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The importance of Vicksburg was recognized by the South as a defensive citadel for the control of traffic on the Mississippi River, while the North realized that an all out campaign against the South could not be made until Vicksburg became untenable.
Vicksburg occupied the first high ground close to the river below Memphis. A railroad runs East connecting with Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, and all points in the Southern States. A railroad also starts opposite, running West to Shreveport, Louisiana. Thus Vicksburg was the only point connecting several parts of the Confederacy divided by the Mississippi River and represented the control point for free navigation of the Mississippi.
 
The actual campaign started on November 2, 1862 Grant having three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar, a force of 30,000 men, with his opposite, Pemberton, having about the same number under his command. Pemberton had replaced General Earl Van Dorn who was then put in charge of cavalry.
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U.S. Grant |
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For the Union, General McPherson commanded the left wing, General Hamilton the center, with General Sherman at Memphis commanding the right. Pemberton was fortified at the Tallahatchie River and occupied Holy Springs, Mississippi and Grand Junction, Tennessee. On November 8th the Union forces captured Grand Junction and LaGrange.
Up to this time it was axiomatic that large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies well covered and guarded in all forward movements with delays, which might be required to repair, or rebuild all vital roads for the forwarding of supplies. As the countryside seemed to be well provisioned, Grant concluded it was desirable and highly probable to secure forage by the advancing columns. At this point the Freedman's Bureau came into being. The Negro was under the protection of the Army if he came voluntarily, after which he would not be allowed to starve. The Commissioner of Education, Chaplain Eton, suggested that this large force of labor could be employed to harvest crops, perform labor such as teamsters, wood cutters, cooks, etc., their wages being paid from proceeds of the sale of surplus crops shipped to the North. Thus the Freedman's Bureau became self sustaining.
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William T. Sherman |
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Grant was nominally in command at this point, however, pressure was being brought to bear for General McClernand to have a separate and independent command within Grant's, to operate against Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi River, however, General Halleck decided on a single command, with Grant being authorized to fight the enemy where and how he so elected. On the 13th Grant was in Holly Springs, with Pemberton slowly falling back on the Tallahatchie.
In the field at times Grant's judgment betrayed him. Had he pursued Pemberton in his retreat from the Tallahatchie, the retreat might have become a rout, but Grant's thoughts were still on bases of supplies, and not of overall strategy, despite a hint from Halleck that it might be well to reinforce Rosecrans and pursue the enemy into Mississippi. This error would prove costly later in the campaign in time and material.
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West Point Military Atlas - Northern Mississippi |
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On November 15th Sherman and Grant were but 47 miles apart. Grant ordered Sherman to move two divisions down the Mississippi Central Railroad, and on the 29th was 10 miles from Oxford with three divisions. Halleck instructed Grant to have his troops cut the roads in Pemberton's rear, and Grant directed that Generals Hovey and C.C. Washburn stationed in Helena, Arkansas, perform this task. Pursuit was halted at Oxford as it was necessary to repair the railroad destroyed by Pemberton from the Tallahatchie northward. On December 5th Grant suggested to Halleck that troops be taken South of the Yazoo River to take Vicksburg. Halleck concurred, and ordered Grant not to hold the country South of the Tallahatchie but to collect 25,000 troops at Memphis for the Vicksburg expedition. Sherman was ordered back to Memphis and directed to proceed with two divisions down the Mississippi. Pemberton in front of Grant represented the main defensive force holding Vicksburg. Grant hoped to hold Pemberton by judicious stabs and feints while Sherman could get in the rear and into Vicksburg. The further Pemberton could be drawn out of the perimeter of Vicksburg, the better Sherman's chances would be.
On December 18th Grant was ordered to divide his command into four corps, with General McClernand assigned to operate down the Mississippi. On December 20th Confederate General Van Dorn made a surprise attache on Holly Springs, Grant's second base of supplies and captured the garrison of 1500 men commanded by Colonel Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin Regiment, destroying munitions and forage. At the same time Nathan Bedford Forrest destroyed the railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, and Columbus, Kentucky, a main supply road. This dual action cut communications for more than a week. These two actions influenced Grant to consolidate his bases and make Memphis and the Mississippi River the line from which to draw his supplies.
