The Haunting Mystery of A. P. Hill

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The Haunting Mystery of A.P. Hill

By Warren W. Hassler

October 20, 1988

My topic for tonight is The Haunting Mystery of A.P. Hill. It's a title for discussion and presentation that I borrowed from the late Clifford Dowdy who was sort of my mentor in the early days of writing about the Civil War. He, himself, was a fan of A.P. Hill's. In his review of my book he played out that although the material that was available had been compiled into the book that there's still, and I agree with him 100%, an aura of mystery about this confederate general. Most of you, myself included I think, in general have a very limited knowledge of A.P. Hill. That knowledge is probably confined to the fact that he was on the dying lips of both Lee and Jackson. More recently some of you might remember him because of Bud Robertson's claim that he had venereal disease. I don't know if that's hit Cincinnati or not, but it's created quite a stir in the Civil War community. I'll talk later about that, if we have time. I have some thoughts on it, and I think it's an interesting topic. Of course, the first question is should it be the subject of a biography because of a fellow by the name of Alexander Holmes? Alexander wrote a book on Jackson several years ago in which he cited various sources indicating that young Stonewall had fathered a son, an illegitimate son. The outcry was so great that after several additions he withdrew that page from the book. That's something we can also talk about later on.


A.P. Hill

I think that Clifford Dowdy was voicing the same feeling I had after delving into the various materials available on A.P. Hill. Namely, that he has been neglected despite the fact that he was ranked next to Longstreet and Jackson by Lee as the third ablest general in the Army of Northern Virginia right around the time of Chancellorsville. The problem is that Hill was not deliberately trying to create an aura of mystery about him, he was a very outgoing person, very extraverted. Apparently the diary that he kept was lost, as were his personal records and papers. Some were destroyed in a fire and others were given to autograph seekers and scattered to the winds. I've uncovered one or two A.P. Hill autographed items, but they are extremely scarce. This makes presenting a biography of A.P. Hill a difficult challenge. In contrast to most of the speakers you hear who give you pretty much of a definite comprehensive picture of their subject, I am going to be limited to certain aspects. I make no pretense or profess that this is the definitive biography. I don't think it will ever be written, unless by happenstance there is a trunk full of memorabilia in somebody's attic that may contain some materials of A.P. Hill.

What I want to do tonight in the time I have here is to review a military career, which is very well documented. It has a few enticing and intriguing aspects that I want to go into with you and perhaps you have some opinions that can help clarify some of the more nebulous aspects. Then I want to spend a little bit of time, with your indulgence, in talking about the conclusions I have reached about the persona of A.P. Hill gathered from various fragments that do exist. So, with that, let's start out with a brief review of his military career. I think you're familiar with it as it relates, as does most of the material, to his superiors. He was in the shadow of Jackson, the shadow of Lee, and in the shadow of Longstreet. So the people that reported, reported mainly their observations of the principals and not of A.P. Hill. He became sort of incidental. Here's the story.


George B. McClellan

He was a Virginian, born in Culpepper. He went to West Point where he roomed with George B. McClellan the first two years. At the end of the second year, you'll remember at the academy, they don't go home the first year. They do today. Now, there's an interesting thing that has come out and that's a letter that Hill wrote to his parents at the end of his first year. The letter is very pathetic. Apparently his parents had not written to him the whole year. He is a youngster; he's only about sixteen at the time, I think. They went to the academy earlier in those days. I'm sure he was homesick. He was a very warm person himself, and here he was completely lacking in any token of affection or concern by his parents. I can't understand the parents on this. In going back to West Point from his summer sojourn at Culpepper, he stopped off in New York. That was the custom. Then they would take the boat from there up to West Point. This is where Robertson pieces together parts from the West Point records which indicate that he was put under arrest upon his return to West Point because he had appeared in New York in civilian garb. Robertson feels that with the wide spread prevalence of venereal disease in New York City at that time, that he simply had a boyish fling and contracted gonorrhea. In any case, the records do show that he was quite ill at the academy that fall. In fact it got so bad he had to go back home for an extended stay. The records of the physician in Culpepper referred to his condition as prostititis. I'm not an Urologist so I don't know the technicalities of these things, but I understand that covers a multitude of sins. He did not refer to it, however, as a venereal disease. When he went back he still had problems of irregularity as far as his health was concerned. He couldn't complete his studies for the third year and he graduated a year late. He did however graduate in time to join the Army in Mexico for it's closing engagements.

