New Orleans of 1861 was the largest and greatest city in the south. It fell on April 25, 1862. The question is why? This one is for me to answer and that is what the heart of this presentation is all about. The actual capture of the city was rather anticlimactic. The event that lead directly to the fall of New Orleans was the passage of the two forts down river on the morning of April 24. The forts were approximately 70 miles away. However, the reason New Orleans fell goes much deeper than the mere passage of these forts. The question goes directly to the heart of the two governments, the Union and the Confederacy and the strategic decisions made on the part of both.

Now, since I am not going to present this as a blow by blow telling of the fighting around the forts, I will ask you for your interaction. Who can name the two forts involved in the April 24 action below the city. - The answer is Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

Braxton Bragg

Now it's time to start looking at the various decisions made and the personalities involved in the fall of New Orleans. With Louisiana out of the Union, an army was needed to provide for the defense of the state. Governor Moore selected Colonel Braxton Bragg to lead this new army of Louisiana volunteers. I will not spend time describing Braxton Bragg or his illustrious career. I'll leave that to some hardier soul. Along with the appointment of Bragg, a Creole major was assigned to command the artillery regiment in this new volunteer army. That major was Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard. For your next question, from which position did Beauregard resign prior to returning to Louisiana? - Answer Superintendent at West Point.

Beauregard was a native Louisianan. He had served as chief engineering officer in charge of state defenses since 1850 and worked as the chief engineer on the drainage problem in New Orleans in 1858 and 1860. For the audience "what is the drainage problem in New Orleans? - Answer the city is below sea level and is very quick to flood from the rain and river. Even though he was junior in rank to Bragg in the old army, he refused to serve under the North Carolinian in his home state. So he declined to accept the assignment. Already personalities are impacting the welfare of the city. The question for the audience now is "What was the lowest rank Beauregard held in the Civil War? - Answer Private. With his refusal to serve under Bragg, he humbled himself to enlist as a private in the Orleans Guard. A unit of all blue blooded Creoles. Of course he quickly schemed and used his influence and friends to get a generalship in the newly formed Confederate army.

P.G.T. Beauregard

David E. Twiggs was born in Richmond County, GA in 1790 and was the oldest officer in the US Army to join the South. He fought in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. When Texas seceded from the Union, Twiggs quickly surrendered the entire Department of Texas to the Confederates. This resulted in his dismissal from the US Army effective March 1, 1861. He would serve at New Orleans from May 31 until he requested to be relieved on October 5, 1861. During his tenure in New Orleans, he accomplished nothing.

Stephen R. Mallory

Twiggs had the more complicated job. He had to create an almost non-existent defense for the city. He had two antiquated forts below the city that needed the replacement of the old smooth bore cannon with more modern artillery and of a large caliber plus new defense lines around the city. He spend six months discussing the situation with his lieutenants and as I said before, accomplished nothing. He even had the benefit of a copy of the 20 page document prepared by P. G. T. Beauregard detailing recommendations for improvements to defend the city. Twiggs did nothing with this document because he, like President Davis, Secretary of the Navy Mallory, and three different Secretaries of War firmly believed that any threat to New Orleans would come from the up river. I have given the audience enough rest. Your question now is to Name the three Secretaries of War in the proper order. - Answer - W. H. T. Walker, Judah Benjamin, and George Randolph. Everyone in the chain of command believed that wooden ships could never pass the forts. They continued to hold to this belief after a Union fleet successfully passed the forts defending Port Royal in November, 1861.

Mansfield F. Lovell

For the Confederacy, cooperation and coordination of efforts to defend New Orleans were definitely lacking. Stephen Mallory replaced the aging Commodore Rousseau with the 62 year old Commodore George Hollins on July 31, 1861. Hollins would later be removed for providing too much support for Lovell. The Department of the Navy, as it turned out, was even in competition with itself. Hollins was given the task of continuing Rousseau's efforts to build a navy from scratch. However, on September 1, 1861 Secretary Mallory, without consulting Hollins, signed a contract with Nelson and Asa Tifts of New Orleans to build an ironclad - the Mississippi - to be delivered by December 15. On September 18, he signed a second agreement, again without informing Hollins, with E. C. Murray, also of New Orleans, to build another ironclad - the Louisiana - with a delivery date of January 25, 1862. Details such as shipyard capacity, iron availability, skilled workmen, sources of lumber and any other resources required were never considered. Murray and Tifts would competed with the local economy and Commodore Hollins for these limited resources. Neither Rousseau or Hollins would have any control over these projects. New Orleans did not have the capability to roll iron for the ships armor or manufacture the large caliber cannon required.