Pemberton was withdrawing into the perimeter of Vicksburg while Sherman started moving south from Memphis with 20,000 men and was reinforced by 12,000 from Helena, Arkansas. The Confederates occupied Hains Bluff, on the Yazoo River, 11 miles above its mouth. The Mississippi had overflowed, covering the bottom lands below, and such portions of land which remained dry could easily be defended. As a result Sherman could only use one-quarter of his force and it was impossible for him to capture the city from that direction. The gunboats were too far away and Grant's support was not there. The troops attempted to push forward on the 27th and 28th. The fort's plunging fire stopped the advance completely and Sherman backed out. Sherman recognized his efforts as futile but Grant, because of loss of communications was unable to order him to desist in his attempts to take Vicksburg. Sherman, who was also collaborating with Admiral Porter then withdrew from the area of the Yazoo and returned to the Arkansas River to take Arkansas Post, 50 miles upriver, garrisoned by 5,000 men. After Sherman's failure to get to the rear of Pemberton, Confederate General Magruder wrote Richmond that Pemberton should have 50,000 more men. In the end 8,000 men from Bragg's troops were transferred, which satisfied no one. McClernand reluctantly agreed to cooperate with Porter and after three days bombardment Arkansas Post was taken. Despite his reluctance, McClernand took more than his share of credit, while deprecating the service which the Navy had rendered. McClernand then withdrew his force, returned to Napoleon at the mouth of the Arkansas River, after which Sherman and Porter implored Grant to come and take command of the situation. Grant visited them, as well as McClernand and ordered him and his command to Millikens Bend. Grant then took entire command on January 29th, and returned to Memphis. McClernand became insubordinate but it was ignored by Grant.
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John A. McClernand |
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McClernand was a complex individual, filled with pride and ambition. Austerity and vanity greatly dominated his bearing. He was a soldier's soldier only once, in the Black Hawk war, and saw foggily through eyes of self interest. McClernand had well established connections in Washington and he proposed directly to Lincoln that an Army be raised in Illinois with himself in command, to charge down the Mississippi and capture Vicksburg. This plan was vetoed, much to the chagrin of McClernand.
The real siege of Vicksburg now began. The problem was to secure footing on dry ground on the East side of the river to operate against Vicksburg. The Mississippi from Cairo South runs through a valley on the East 80 to 200' above the water, while on the West the land is hardly higher than the high water mark. On the East bank South of Memphis, no high lands reached the river's edge until Vicksburg, the intervening land being cut by bayous, thus marching across this country is impossible and the bayous are not navigable by river steamers. The winters of 1862-3 were noted for high water, and the Union forces had to occupy high ground and levees so limited that one corps under McPherson was 70 miles above Vicksburg.
The East bluff follows the left bank of the Yazoo from Haines Bluff 11 miles above Vicksburg and continues South along the Mississippi to Warrenton six miles below. This entire area was strongly fortified with batteries and connecting rifle pits. From Young's Point the Mississippi runs in a Northeasterly direction to a point above the city where it turns Southwest exposing any vessel attempting to run the blockade to the batteries above the city, as well as those below. North of the Yazoo the area was heavily timbered, marshy, and cut up by bayous, making a frontal attack impossible.
In 1862 General Thomas Williams from New Orleans had cut a ditch ten to twelve feet wide and about as deep, from Young's Point to the river below, a distance of about one mile. It was his expectation that on the rise of the river it would cut a navigable channel. The canal, however, started an eddy at both ends filling the canal and doing no cutting as anticipated. McClernand had been directed to push the widening and deepening of the canal with 4,000 men. A sudden rise of the river on March 8th put an end to the work and broke through the dam at the upper end. Had the canal project succeeded, it would have been of little value as the batteries still could have commanded the canal throughout its entire length. The work was then abandoned as the enemy put the dredges under fire, forcing their withdrawal.
The next attempt at diversion was made by McPherson at Lake Providence, which is part of the old bed of the Mississippi, by attempting to cut the levees and redirect the river through the Tensas, Washita, and Red River. Of successful; it would provide a waterway joining the Mississippi at the mouth of the Red River above Port Hudson. Grant inspected the operation in February and decided it highly impractical, as navigation would be impeded by too many torturous turns exposing ships to fire from bodies of Rebel troops and guns which could be well concealed.