After the War with Mexico he went to Florida to engage in the relocation of the Seminole Indians to the west. He reported with an illness that probably was a mild case of yellow fever. As a result of his health problems, he requested permission from the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis at the time, to go to Washington. Jefferson Davis complied by getting him appointed to the Coast Survey Office.


Another A.P. Hill

At the outbreak of the war he resigned his commission in the army and was appointed a colonel of the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment. During the first battle of Manassas he was assigned to an inactive area located by the A. & P. Speaking of the Restoration and Preservation Act, much of the battlefield of First Manassas has already been usurped by planning and development. He didn't do anything significant at this battle. He was more or less relegated to a very off-limits type of activity and location for the battle. During the winter and spring of 1862 he rose rapidly within the army to the rank of Major General in charge of the famed Light Division. The Light Division really became his trademark. He put his stamp on it. It was the largest division in the Army of Northern Virginia, about fourteen to fifteen thousand men originally. We don't know the exact origin of the name; there are several possibilities. The most probable one is because of the light accoutrements they carried with them on the march. He was a very fast marcher as a rule.

The next thing that happened is that he was assigned command of the Sixth Brigade in the Light Division together with the artillery of Lindsey Walker. He commenced to serve under Lee in the Seven Days Campaign. He showed remarkable alacrity and remarkable drive, which was lacking in so many of Lee's lieutenants at that time. He also exhibited some problems. The principal one was his impetuosity. At the Battle of Mechanicsville, or Beaver Dam Creek, whichever one you prefer, he was supposed to wait until Jackson coordinated his attack with Porter's Fifth Corp north of the Chickahominy. Jackson was delayed. Even though Lee was only two miles distant, Hill decided on his own to launch an attack. As it turned out it was much more costly than Lee anticipated or planned it to be. Hill redeemed himself at Gaines Mill and Fraser's Farm and then went on to become associated with Jackson. During the Seven Days Campaign the Light Division was attached to Longstreet. Both were divisional commanders but it was simply a device for getting around and circumventing the absence of the Corp unit that was not adopted until after Antietam.


Stonewall Jackson

Lee assigned Hill to Jackson's division, which was at the time out of Orange Court House during the summer following Seven Days. Jackson was getting ready for an encounter with Banks of Polk's Corp, Polk's Army of Virginia actually. The reason that Hill was transferred was also an example of another fault that he had. That fault was that he was supremely proud, which can be a good characteristic, and it had its advantages as far as Hill was concerned. It also had terrible detrimental affects as well. Hill was so hypersensitive to criticism or imagined insults that during the period following the Seven Day's battles considerable friction developed. The press reports, which sided one way or the other with either Longstreet or Hill, gave them the credit for the success of the Seven Days Campaign. Well, the thing got way out of hand and it escalated to the point where reports reached Lee that a dual between Longstreet and Hill was impending. Lee couldn't, of course, afford to lose either one of them. His solution, and it was the only one he had unless he wanted to lose Hill to another theater of the war, was to assign Hill to Jackson. When he did he wrote an interesting note to Jackson in which he said, "A.P. Hill is, I think, a fine officer with whom you can consult." Well, you know Jackson would not take orders to consult. After the infamous last Council of War when he pulled out a Winchester just before the Valley Campaign he stuck to that and of course Dick Garnet was virtually ostracized and never reinstated. What I'm getting at is; this was the atmosphere in which Hill went. As a matter of fact when Hill reached Gordonsville he found there were five court marshals against him involving Jackson and other officers of his staff. As we'll see, there was great friction between them but they did manage in some way to sort of help each other when the battle began. At the Battle of Slaughter's Mountain it was Hill who came to the aid of Jackson. Jackson had not reconnoitered properly and was in trouble with the vanguard of Bank's force when Hill came crashing through in the nick of time and saved the day.