Exasperating the problem of resources, a local businessman - John A. Stevenson had raised $100,000 to independently buy and refit the Enoch Train into the ironclad ram, Manassas, to be used as a privateer. The Manassas was referred to locally as the Turtle due to its unusual shape. Hollins did not think the ram was any good but he eventually confiscated it for use by the Navy. With all this competition, Hollins did fairly well in building and outfitting his fleet - which became know as the Mosquito Fleet.

Besides the Navy and the independent efforts to buy or build ships in the New Orleans area, Secretary of War, Judah Benjamin, obtained $1.3 million in funding to purchase 10 streamers for Major General Lovell. In his opinion, the Army needed a Navy. Benjamin thought that the Army should replace the lack of Naval presence in the area. This was at the same time that Secretary of the Navy Mallory was looking for funds for his construction program of the two ironclads. This Army built fleet would be known as the River Defense Fleet and compete for the same limited resources. Lovell tried to get Hollins to take command of the River Defense Fleet after the Mosquito Fleet was ordered North in December of 1861 to defend Island No. 10, but he refused to command Army assets and the civilian commanders, Captains Montgomery, Townsend, and Stevenson of the River Defense Fleet refused to work for the Navy.

Jefferson F. Davis

To help an already deteriorating situation, Secretary of the Navy Mallory replaces the too cooperative Hollins in February, 1862 with Commander John K. Mitchell. He is assigned to the afloat assets which are very few since all the better ships had been sent North to defend Island No. 10 and dispatches Commander William C. Whittle to New Orleans as the Naval Commandant. Whittle interprets his assignment to mean he controls the naval station but not the fleet. Neither Whittle nor Mitchell take any responsibility for the construction of the two ironclads. Did Mallory really intend to split the local command or did he just fail to communicate his wishes properly? Also neither Whittle nor Mitchell go out of their way to cooperate with Lovell. The source of the command problem was not in New Orleans but definitely back in Richmond.

Richard McMurry, author of Two Great Armies, mathematically describes President Davis' knowledge of any location or event in the Confederacy as inversely proportionate to its distance from the center of his desk in Richmond. And in the case of New Orleans, this theory is more than adequately proven.

Gideon Welles

Who can describe the relationship between Porter and Farragut. - Answer - Farragut was Porter's foster brother.

On April 19, 1861, President Lincoln proclaims that the Southern ports are to be blockaded. Secretary of the Navy Welles believes that just closing southern ports would be the better action to take for international relations. However, this subject is out side the scope of this presentation.

Early in the war there is some intrigue between Fox and Porter over the how to provision Fort Sumter at Charleston, SC and Fort Pickens at Pensacola, FL. While Fox was working on the Sumter issue, Porter with the President and Secretary of State Seward were involved in conflicting plans for Fort Pickens. For this reason, there was distrust between the two. Porter and Butler would fight over who should get the recognition for the capture of the Forts Jackson and St. Philip at New Orleans, we'll discuss this issue in more detail later.

David Dixon Porter

In November, Porter takes his ship the USS Powhatan to the Brooklyn Navy Yard for repairs. On November 12, Porter visits with Fox at the Navy Department. Fox is friendly but due to his mistrust refuses to get Porter an interview with Secretary Welles. However, Porter spots two Republican senators from the Naval Affairs Committee, John P. Hale of New Hampshire and James W. Grimes of Iowa. In a discussion with these gentlemen, Porter mentions his proposal for the capture of New Orleans. He is invited to joint their meeting with the Secretary. Here Porter outlines his plan. He envisions a 48 hour bombardment of the Forts by a fleet of schooners mounting 13 inch mortars that will reduce the forts and allow the fleet to pass. Welles, who was already working on plans to capture New Orleans likes Porters idea and they hurry off to see President Lincoln and General McClellan. For the record the idea for the capture of New Orleans is also claimed by Welles and Fox, and Stanton and Butler.