Another attempt at diversion was made in February by Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Wilson by way of Moon Lake, which lies one mile East of the Mississippi and of Helena, Arkansas. The plan was to divert the Mississippi to Moon Lake, then East through the Yazoo Pass, to Coldwater River, thence to the Tallahatchie which joins the Yallabusha 250 miles below Moon Lake to become the Yazoo River. All of these various attempts had as their objective getting a sizable force in front or on the flanks of Vicksburg. On February 2d, 1863, the inlet was opened by blasting a dam, allowing the Mississippi to flood the bayous. This work was done by 4,500 troops under General Ross. The Confederates had previously realized that these attempts would be made and had obstructed the Yazoo and Coldwater with trees and debris of all kind which had to be removed by the dint of hard labor. At Greenwood where the Yazoo begins, it was fortified by Ft. Pemberton which had been constructed two months previously. Ft. Pemberton was a small work built of cotton bales and earth, mounting but three guns, and manned by Loring's brigade of 1.500 men. Several attempts were made by Quimby and Ross to take Ft. Pemberton, but without results. This diversion became impractical and was abandoned.
Still another attempt was made by way of Steele Bayou which approaches within one mile of the Mississippi at Eagle Bend. Steele Bayou connects with the Black Bayou, Deer Creek, Rolling Fork, Big Sunflower, and into the Yazoo above Haines Bluff. Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on March 14th and reported it navigable. He started with five gunboats and four mortar boats. With extreme difficulty progress was made and Sherman with Stewart's Division of the 15th Corps marched from Eagle Bend on the Mississippi across to Steele Bayou where they embarked on transports. When within a few hundred yards of success Rebel sharpshooters plus river obstructions, stopped progress. The Rebels had deployed 4,000 men to stop this expedition. Sherman returned to Black Bayou to rush up reinforcements but success was hopeless. They were forced to back the vessels out and return to the Mississippi, this ending in failure another attempt to get in front of Vicksburg.
The Queen of the West under Charles R. Ellet on February 2d the batteries of Vicksburg as a trial and found she could roam the river as far as Port Hudson, 300 miles to the Rid River through which provision came to the Confederates from the West. On February 14th she was captured by the Confederates with the Webb and two cotton clads which placed the Mississippi from Vicksburg to Port Hudson back in Southern hands. Farragut on the Hartford on March 14th ran the Port Hudson batteries and regained control of the Red River. The valley of the Mississippi was beset by Union forces and from Cairo to New Orleans, nearly every mile of river was patrolled by Federal gunboats.
At Milliken's Bend and at Young's Point bayous started and connected to form a channel entering the Mississippi at Carthage, approximately 25 miles above Grand Gulf. Levees on the Mississippi hold back waters which might flood these channels. Grant determined to open these channels for transports away from damage by enemy batteries. About February 4th work was begun by clearing these channels. Hard and unexpected rains hampered efforts and the rivers in early 1863 were higher than ever. Troops could not find high ground, and smallpox and measles ran rampant. It soon became apparent that a continuation of this plan would be futile and orders were issued to abandon the project.
ith these four failures the public and press clamored for Grant's removal, suggesting McClellan, Fremont, or Hooker as successors, but Washington took no action.
Upon the recession of the waters, troops were concentrated at Milliken's Bend. Admiral Porter was to fit into this plan. Part of his fleet was to provide ferries, for troops below Vicksburg on the West bank. His fleet at that time was on the East side of the Mississippi above the Yazoo. All vessels were prepared for running the Confederate batteries by protecting them with bales of cotton and bags of grain which could later be used below Vicksburg if the action was successful. The run started on April 16th with the flagship Benton, Porter commanding, followed by the Lafayette with a captured vessel, Price, lashed alongside, the Lousiville, Mound City, Pittsburgh, and Carondelet. Next came the transport Forest Queen, Silver Wave, and Henry Clay, each towing coal barges. The gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear. The gunboats drew fire immediately and despite being struck repeatedly suffered no material damage. The transports, however, were damaged, the Henry Clay being disabled and eventually deserted by her crew.
At no time did Pemberton have enough heavy guns to oppose or block Porter, while the strength of Sherman's army alone was at all times nearly equal to Pemberton's.
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West Point Military Atlas - Vicksburg and Vicinity |
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On March 29th McClernand with four divisions started to New Carthage, hoping to capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops got there. The lowlands were flooded and by the time boats were available it was April 6th before McClernand with one division and supporting artillery reached New Carthage. Orders were issued for the advance, with two of McPherson's divisions and Sherman to follow. Such a large concentration of troops required mammoth stores and six more steamers with twelve barges on April 22d ran the blockade, with but half getting through.