From there we go to Second Manassas the end of August. Here Hill showed for the first time his ability not only to be a good offensive fighter but also a good defensive fighter, particularly the first day. The second day he had the opportunity to exercise his offensive ability.

Then we go from there to Antietam. Antietam was really the zenith of Hill's career. In order to understand the superb drama that was involved there you have to understand that Antietam was really a feud within a fight. Let's go back a moment to the time when Hill joined Jackson. What happened was that in the month between when he joined Jackson, and the time that Lee defeated Pope at Second Manassas, there were a series of episodes that occurred that resulted in charges being brought against Hill. There really was just one charge - neglect of duty and then were seven specifications that Jackson drew up against Hill. They were relatively minor, nothing major, but they were irritating, especially to one of Jackson's punctilious nature. And, so I think in fairness to Jackson, we'll get into more of this later, the principle of blame, when you read the charges, really falls on Hill.

The first charge was really Jackson's fault due to failure to communicate his extreme reticence. And, they appear to be things that I'm sure in today's ambiance could be resolved, and would be resolved very simply by the two simply getting together and talking things over in a friendly manner. What happened related to the days after the Battle of Manassas. Lee's army was heading through Maryland in what culminated in the Battle of Antietam. Jackson found that on this particular day Hill was not riding back and fourth along the column to keep the stragglers together and keep them close up or "press on" as he would say it. Hill was very laxadaisical here. He also was staying ahead of the column a considerable distance and this annoyed Jackson. Jackson had been subjected to little annoyances like these and this was just the straw that broke the camel's back. He galloped up the hill and demanded that he surrender his sword. He put him under arrest and put General Branch, Hill's senior brigadier, in charge of the Light Division. You can imagine Hill, who've I've mentioned was a proud person, striding at the back of the column in humiliation. It would be to anybody but it was particularly that way to him. But, here is the important thing and the interesting thing from a human standpoint. Important though pride was to him, the idea of missing a battle was even greater. It surmounted everything. Somebody said Hill had an unquenchable thirst for combat. And, that was about it. One indication of that you're probably familiar with is the way they spoke of the red shirted Hill. When a battle came he would put on his red coat. The color itself indicates the passion of the bloody conflict etc. After he was reinstated he again put on his red shirt. Incidentally, he had relayed to Jackson through Kyd Douglas, Jackson's aid, that he would present himself to be placed under arrest again after the battle was over.


James J. Archer

Now, what happened was that as Jackson's force went on to Harper's Ferry to reduce it, Lee took the more direct route to Hagerstown until he found that McClellan was on his heels. At this point he began diverting over toward Antietam. Jackson ordered Hill, when they got to Harper's Ferry, to dispose of his troops in such a way that they would be the infantry to close in on the Federal Garrison. After the artillery birrage from Louden Heights, Maryland and beyond Boliver Heights had ceased the two brigades under Archer and Pender advanced to deliver the coup de ta, a white flag was raised. I'm going into such detail on this because what happened next is part of this "haunting mystery" and it's fascinating. Maybe you'll have some ideas of what happened here, why it happened. Jackson, at that time, had three divisions under him. Hill was the only experienced and unquestionably the most skilled of the three. The other two were relatively new, Lawton and Stark. They had replaced Ewell and Winder. Winder had been killed at Cedar Mountain and Ewell had his leg amputated at Brawner's Farm. What would you do in a case like this? Lee summoned Jackson by urgent courier to hurry back to Antietam because he had a very thin force to oppose McClellan's horde, which was gathering for the kill. What did Jackson do? He left A.P. Hill at Harper's Ferry. He took the other two divisions with him. You might say he felt they needed more guidance, but the point is it doesn't take much guidance to go through the formality of accepting surrender. Why did it take a whole division to do this? Why couldn't he have taken Hill's Corp minus a brigade and leave the surrendered details to someone else. This is what Hill did, which we'll see in a moment. He also wrote Lee a very cryptic note. He said that he had received General Lee's order to hurry to Antietam and he would leave that evening. That was the evening of the fifteenth, I think. Then he goes on and he says, "since A.P. Hill's division has borne the brunt of the fighting." Well, there wasn't any fighting to speak of. I don't think there was a single casualty. Remember, in Stonewall's book that was the reason for one colonel being dismissed because one Colonel said he didn't have any casualties. He also said, "I shall also leave General Hill to complete the surrender details unless you advise otherwise." In other words, he didn't want to take the responsibility for leaving Hill there and having Hill absent at a time when Lee needed every available resource. This is not typical of Jackson. This isn't the forthright Jackson that we normally see.