George B. McClellan/font>

Now for the Navy commander of the expedition, Welles described the man needed as having courage, audacity, tact and fearless energy with great self-reliance. Both Porter and Fox would claim credit for recommending David Farragut to command the expedition. However, the decision really belonged to Welles alone. He based his decision on the recommendations of both Fox and Captain Joseph Smith. Fox really wanted the place Porter in charge but knew he was too junior for such an important task. Welles had asked Capt. Smith, a previous superior of Farragut's, for his impression of the man. Smith's response was; "I consider him a bold, impetuous man, of a great deal of courage and energy, but his capabilities and power to command a squadron are a subject to be determined only by trial." While Captain Farragut was only number 38 on the Captain's list, Welles did not hold with seniority as the sole criteria and selected him as the best man available for the expedition. Porter was given the assignment to interview Farragut, first to see if he was firmly committed to the Union, there was still some doubt concerning his southern heritage, and then to feel out his thoughts on possibility of capturing the City of New Orleans. After Farragut's selection, Fox informed Porter of his doubts about Farragut and arranged for Porter to keep him informed of how well Farragut was functioning up to expectations.

David G. Farragut

Your question is to define the relationship between Blair and Fox. - Answer Blair was Fox's brother-in-law.

On January 9, 1862, Farragut is officially assigned to command of the new West Gulf Blockading Squadron extending from western Florida to the Rio Grande. On March 9, Farragut's appointment as Flag Officer is approved by the Senate. The flagship for the expedition was the Hartford, which is anything but a river craft, at 2,900 tons, 225 feet in length and 44-foot beam with a draft of 17' 2". Farragut's initial impression is that the mortar schooners will not work but he agrees to let Porter try out his idea. Otherwise Porter would be left behind.

Back to the Confederate problems. Together, General Lovell and Governor Moore managed to recruit, train and equip more than 30,000 volunteers. However, Lovell is repeatedly ordered to send his resources away as fast as he can develop them, due to the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and then the defeat at Shiloh. By the time Farragut approaches New Orleans on April 25, Lovell will have approximately 3,000 untrained militia available to defend the city.

On February 6, 1862, the Louisiana is launched and Commander John Mitchell is given command. Commander Arthur Sinclair will command the Mississippi when it is finally launched. The Mississippi, which had been promised by December 15, 1861, was still facing construction difficulties. The land on which it was being built, along with the Louisiana, a 4 acre tract belong to Laurent Millaudon, was only on loan until February 1. The 44 foot center shaft for the Mississippi exceeded the forging capabilities of the Tredegar Works. The Gosport Navy Yard had better forging capabilities but its resources were tied up with the refit of the Merrimack. A shaft adequate for use on the Mississippi was located on the burned out hulk of the Glen Cove, a steamer resting on a bank of mud in the James River. Tredegar agreed to salvage the shaft, modify it, and ship it to Tifts. However, work on the shaft was delayed for 3 weeks due to a blacksmith strike in Richmond. Finally, the shaft was shipped on March 26 scheduled to reach New Orleans three weeks later. Machinery for the Mississippi was not delivered until April 25. Four months late. The Mississippi was being completed just in time to be destroyed to prevent the Union from capturing it and failed to contribute anything to New Orleans defense.

Murray's problem with the Louisiana was money to pay for material. Murray and Tifts fought for the limited iron resources. Finally, in the interest of completing at least one of the ironclads, the Tifts agrees to help Murray. The Committee on Public Safety also provided support for Murray by raising $250,000.

In March of 1862, President Davis declared New Orleans to be under martial law. In early March, the raft barricade below Forts Jackson and St. Philip breaks. Lovell appeals to the city to help finance repairs and receives $100,000.

On March 7, Farragut takes his West Gulf Blockade Squadron to the mouth of the Mississippi. March 13, the Hartford crosses the bar. Newly promoted Commander Porter takes his 21 schooners and 7 gunboats across on the 20th. The Mississippi crosses on April 4 and the Pensacola finally on the 8th. Farragut never understood why the Confederates allowed him to bring his heavy ships into the river without some show of resistance.

Commodore Hollins and Commander Whittle had planned to attack Farragut in early April. However, Hollins' Mosquito Fleet was up river near Island No. 10. When he requested permission to move to New Orleans for the attack, Mallory response was to reassign him to the position as President of the Board to Examine Midshipmen in Richmond. Mallory was still convinced that the real threat to New Orleans was Union Flag Officer Foote and the Union river boat fleet at Island No. 10.