On April 27th Grant determined to effect a landing on the East side. About 10,000 men embarked. The plan was to have the Navy silence the Grand Gulf guns and as many men as possible to get ashore and carry the works by storm. On April 29th Porter attacked and after 5 1/2 hours of bombardment not a single Rebel gun had been silenced. Grant then ordered a withdrawal. Grand Gulf was situated like Vicksburg and appeared as impossible to capture. After dark troops were landed and marched on the top of a levee to a point below Grand Gulf. It was found a landing was available at Bruinsburg on the east side and twelve miles by good road from Port Gibson. Sherman in the meantime was creating a diversionary attack on Haines Bluff on the Yazoo, the object being to compel Pemberton to keep his major forces closely contained about Vicksburg. Sherman's action was started on April 29th with ten regiments of his command and seven gunboats which Porter had left above Vicksburg. By May 1st Sherman having accomplished his objective was ordered to follow McPherson with two divisions to Bruinsburg. On April 30th McClernand's Corps and one division of McPherson's Corps were landed on the East bank of the Mississippi. For the first time Grant felt he was in the enemy's country. All the campaign's labors and hardships which had been encountered were for the accomplishment of this one objective.
Grant was now below Vicksburg and accessible to Pemberton's right flank. Pemberton received neither instructions nor suggestions as to how to stalemate Grant, and Grant should have been attacked immediately upon landing. Most devastating to Pemberton were cavalry raids by 1,700 men of Colonel B.H. Grierson, since opposition there was none. He destroyed bridges and stations and wrecked Pemberton's transportation system. General Johnston in Vicksburg advised Pemberton he had ordered a cavalry brigade to him, but it never reached his army. Confederate Major General Loring, in command of troops to meet these raids, was not permitted to leave the line of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. Pemberton's position without cavalry was identical to Lee's first few days at Gettysburg, with no Stuart on hand, he had no military intelligence. Historians claim Pemberton should have known of many of Grant's movements, as he certainly had sources of intelligence. Pemberton, however, claimed it was impossible to protect every part of the river, and there was no indication at what point down river Grant might land. To protect Bruinsburg, Rodney, Grand Gulf, and elsewhere, would have meant turning over Vicksburg to Sherman who waited at Haines Bluff with a force two thirds that of Pemberton.
Pemberton kept imploring Taylor, Smith and Johnston, for a movement upon Grant's lines of supply on the West bank of the Mississippi, as Grant was moving troops and supplies unmolested. Pemberton, without aid, was burdened with the defense of Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Jackson, Ft. Pemberton, Grand Gulf, and Bruinsburg, widely separated but essential to the Confederacy. The Confederate War Department favored the dispatching of two divisions to Mississippi, but Lee said in his opinion a choice had to be made of maintaining the line in Virginia or Mississippi, and Lee's plan was to relax the hold on Vicksburg by invading Pennsylvania.
Grant now had McClernand's 13th Corps and two brigades of Logan's division of the 17th Corps, about 20,000 men. These were reinforced soon by the remaining portion of the 17th Corps and Sherman with two divisions of his 15th Corps, a total of 33,000 men.