Robertson seems to feel that Jackson was in effect punishing Hill. I don't see it that way for this reason. If he really wanted to punish Hill he didn't have to reinstate him at all. Hill would have been left out in the cold and there wouldn't have been any recourse on the thing. I do think this illustrates the fact that by reinstating him he recognized that Hill was able and he needed him. He was one experienced division commander who had a distinguished recorded to date, etc. He did not want to leave him under arrest. Why not use him to the fullest. What this resulted in was a very bizarre situation on the seventeenth, which was the day of the Battle of Antietam. At 6:30 on that morning Hill received an urgent message from Lee to hurry post haste to the battlefield. Lee desperately needed him. Within an hour Lee had arranged for General Thomas, one of his brigadiers, to take care of the surrender details. He took the other five brigades and hotfooted it to Antietam. It was a seventeen-mile march and it took five hours which is much faster than the normal pace. He arrived on the southern end of the battlefield, which was fortunate, because the battle had been raging from left to right from Lee's vantage point all day. Lee's maneuvering and shifting of troops had managed to stave off a break through all along the line. Now he was down to his last thin line, defended only by General Toombs of Georgia.

The Ninth Corp of Burnside had finally succeeded in crossing Burnside's Bridge and was mounted on the slopes ready and poised to brush aside Toombs and get behind the Northern Army of Virginia and prevent them from escaping across the Potomac. It was truly a do or die situation. When Hill arrived he arrived at the opposite end of the line from where his own commander was. Jackson was at the other end. So, what to do? Fortunately, Lee happened to be there. He had been watching the road anxiously for signs of dust and unfurled flags, etc. When they finally arrived, Hill went up and reported to Lee. Lee very tactfully did not assign him to Longstreet, who was in charge of that sector. In effect Lee became A.P. Hill's boss. He gave him very wide discretion and after consulting with a couple of people, because he realized that time was of the essence, he sent Brockenbrough and Pender's brigades to the lower forge to guard against a surprise attack. Then he unleashed Archer, Branch and Gregg against Rodman's Division of Burnside's Ninth Corp, which was advancing across the famous cornfield toward the rear of Lee's army. Again, very fortunately, his troops began to strike relatively untried Connecticut regiments who were surprised by the fact that Hill's men were wearing blue uniforms that they had captured at Harper's Ferry. So, it's kind of hard having people coming through the corn field apparently being shot by your own men. Hill rolled them back to the Heights overlooking the Potomac and the army was saved. In recognition of Hill's service, Jackson did not re-arrest him. I think this is significant.


Yet A Third A.P. Hill

Secondly, when Lee withdrew to Virginia soil, remember Pendleton forgot to count his number of guns, etc., they had a terrible time because they thought the artillery had been reserve artillery and it had all been captured. They did know that Porter's Fifth Corp was following them and attempting to cross the Potomac. In fact, it already had some people across. All this came back in very anxious information - alarming reports. Jackson immediately called not upon his other two divisional commanders, but upon Hill to go back and drive them off, which he did. This was the high point of his career.