Three days after the fall of Island No. 10 on April 11, Mallory orders the Louisiana upriver to meet Foote - she is not ready. Commander Whittle thought she would need 6 weeks to 2 months yet before she would be ready for service. Lovell, in the mean time, wants the two 7 inch guns taken from the Louisiana and placed in Fort Jackson's water Battery. President Davis refused to support Lovell's request because he had given the guns to the Navy. Fortunately, Mallory at least countermanded his order to move the Louisiana which was incapable of moving anyway.

On April 13, Porter begins his bombardment of the forts. After 48 hours of bombardment, Lovell reports to Secretary Randolph that the forts are undamaged. Porter continues his bombardment for another week.

Time for a little geography and a chance to find some use for the handout you were given. Fort Jackson is situated on the west bank of the Mississippi. Fort St. Philip is on the east bank and 700 yards upstream. In 1840, Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard (now Chief Engineer for the Army of the Potomac) had collaborated with Beauregard in rebuilding Fort St. Philip and strengthening Fort Jackson. In January, 1862 he prepared a lengthy narrative describing both forts. Fort Jackson is a bastioned pentagon with fronts of about 110 yards, constructed of brick. The scarp walls are 22 feet high and are surrounded by wet ditches. Jackson mounted 127 guns with 111 bearing on the channel. Fort St. Philip (established originally by the Spaniards) was an irregular quadrilateral shape of 150 by 100 yards. The scarp facing the river is 15 feet high. Twenty heavy guns will bear on the river. Two external water batteries with 22 heavy guns also bear on the river. Both forts had furnaces and 32 pound hot shot which could cause extensive damage to wooden ships.

The Forts are part of the command of Brig. Gen. Johnson Kelly Duncan. Duncan born in York, PA in 1827, graduated from West Point in 1849, and served in Florida against the Seminoles and in the Northwest exploring routes for the Northern Pacific Railroad. He resigned from the Army in 1855 to become the Superintendent of Government Construction in New Orleans and in 1861 was the Chief Engineer of the Board of Public Works for Louisiana. Originally appointed Colonel of Artillery in command of the coast defense in and around New Orleans including Forts Jackson and St. Philip, he was promoted to brigadier on January 7, 1862 at Lovell's request. Duncan will be captured at Fort Jackson and upon release reassigned as Chief of Staff to General Bragg. He would hold this position until his death in front of Knoxville, TN on December 18, 1862.

General Duncan and Commander Mitchell disagree over the placement of the Louisiana. Duncan wants the ship below the barrier near the eastern shore to catch Farragut's ships in the river bend and also to assist in the defense of the raft barricade which Farragut would cut just prior to the Union fleets ascending the river. Mitchell refuses to move and positions the ship above Fort St. Philip. Mitchell also has control of the fire rafts and fails to release the rafts according to Duncan's schedule, making it difficult for the Southern observers to see the Union preparations and harass Farragut's deployment. Not a single raft was sent down river at the appointed time. Therefore, the few sharpshooters assigned to protect the raft barricade not only failed to have the close support of the Louisiana, they were also in the dark because the fire rafts were not released as planned. Mitchell could to create problems with the defense of the river by failing to organize communications between the three Confederate flotillas (the remainder of the Mosquito Fleet, the River Defense Fleet and the Louisiana and her support). When Duncan tried to help, Mitchell refused to listen. According to General Lovell, the Army's rivermen of the River Defense Fleet proved "unable to govern themselves, and unwilling to be governed by others".

Duncan pleaded with Lovell for support; however, when Lovell approached Commander Whittle, he does not consider himself in charge of naval affairs on the water, but agrees to wire Mitchell. Again Mitchell refuses to cooperate.

At 3 AM on April 24 Farragut attacks. By daylight, 14 of the 17 ships have passed the forts.

Time for another question. On board the Mississippi was a young Lieutenant serving as the Executive Officer who would later make a name for himself. On this night, Captain Melancton Smith gave him control of the ship because Captain Smith could not see at night. Who was the 24 year old LT who would make his name in the Philippines during the Spanish American War? - Answer George Dewey the victor at Manila Bay.

On the April 23, Lovell had gone down river but decided to return to the city when he became convinced that the forts could not stop the Union ships. Lovell concludes that New Orleans can not be defended. He wakes Mayor John T. Monroe and the rest of the city council members on the morning of the 24th and informs them of the situation as follows: there are only 3,000 militia available in the city and no heavy guns; and the city's current population of 170,000 could be starved into submission within 3 weeks. Lovell tells the city council that he has decided to leave New Orleans ungarrisoned instead of a military position. This measure hopefully, would prevent the city from being bombarded by the Union fleet.