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West Point Military Atlas - Vicksburg May 15 to 19 |
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The Confederates occupied Grand Gulf, Haines Bluff, and Jackson, fifty miles East of Vicksburg, with 60,000 men. The first objective was to capture Grand Gulf. It was expected the enemy would attempt to prevent this. Union forces had to advance to Port Gibson, the nearest point where a bridge crossing the lowlands was available. An advance was made at once to gain the high ground adjacent to Port Gibson. McClernand met the enemy five miles West of Port Gibson. 7,000 to 8,000 men under General Bowen held a strong position and were to receive reinforcements under Loring from Vicksburg. These did not reach him in time and McPherson's brigades followed by McClernand were ready to advance. Ridges guarded Port Gibson, the center being held by Bowen. McClernand was forced to divide his forces as a consequence. On the right flank the action was static but on the left Osterhaus was being pushed back. McPherson, with one brigade under General J.E. Smith was sent to support Osterhaus. An attack succeeded and the right flank of the enemy was sent in retreat, followed by the left by sunset. In the morning, Port Gibson was taken. On May 2nd the bridge over the North Fork having been burned in the retreat of the Confederates, was rebuilt. The enemy was covering a massive retreat from Grant Gulf and Port Gibson to Vicksburg. Logan advanced along the road to Vicksburg until he reached the juncture of the road from Grand Gulf, turned left and proceeded to Grand Gulf. The enemy had evacuated all positions, and Porter was able to take his fleet into Grand Gulf. These rapid advances forced Grant to halt for three days until food and supplies were available. On the 6th McPherson advanced toward Jackson through Rocky Springs and Utica. That night he and McClernand were both a Rocky Springs. Sherman marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's Ferry. Vicksburg could have been besieged from the South from Hankinson's Ferry, however, the broken nature of the ground would have enabled Pemberton to hold a strong position from the river South of Vicksburg to the Big Black, and he would have retained possession of the railroad back to Vicksburg. Grant decided to take the railroad East of Vicksburg to Jackson. McPherson was directed to move toward Jackson with McClernand's Corps protecting his flank along the Big Black, Sherman being on the left of McPherson. Grant's forces were now parallel with the Jackson & Vicksburg Railroad, about eight miles south, the right flank at Raymond, Sherman in the center, McClernand on the left at Edwards Station. The first action was by McPherson's forces two miles outside of Raymond. The Battle of Raymond was a mistake for the South, as in the process the Southern Army opposing Grant was in three separate detachments in open country. Pemberton with 18,000 men, Johnston was at Jackson with 6,000, and Gregg at Raymond with 5,000. Gregg had been instructed not to challenge a Union advance but to fall back on Jackson. This he did not do, allowing McPherson to engage him with costly results. To stop both Grant and Sherman was in the opinion of Jefferson Davis worth the risk of losing an army. Grant now decided to take Jackson, then turn upon Vicksburg and Pemberton's main forces.
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Joseph E. Johnston |
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Forces in the Confederacy working against Pemberton equaled those in the Union working against Grant. Three fourths of Pemberton's cavalry were withdrawn in early January to create a diversion for Bragg. When Porter's fleet moved to Grand Gulf and Grant set in motion 1.700 cavalrymen under Grierson, the loss to Pemberton became apparent and all of Mississippi was thrown in a panic. Without cavalry Pemberton had lost his eyes, and knowledge of Grant's movements always came to him a day late. Pemberton kept pleading for more troops and guns after Porter ran his ships past Vicksburg successfully. Pemberton advised President Davis that this feat alone showed the lack of heavy guns. Of 28 guns in position at Vicksburg, many were incapable of reaching the Union fleet as it sailed past. General Joseph E. Johnston on the 13th, despite his battle wounds, was placed in command of all Confederate forces in Mississippi. On the 13th Pemberton advanced on Jackson, with the general attack to start on the 14th. During the night Johnston in Jackson had been reinforced and had 11,000 men available. Artillery fire commenced and Crocker moved his division forward, routing the pickets and advance forces, driving them back to the main body. At the same time Sherman out-flanked the enemy. This exposed the whole line in front of the enemy's works which was continuous on the North, West, and South side of the Peal River which ran through the city. The Confederates started to evacuate their positions and after minor skirmishes the city was captured. Sherman was to remain in Jackson to destroy it as a railroad and manufacturing city. On the 13th Johnston sent a dispatch to Pemberton advising him that Sherman's troops lay between them and suggested he come upon his rear. One copy of this message found its way into the hands of McPherson. Johnston was at Canton, six miles North of Jackson on the 14th. Grant expected Pemberton to obey Johnston's orders, which were to attack at Clinton. Pemberton, however, decided this was not feasible and determined to move South to Edward's Station and get between Grant's forces and their base. This was a fallacy as Grant no longer operated from established bases. On marching South Pemberton found the rivers swollen and bridges washed out. This forced him to reverse his direction and proceed to Clinton as originally directed, but with subsequent loss of