One of Hill's flaws was that he had a tendency (I don't know what got into him or what was responsible for this) but he tended to leave gaps in his line. At Second Manassas he left a gap between Craig and Thomas and the federals poured through. He had to get Pender to restore the line and repair the one hundred and fifty-yard breach that was there. At Fredericksburg there was a six hundred-yard gap that he had left between Archer and Lane in the front line facing a bog. This brings out another factor about Hill at Fredericksburg. The same thing happened in the Wilderness. He tended to be very considerate of his men. Jackson is viewed as being very harsh and intransigent with his men. He put an impossible task before them. His answer to all this, which I recently read, was "it saves lives." What happened at Fredericksburg was related to the December 13th weather. It was a very cold, foggy, clammy night as Hill looked over the situation. There was this bog between Archer and Lane. He decided that it would be virtually inhuman to put his men in there to cover that gap. He didn't think that if it was uncomfortable for his own men it certainly would be so for the enemy if they tried to get through first thing in the morning. But, that's exactly what happened. Meade poured through there. Gregg was shot mortally and it took Gregg's brigade and Early to come up and restore the breach.

Now lets skip over to the next battle which was Chancellorsville. Here, when Jackson was wounded, Hill being in the vicinity went over and very touchingly comforted him. He took his gauntlet and belt off so as to relieve the pressure, and waits on him. He reassured him the surgeon was a good surgeon until his own surgeon, Dr. Homer McGuire, the medical director, could reach him. Then he had to go because the enemy was beginning to resume its firing. He was hit in the calves, and at the moment when he had the supreme opportunity to take over for Jackson he was incapacitated himself.

One thing that again is puzzling about Jackson's relationship with Hill is the fact that Jackson at Chancellorsville, which of course was the zenith of his career, again relegated Hill to, in this case, the third line. You remember there were three lines: Rodes, Colson and Jackson. Now you would think, at least I would think, that you'd want the real hammer blow outfit to be in the front line. It's unfortunate from the confederate viewpoint that it wasn't because Bob Crick has done an excellent job in showing that Colquitt's brigade in the front line really slowed the advance. It's lucky for Colquitt that Jackson didn't survive because Jackson wasn't aware of it at the time, but he would certainly have found out that Colquitt was holding things up. Colquitt, who was on the extreme right, was fearful that he was going to be flanked. He felt there was some force that was getting ready to attack him so he did not move. The rest of the front line under Rodes was stalled because of his inaction for a longer period of time than Jackson liked to have. Again, it raises the question of why did Jackson do that? I've talked with Bob Krick, and he has no answer. He said he never even thought about it. What does it reveal about the relationship? Or, was it just happenstance? Who knows? I don't.

That brings us to Gettysburg. After Chancellorsville Lee reorganized the army into three corps. Hill was placed in charge of the third corp, which included his own old Light Division plus some other brigades and the five brigades of B. H. Anderson from Longstreet's Corp.

At Gettysburg, Hill has taken his wraps along with every other Confederate leader including Lee, especially Lee I guess, for the failure. The usual charge that's leveled against him is the fact that he precipitated a battle which Lee didn't want to have happen, at least until the whole army was up.


Henry Heth

I disagree with that. I think the evidence will support, I hope, what I have to say here. What happened was, of course, that when Lee learned from Harrison, Longstreet's spy, that Hooker had been relieved and the army was on the march northward under Meade, Lee recognized he would have to reorganize his plans and recast them. He did this by calling Ewell back from Carlisle - he was heading toward Harrisburg and Early who had gone pretty far east to Columbia in the vicinity of York. Hill and Longstreet who were at Chambersburg were ordered to proceed east along the Chambersburg Pike toward Gettysburg. On the twenty-ninth Pettigrew, of Heath's brigade, got into the west side of Gettysburg where he heard the sounds of muffled drums on the other side. He very prudently withdrew and reported to Heath, his superior, and to Hill who happened to be with Heath at Cashtown. Hill dismissed any danger up ahead because he had just been with General Lee at Chambersburg. General Lee's information was that the federal army was at Middleburg and had not struck its tents. So, he felt there was no major federal force in the area of Gettysburg. When Pettigrew and Heath asked for permission to proceed from Cashtown towards Gettysburg the next day he said he had absolutely no objection. He must have had some concern, however, because he did not allow Pettigrew to go alone. He sent Heth's whole division forward followed by Pender's division. Anderson happened to be at Fayetteville, which is six miles east of Chambersburg, and he sent word to General Lee to start Anderson as soon as he could.


