., Vol. XVIII, 921; Cormier, Steven A., The Siege of Suffolk The Forgotten Campaign April 11 - May 4, 1863, (Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, Inc., 1989), 323.

fn (9) Sears, Stephen V., Chancellorsville, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), 94.

fn (10) Gallagher, Gary W. ed., Fighting for the Confederacy The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 190; Wert, Longstreet 231-233; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, II, 477, 493-494, 504-505;Cormier, Siege of Suffolk, a; O.R., Vol. XXV, 2, 697, 725; O.R., Vol. XXI, 1100; Freeman, R. E. Lee, II, 503-504.

fn (11) Cormier, Siege of Suffolk,13-15, 71, 323.

fn (12) Ibid. 16.

fn (13) Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, II, 474, 479; Wert, Longstreet, 231.

fn (14) O.R., Vol. XVIII, 933.

fn (15) Ibid., 942.

fn (16) Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, II, 482.

fn (17) Wert, Longstreet, 234; O.R., Vol. XVIII, 942, 998.

fn (18) Wert, Longstreet, 234; Cormier, Siege of Suffolk, 184; Jones, John B., A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, 2 vols., (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1866 (reprinted Time-Life Books Inc., 1982), I, 298.

fn (19) Wert, Longstreet, 236; O.R., Vol. XVIII, 1029; Cormier, Siege of Suffolk, 251, 292; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, II, 494, Jones, Rebel War Clerk, I, 302; Eckenrode, H. J. and Conrad, Bryan, James Longstreet Lee's War Horse, (reprinted ed. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 166.

fn (20) Piston, William Garrett, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Image in American Society, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1982), 201-202.

fn (21) Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, II, 468.

fn (22) Ibid., 473, 480.

fn (23) Piston, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, 201-202.

fn (24) Thomas, Lee 279-280.

fn (25) Gallagher, Fighting For The Confederacy, 190.

fn (26) O.R., Vol. XVIII, 867.

fn (27) Wert, Longstreet, 231; O.R., Vol. XVIII, 883.

fn (28) Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 263.

fn (29) O.R., Vol. XVIII, 921.

fn (30) Wiley, Bell Irwin, ed., General G. Moxley Sorrel: Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer, (Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1987), 154.

fn (31) Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, II, 477; Wert, Longstreet, 233

fn (32) Eckenrode, Lee's Old War Horse, 153-165.

fn (33) Cormier, The Siege of Suffolk,, 16.

fn (34) Ibid. 323.

fn (35) Freeman, R. E. Lee, II, 499.

fn (36) Wert, Longstreet, 237-238.

fn (37) O.R., Vol. XVIII, 977.

fn (38) Ibid., 1002.

fn (39) Ibid., 1029.

fn (40) Ibid.

fn (41) Sanger, Donald Bridgman, General James Longstreet and the Civil War A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Division of the Social Sciences in the Candidacy for the Degree of Philosophy - Department of History, (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1934), 173.

fn (42) O.R., Vol. XVIII, 1049.

fn (43) Hood, J. B., Advance and Retreat, (Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1985), 153.

fn (44) Piston, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, 218-219.

fn (45) Wert, Longstreet, 236.