time. Grant being advised of Pemberton's advance with about 25,000 men, directed Sherman to proceed to Bolton, thereby intercepting Pemberton midway to Clinton. McClernand, however, was actually closer to Pemberton than Sherman, and Grant ordered him to advance. Pemberton at Champions Hill was in a well fortified position. McClernand with three divisions, and Blair, of Sherman's command, advanced. Soon the skirmishing had grown into a full scale battle. Slow progress was being made until McPherson brought up his troops, Logan in front and to the right of Hovey, with Crocker following. This action brought them across the flank of the enemy and eventually to his rear. This put them in command of the only road over which Pemberton's forces could retreat. With McPherson on the left, with his left flank covered, McClernand on the center, and Blair and Smith on the right, the enemy was stalemated. Assaults by the left and right wings put the Confederates to flight. Loring, who had been sent to support the Confederate right wing, continued marching and joined forces with Johnston, giving no support to Pemberton whatsoever. Involved in the action were 15,000 men, with 410 killed and 1,844 wounded. Had pursuit been organized, it is questionable if Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force, but instead that night the majority of the Union forces encamped about seventeen miles East of Vicksburg. It now became evident that Johnston and Pemberton could not join forces as Grant was firmly established between the tow. When the advance was resumed, the enemy was again established in positions on the Big Black. The Confederates had constructed parapets on the inner banks of the bayous. Assaults were successful, the enemy fleeing to the west bank, burning bridges, and leaving guns and sizable forces of men on the east bank. Three bridges were ordered built and on the 18th these were finished. Other than brief skirmishes on the 19th, investment was complete, with Federal forces before the defenses of Vicksburg. Several assaults were attempted but with no success. Grant was aware and concerned that Johnston was to his rear with an army equal in size and being reinforced and dedicated to coming to the assistance of Pemberton. On May 22nd a coordinated assault was made by all of Grant's available forces. Other than for temporary successes the attack only increased casualties. Of all the commanders, McClernand was the only one who claimed success, which later proved to be an idle dream. After dark, troops were withdrawn ending the last assault on Vicksburg. This was Grant's bloodiest day, with 3,199 in losses. Grant now determined a siege to "outcamp the enemy" to reduce as much as possible further casualties. The bloody business on the 22nd was weighing heavily on his mind.
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West Point Military Atlas - The Siege of Vicksburg |
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The Navy was holding the river, and if land positions could be held, the enemy was limited to such food, men, and munitions as were on hand in Vicksburg. On May 19th, twenty days after the original crossing of the Mississippi, the city was invested. The State Capital had fallen, 6,000 of the enemy were captured, with as many more killed or wounded, and 400 miles of river from Vicksburg to Port Hudson had been secured. Federal forces killed were 695, wounded and missing 3,684. Sherman now occupied the right from the river above Vicksburg, McPherson the center, and McClernand the left. The line was fifteen miles long from Haines Bluff to Warrenton. The terrain was admirable for defense, deep ravines grown up with underbrush with the sides and tops covered with dense forest, and any gullies cutting these ravines were fortified at the head to command a view of any approach. Grant having no siege guns, Admiral Porter was called upon to supply Navy guns of large caliber. Gun emplacements and rifle pits were set up, with no harassment by the enemy, principally due to the increasing shortage of ammunition. The Federal lines were on an average only 600 yards from the enemy. Sand bags and logs protected the trenches. Mortars were made by boring out logs and binding them with iron bands. Shells could successfully be thr3own from them into the trenches. By June 30th 220 guns were in position and the defenses were completed though Grant was conscious that Johnston at his rear was receiving reinforcements. Grant had about 71,000 men at his disposal, half were across the peninsula from Haines Bluff to the Big Black, the balance deployed below to prevent any crossing from farther South and West. The siege pattern followed five steps: investment, artillery attack, construction of parallels and approaches, breaching by mines, and final assault.
General McClernand published a congratulating order, embellished with falsifications of fact, to the 13th Corps, which did injustice to the other troops involved in the campaign. This was done indirect violation of War Department orders, and on June 18th Grant relieved him of his command and sent him back to Springfield, Illinois to prevent further dissension. On June 22d Johnston crossed the Big Black for the purpose of attacking Grant's rear to raise the siege. Correspondence intercepted between Pemberton and Johnston showed that actually all hope of holding Vicksburg had passed. The plight of the civilian population in Vicksburg was rapidly deteriorating. The railroad from Vicksburg to Jackson had been in such a miserable state as to be almost impossible. Supplies from the West were the only reliable source until the gunboats cut it off. Roads were so mired that grain abundant fifty to seventy-five miles away could not be gotten into Vicksburg. All available animals had been slaughtered and the populace was subsisting on meager stores of ground cornmeal and scant rations of dried food stuffs.