Robert E. Lee

We all know what happened. Heth's front line encountered Buford's dismounted Calvary and later Reynold's infantry around McPherson's Ridge and were badly repulsed. They did not attack again. Not that time. What he did was reorganize his forces. Archer and Davis had been very badly mauled. In the meantime, Hill came up. He had been ill that day and came over at the sound of the firing. Shortly after that, Lee came.

After the first clash there was no follow-up by either Hill or Heath. What happened was that Heath asked Lee for permission to renew the attack. General Lee said, "No, I don't want to get involved in a large scale engagement. Longstreet is not up." When Rhodes burst through the northern part of the battlefield and attacked, Heath again asked Lee. Lee again refused saying "No, I don't want to bring on a general engagement today." At this point in time Lee did not feel a general engagement had been precipitated. When Early returned, and the attack on the Union forces began gathering momentum, Lee saw an opportunity for a real breakthrough. He told Hill to order Heath to go ahead, which he did. I don't see this as Hill's rashness. They always quote this as being similar to Mechanicsville, and I don't think that was the case. The other thing for which he's criticized regarding the first day is the fact that, as many of them said at the time, if Jackson had been here he would have ordered Anderson's fresh division to take Cemetery Hill where Hancock was rallying the Union forces. That sounds very plausible and to be a legitimate concern. The only thing is that Coddington in his excellent and comprehensive treatise on Gettysburg points out something that I've never seen elsewhere and it is substantiated by the official record. Lee sent Anderson, who arrived on the field about 4:00 or 5:00 in the afternoon, a message ordering him to go into camp. Anderson was dumbstruck by this after all the fighting that had gone on that day. He felt he should have been asked to go up and be at the front and here he was being asked to go back and camp in back of the battle line. He, on his own, rode forward to find Lee. He asked him if the order was correct. Lee said, "Yes, I want you as a reserve in case we need you. You're the only reserve I have from the day's fighting. So, that exonerates him on that.

Where I think he was lax or faulty, for which he has not been blamed, oddly enough, occurred on the second day. What happened there, you'll recall, is that Lee proposed and made clear, particularly to Longstreet, that what he wanted to do was to mount an assault from the right end of his line and sweep up the Emmetsburg Pike. He was mistaken about the position of the Federals, but that doesn't alter the fact that that was his plan. When the battle got to the point at which it reached Hill's corp, which was in the middle of the line there; he wanted to have Anderson's fresh division go in along side of McLaws who was the end division for Longstreet. Hill huddled with Anderson and he went over the plans that Lee had indicated not once but three times. The reason he did this, I feel sure, was because this was the first time that Anderson had fought under Hill and he wanted to make sure the instructions were clear. Anderson, as I had said, had been under Longstreet and Longstreet kept a very close hand on his subordinates. Hill was more like Lee. He gave his subordinates a great deal of discretion and that was where the problem arose here. When the battle started on Anderson's front he had his five brigades; Mahone was in reserve and the other four were to advance, which they did. They didn't, however, advance in concert. It was disjointed. Some lines were only single lines and there were no reinforcements. Posey's brigade on the extreme left simply sort of wilted and never got its act together. The other three did do well and gained considerable yardage. When the Federals mounted a counter drive against the middle brigade, Perry's, they were right of Perry and Wilcox. Perry had to pull back and when he did he exposed the flanks of the other two. The whole thing fell through. The immediate responsibility for this fiasco lay with Anderson who was in charge of the division. Incidentally, Anderson was accused by Wilcox of never leaving his tent the whole day. But, the responsibility also goes to Hill, and very seriously so, because although he went over the plans it was his duty to see that the orders were executed correctly, particularly in view of Anderson's newness under him. It was soon obvious that something was wrong. One example of this involved Mahone who was held, as I said, in reserve. He refused repeated requests from Wright and Wilcox to come to their aid because he said; "I'm in reserve." Well, what do you have a reserve for if it isn't to help when critical problems arise? And, where was Hill all this time? The answer proves interesting. Hill was next to the end of Anderson's division sitting on a boulder with Lee. Of course, your natural question is.well, what about Lee? I'm surprised that Lee, with his customary tact, didn't suggest to Hill something like, "Don't you think you ought to see what's going on here?" But, I'm sure there wasn't anything like that said or Hill would have done it. I do think Hill was capable on the second day but not on the first.