Martin L. Smith

The Mayor refuses to surrender the city citing that the city is under martial law and the demand would have to be made to General Lovell. The city is never officially surrendered. Farragut is told the city is defenseless and can not stop him from taking control, but also that the city government would not cooperate with him.

Brig. Gen. Duncan holds out for a short period but finally agrees to surrender the forts. His decision to surrender is based on the lose of communications with New Orleans, receiving reports of the investment of the forts by the Union infantry and half of the garrison of Fort Jackson mutinied. Poor morale in the fort, after hearing that New Orleans had fallen contributed to the mutiny. The Navy, under Porter, signs the surrender agreement.

Ben Butler

Porter was also quick to criticize Farragut to the Navy Department for procrastination and indecisiveness. He was furious because Farragut decided to leave him and his mortar flotilla below the forts on the morning of the 24th, while Farragut proceeds to capture the city. After regaining his prospective on the matter, Porter hastily requests Assistant Secretary Fox to delete the offensive and untrue statement from his official report, but, Welles refuses to allow any changes to be made to Porter's remark. Fortunately for Porter, Farragut is either extremely forgiving or never sees the official report, because Farragut never mentions the issue to Porter or takes any actions to undermine Porter's efforts for advancement.

As far as strategies developed by the two governments, the Confederate high command, including Davis and Mallory, believed that the primary threat to New Orleans came from the gunboat flotilla upriver. This was especially true after the fall of Island No. 10. Not until Porter started to bombard the Forts, did the Confederate government even consider another possibility. After the defeat at Shiloh, President Davis forgot all about New Orleans and insisted that all available forces be rushed to Corinth, MI. Actually, Davis was correct up to a point, the original Union strategy was to advance down the Mississippi, that is, until Porter opened a lot of minds in Washington to other available options with his ideas.

Some innovative ideas were developed by Farragut for this project. He had the gun decks on his ships painted white to improve the ability of the gun crews to functions at night. White six-foot tall numbers were painted on the smoke stacks and hulls of the ships for better recognition. He also required garlands of heavy chains be hung over the sides of the ships as armor mail.

There were other repercussions as a result of the fall of the city. Now, Napoleon III refused to recognized the Confederacy without Great Britain taking the initiative. Prior to the fall of New Orleans, he was seriously considering intervention without Great Britain. Two powerful gunboats were lost; the Louisiana and the Mississippi. Attempting to build to build the two ships simultaneously, in the same shipyard, was a huge mistake on the part of the Secretary Mallory. The two ships wasted resources because of their poor design. The Louisiana design had small and inefficient engines planned that would have been a detriment even if they had worked. At best, the Louisiana would have made an adequate floating battery. The Mississippi never came close to being completed on schedule and was lost with the fall of the city. It providing nothing to the defense of the city and was destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Union.

On April 27, 1862, Mary Chestnut wrote in her diary "New Orleans gone and with it the Confederacy. The Mississippi ruins us if lost. The Confederacy has been done to death by the politicians. What wonder we are lost." Writing again on April 30, she adds "Lovell left the women and children to be shelled, and took the army to a safe place. I do not understand why we do not send the women and children to a safe place and let the army stay where the fighting is to be."

Davis claimed that New Orleans fell because General Lovell failed to keep the government in Richmond informed. Davis also stated that he would have taken prompt action had he known, especially when the raft barricade broke. Of course, Davis as always believed that the forts were impregnable and that the barricade was only an added defense. He needed some excuse to blame Lovell for the failure of the Confederate government to take proper measures to defend the city.

On October 17, 1863, a Court of Inquiry delivered to the Secretary of State a report stating as a Report of Facts that the defense of New Orleans would be difficult without a strong naval force. The Opinion of the Court was as follows:

1. As against a land attack by any force the enemy could probably bring, the interior line of fortifications, as adopted and completed by Major-General Lovell, was a sufficient defense of the city of New Orleans, but his ability to hold the line against such an attack was greatly impaired by the withdrawal from him by superior authority of nearly all effective troops.

2. The exterior line, as adopted and improved by him, was well devised, and rendered as strong as the means at his command allowed.