Sherman was placed in command of all troops from Haines Bluff to the Big Black River. Johnston sensed that in attacking he would inflict losses on both sides without any results. Grant could readily have taken the offensive against him but declined to do so as he did not wish to jeopardize his hold on Pemberton.
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John C. Pemberton |
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Efforts were made by the Union forces to mine under the enemy's positions. Numerous tunnels were dug and mines exploded and large craters formed, but no actual advantage was gained, however, this work was pursued in front of each corps to where the parapet of the enemy divided them. Grant received information that Pemberton was preparing to escape across the Mississippi to the Louisiana side at night in boats being hastily built in Vicksburg. Porter was alerted and collected combustible material on the West bank to be set on fire and light up the river. On July 1st numerous mines having been planted, orders were given for an assault on July 6th. On July 1st, however, Pemberton sensing his hopeless position asked his division commanders as to their ability to successfully evacuate their troops. Two of his generals suggested surrender, the other two practically concurring. General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, approached the Union lines and asked that Grant meet Pemberton. Grant agreed to this in front of McPherson's Corps at 3:00 p.m. At the meeting Pemberton requested that Grant indicate his terms of surrender and Grant advised the terms were just that "Unconditional surrender of the city and garrison." Pemberton indicated that the conference may just as well end as these terms were not acceptable. General Bowen suggested that he and General A.J. Smith have a conference, during which Bowen suggested the Confederate Army be allowed to march out with honor and carrying small arms and field artillery. This was promptly rejected. The conference terminated, however, Grant that night sent a letter to Pemberton advising he would agree to allowing Officers to retain their side arms and clothing, the Field Staff and Cavalry Officers one horse each, the rank and file all their clothing, with such rations as were deemed necessary. Late that night Pemberton replied that the terms in the main were acceptable, but suggested an amendment that his troops march out with colors and arms to be stacked in front of their lines. These terms were acceptable to Grant. At 9:00 a.m. the garrison marched out, formed in line, stacked arms, and marched back in.
Many Southerners, both civilian and military, considered Pemberton's conduct of the Vicksburg Campaign subject to reproach. As a consequence, Pemberton asked President Jefferson Davis to convene a Court of Inquiry, but the chance of vindication never came. Before his death at Shiloh, Albert Sidney Johnston said "The test of merit in my profession with the people, is success". So tested, Pemberton for the most part stands in history as a man condemned, but there remains much untold of his story of desperate crisis and ultimate defeat. The only adverse criticism of Pemberton that Grant made was that Pemberton should have crossed to the West bank of the Big Black, moved North immediately, and joined Johnston. This would have given Grant Vicksburg but was the proper move, and in accordance with the orders Johnston had given to Pemberton.
The last effort to relieve Vicksburg was made on July 4th by General Holmes with 8,000 to 9,000 men of the Trans-Mississippi Department, with an attack on Helena, Arkansas. He was roundly defeated by General Prentiss who held Helena with less than 4,300 men.
Grant rode into Vicksburg on July 4th, then returned to his command posts. Port Hudson, held by General Gardner, the last occupied point, was surrendered on July 9th. At Vicksburg 31,600 men surrendered with 172 cannon and 60,000 muskets. Sherman, Steele, and Ord were instructed to prepare to move against General Johnston. Sherman moved at once and crossed the Big Black at Bolton. Johnston, hearing of the surrender of Vicksburg, fell back on Jackson and on July 11th Sherman started shelling the city. The siege was kept up until July 17th when it was found that the Confederates had evacuated the city during the night, destroying all roads and bridges as the retreated. Sherman deemed pursuit was pointless, but sent one of Steele's divisions in pursuit as far as Brandon, fourteen miles East. Sherman returned to Vicksburg and having cleared out stragglers at Vicksburg and captured or routed all Confederate forces for 100 miles in all directions, the campaign for all practical purposes was completed. The citadel was captured. The Mississippi was opened.
Source material credits:
Memoirs of U.S. Grant - U.S. Grant
Web of Victory - Earl Schenck Miers
The Blue & The Gray - Henry Steele Commager
Three Years With Grant - Sylvanus Cadwallader
Official Atlas of the Civil War
Pemberton - Defender of Vicksburg - John C. Pemberton III
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