James Longstreet

There really isn't too much more in Hill's military career that is worth noting with respect to the other things I want to point out here, save for the Battle of the Wilderness. He had a good very well fought first day. The second day his concern for his men again got the better of him. At the end of the first day's fighting he had been told that Longstreet was going to relieve him at midnight. Well, Longstreet was, as sometimes occurs, a little slow. He didn't get there until the next morning. Because Hill had expected Longstreet at midnight he had not allowed his divisional commanders, particularly Heath and Wilcox, to straighten their lines and fortify themselves. Hill had told them, "I don't want the men disturbed." He did that out of the goodness of his heart and his humanity. Because of that there were no defenses to hold Hancock the next morning until Longstreet came up and saved the day. Heavy casualties were the end result of Hill's lack of instruction.

Hill was plagued by illness a great deal of the time after this. He did, however, do a very fine job of holding the defenses at Petersburg. He even launched an occasional offensive such as Reames Station.

I would say, and it is my opinion, that A.P. Hill would deserve at least an A- rating as a divisional commander. As a corp commander I'd probably give him not much more than a C or a C+. His ranking as a corp commander has to be tempered because, in the first place, everyone expected a Jackson. To paraphrase Senator Bentsen, "A.P. Hill was no Jackson." He was able and competent but not the genius that Jackson was. You also have to remember that after Gettysburg few southern generals really sparkled? It was a period that signaled the decline of the confederate fortunes. Their resources were dwindling both in manpower and material. That would be my assessment of Hill. As much as I love him, in fairness, that's what I would say.

I mentioned earlier that I'd like to touch a little bit on the persona question. Two things are involved here. One goes back to his relations with Jackson. Here we get into his overwhelming pride and the desire to have justice done to him. I would say that the one characteristic that I have gleaned from my study of A.P. Hill is his absolute insistence on justice and fairness, as he honestly perceived them. I think that's shown in his relations with Jackson. The interesting thing is that Hill tended to get along with his subordinates beautifully. His subordinates and men loved him. He couldn't however, get along with Longstreet or Jackson. The opposite was true of Lee. He never had anything but the highest praise for Lee and he never questioned him.

In the case of Jackson the various incidents that I mentioned with him occurred in August of 1862. What he did was simply badger Jackson and badger Lee to order a court of inquiry as to the charges which he felt Jackson had leveled against him, even though he did not know what they were. He did all this, as I said, out of a sense of justice. There actually were, as I said, eight specifications under the general charge of neglect of duty. What he did was, and this was inexcusable, was to bother Jackson and bother Lee so much that it took up a considerable amount of their time just to try to appease Hill on this matter. After the battle of Antietam was over, Hill immediately began attacking Jackson. During the battle he would concentrate on the enemy, the other enemy. This took an awful lot of time and after Antietam Lee was so upset that he dropped everything and came over to Bunker Hill which is right near Martinsburg above Winchester. He was closeted with Jackson and Hill for about two or three hours. No one else was present and no minutes were taken of the meeting. The only way anyone knew what had happened was the fact that everybody was so blue. Lee emerged from the tent very glum and Jackson was gloomy. The behavior of the men involved told everyone there had been no successful reproachment between Jackson and Hill. One of the things I have learned very dramatically from the Civil War is the fact that internal feuding in any organization can be devastating.