3. Until the iron-clad gunboats Louisiana and Mississippi should be ready for service, it was indispensably necessary to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi river between Forts Jackson and Saint Philip. The raft completed under General Lovell's direction was adequate for the purpose while in position, but it was swept away, and left the river unimpeded, either by reason of some error in its construction or neglect in preventing the accumulation of drift, or because of insuperable mechanical difficulties, as to which this court feels unprepared to give an opinion. General Lovell communicated to the Government no opinion as to the insecurity of the raft nor any apprehension that it might be swept away, nor did he immediately make known that fact when it occurred. In this it is considered the he was remiss in his duty.

4. When the raft was swept away, General Lovell, with great energy, immediately endeavored to replace it, and partially succeeded, but, without fault on his part, this last obstruction was broken by the carelessness of the vessels of the river-defense fleet colliding with it and by fire rafts drifting against it, and by the failure of the guard boats to protect it against night expeditions.

5. Non-completion of the ironclad gunboats Mississippi and Louisiana made it impossible for the Navy to cooperate-operate efficiently with General Lovell.

6. The so-called river defense fleet was wholly useless as a means of resistance to the enemy, for which General Lovell was in nowise responsible.

7. Under the existing circumstances the passage of the forts by the enemy's fleet could not have been prevented by General Lovell with any means under his control, and, the forts being passed, the fall of New Orleans was inevitable and its evacuation a military necessity.

8. When the first raft was broken, and the danger of New Orleans thus became imminent, all necessary all preparations should have been made for removing the public and private property available for military uses, and when the second obstruction was swept away the removal of such property should have commenced immediately. The failure to take these timely steps caused the losses of property that occurred, but there was comparatively little property lost for which General Lovell was responsible.

9. The failure of General Lovell to give proper orders to Brig. Gen. M. L. Smith for the retirement of his command from Chalmette is not sufficiently explained, and is therefore regarded a serious error.

10. The proposition of General Lovell to return to New Orleans with his command was not demanded by his duty as a soldier, involving, as it did, the useless sacrifice of himself and his troops, though it explains itself upon the ground of sympathy for the population and a natural sensitiveness to their reproaches.

11. General Lovell displayed great energy and untiring industry in performing his duties. His conduct was marked by all the coolness and self-possession due to the circumstances and his position, and he evinced a high capacity for command and the clearest foresight in many of his measures for the defense of New Orleans.

The Confederate Navy Department and Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory were also investigated as a result of the fall of New Orleans. Due to some questionable testimony the investigation end up praising Mallory's efforts more than reporting the truth.

In summary, the Confederate effort to defend New Orleans was hampered from the very beginning by a government that had tunnel vision and could not comprehend that the Union was capable of mounting simultaneous attacks. Jefferson Davis tried to vindicate the government by blaming Major General Mansfield Lovell for all their problems. However, he totally failed to acknowledge the fact that he and all his top advisors were blind to any idea that the US Navy would attempt to pass the forts. Firmly believing that the only possible avenue of approach to New Orleans was from the north, the Confederate government drained New Orleans of both troops to man the defenses and the Naval assets to properly defend the river. Both Jefferson Davis and Stephen Mallory were guilty of not delineating adequate lines of command. When Mansfield Lovell correctly asked for a unified command structure for the defense forces, he was refused. Secretary Mallory could not even manage to coordinate the command structure within the Navy as neither Commander Mitchell nor Commander Whittle would cooperate with the other and no arrangement was made to establish a local chain of command. The Army further compounded the problems by creating their own River Defense Fleet which refused to cooperate with either the infantry or the Navy. The Confederate defense of New Orleans was doomed from the start.

The Union on the other hand established a clear idea of the mission at hand and placed the responsibility in the hands of an individual who had the insight and drive to manage everything towards that goal. David Farragut was just the individual needed. He did not let petty differences interfere with his job. The command structure was never in doubt. All members of the Union team established a plan and then removed the obstacles that impeded the attainment of their goal. The real back stabbing was saved until after the fall of New Orleans. The credit for the plan was not an issue in the formative stages or in the actual conduct of the operation. In fact, the final plan was really a merging of the various ideas. A team effort proved to be the real strength of the Union plan. Farragut never lost his focus on the goal and refused to envision failure.

I guess that one final question is in order, during Butler's tenure in New Orleans he issued his infamous order concerning the ladies of the city. The question is what event led to the issuing of the order and who was the prime personality involved? Answer - Farragut had a chamber pot pour on his head.

As an extra bonus just because I'm sure you have all been worrying about this one. Where was the Battle of New Orleans fought? Answer - Chalmette.