Hill used this fiendishly clever device, and you have to admire his courage for doing so, because everyone knew Jackson's wrath. A few had felt it such as Garnett. Garnett had asked for reinstatement and Jackson never reinstated him like he had done Hill shortly before Antietam. Hill had drawn up his own charges against Jackson. A copy of those charges has never been found, but they apparently were very scathing. And you must remember they had to go through Jackson in order to get to Lee. So Jackson knew what they were too. Jackson reviewed all the correspondence and all the complaints that Hill was leveling against him. Jackson and Lee, both to their credit, had been trying to slough the thing off. They wanted to avoid an open breach. They realized it wasn't going to do any good except to salve Hill's feelings. They realized in a letter to Lee, which passes through Jackson, that the matter was not going to go away. Hill's feelings for Jackson are clearly evident when he says, "I beg Lee most distinctly to disclaim any credit which General Jackson may have given me for the good results of his punishment as my better behavior thereafter and that its only affect has been to cause me to preserve every scrap of paper received from corp headquarters to guard myself against any new eruptions from this slumbering volcano." Can you imagine someone calling General Jackson a "slumbering volcano?" Hill continues, "I respectfully forward again my charges against Lieutenant General Jackson and request that he be tried on them." What would have happened we do not know. Death intervened for Jackson at Chancellorsville, which was a tragic consequence of that battle.

The last thing is a little bit on the other side. In this case Hill was intent upon justice being done to one of his subordinates. Harry Heth was a divisional commander in the Army of Northern Virginia. I once did an article on him entitled "Hard Luck Harry Heth." I did the article because it seemed that everything went wrong for him. He had a degree of competence and before he joined the Army of Northern Virginia he had done very well in the west. But, during the war, one thing after another seemed to go wrong with him. Hill, in the winter of 1864, it was January 1864, happened to be visiting in Washington. He went there for sort of a furlough. While he was there he attended a lot of social affairs and a lot of get-togethers with other military and so forth. As talk went over to the gossipy stage there were all these rumors and complaints about Heth much like there are about football coaches today. Why had he been so bad at Gettysburg, at Falling Waters, and at Bristoe Station? This bothered Hill so much that when he returned to his troops he wrote this letter to General Heth. He said, "General, having been informed that it was probable some misapprehension existed in regard to your management of your division at Gettysburg, Falling Waters and Bristoe, it is but simple justice to you that I say your conduct on all these occasions met with my approbation. At Gettysburg the first day's fight mainly fought by your division was a brilliant victory. You were wounded that day and not again in command of your division until the retreat commenced. At Falling Waters the enemy were again kept at bay until the army had crossed the Potomac and the prisoners taken by the enemy were stragglers and not due to any fault of yours. At Bristol the attack was ordered by me and most gallantly made by your division. Another corp of the enemy coming up on your right was unforeseen as I had supposed that other troops were taking care of them." And then he writes this very significant statement after, as you just heard, he assumed responsibility for all these things and absolved Heth of any blame. He says: "I write you this letter that you may make such use of it as may be deemed advisable by you." Now that, I think, tends to redeem him to a great extent. That is the mark of a big man. Just put yourself in his position keeping in mind, if you can, the tremendous pride he had. Here was criticism of one of his subordinates. These were all engagements in which Hill had been the corp commander and it's awfully easy to slough off the responsibility on someone else, which is what he heard was being done.

Hill could simply have let it go and not done anything, not written a letter at all. But, he chose to write this letter to Heth which by itself would give Heth a feeling of appreciation and confidence that at least his own general knew what the situation was and accepted responsibility. Knowing it would have been kept between just the two of them, Hill goes one step beyond the last full measure and says, 'You may make what use you want to of this." In other words he could show it to others which would not be very flattering to Hill. Never the less, he felt this very strong need to see justice and fairness done.

I hope I have been fair to him tonight.

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