It is a commonplace to observe that both the North and South entered the Civil War ill prepared, not only from a material point of view, but also from the standpoint of trained personnel. It is true that West Point had been in operation for many years and by April 1861, had graduated some 2000 men. At the outbreak of the War there were 1,036 officers in uniform. Of these 286 resigned to join the Confederacy. 102 came out of retirement. But only a few officers had commanded more than a skeleton regiment in a frontier outpost or had served as more than a junior officer in the Mexican War. The West Point course prior to 1850 was directed in good part at producing good drill masters, and engineers. It was not until 1850 that a course was included on the art of war or grand tactics. And it is revealing of the point of view in officer training in those days to note that not until after the Civil War was the position of commandant of West Point opened to branches other than the Engineers Corps.

There was a good bit of suspicion among civilians of the trained professional officer in those days. Book learning was perhaps all right for a preacher or a lawyer but of little use in a general. Washington, the militia man, had saved the remnants of Braddock's.army and later had beaten the best of the British generals. Andy Jackson with his frontiersmen had given the British regulars a drubbing at New Orleans.

And if you draw upon the examples from the Civil War itself, the textbook authors who presumably would know military theory didn't end up as the top practitioners. Halleck whose Elements of Military Art and Science was the best known general book, was kicked upstairs to be Chief of Staff after a mediocre period as a field commander. Hardee, author of the widely used texts on tactics was a competent corps commander but lacked the confidence to accept a higher command. And McClellan who had acted as an observer in the Crimean War and had written reports on European cavalry operations., turned out to be a top-notch organizer but an indecisive commander.

The Napoleonic Wars were then but 50 years in the past and the successes which the French General had achieved were still fresh in the minds of military men. Fuller pointed out that the principal innovations of Napoleon were not tactical but strategical maneuverability and surprise. This requires in an army commander not only skill in handling troops, but the willingness to take risks. These qualities were demonstrated by only a handful of general officers in both armies. On the Confederate side were Lee and Jackson. Perhaps Forrest could be added but he never held a major independent command. On the Union side were Grant, Sherman and Sheridan.

The Civil War commanders, particularly in the first two years of the War,, followed the traditional attack forms. These had been set down by General Jomini, a French general trained in the later Napoleonic campaigns. The formations he diagrammed bore such names as parallel, oblique, concave, converse and echelon. Essentially all were mass frontal attacks which ignored the most significant military development of the 19th century - the minie rifle and percussion cap. This was a weapon with a killing range of 1,000 yards. This radical change in fire power made the traditional mass frontal assault completely obsolete. Yet it was used until the end of the War. The most publicized failures are Lee at Gettysburg, Grant at Cold Harbor and Hood at Franklin. The other service arms were also affected by the new rifle. Artillery could no longer safely be placed in front of infantry. The cavalry attack on infantry was no longer dreaded.

The organization of both armies followed the British pattern established years earlier. A 'company was composed of 100 men; the regiment 1,000-men; the brigade 3 - 4 regiments; and a division 3 brigades or., in round numbers., 10.,000 men. Union divisions were at the beginning of-the conflict, assigned a cavalry regiment and four 6-gun batteries. Not until Hooker's reorganization was the cavalry pulled together. A division commonly deployed from a column of brigades. The brigade was the basic maneuvering unit. It formed to attack with regiments in a two-rank line. Two lines (or three if topography permitted) formed the usual attack formation. The second line formed from 150 to 300 yards behind the first line. Skirmishers were placed on the flanks and thrown out in front of the first line. The solid shoulder to shoulder line disappeared as the war progressed and skirmish type attack became more common. A dressed line could not stand up under infantry fire.

This evening I propose first to review the campaigns of the war not essentially to illustrate battle tactics, but as background for a discussion of tactics in half a dozen battles. It will also serve as a background for successive lectures.

The Official date for the opening of the War was the firing on Fort Sumter, April 12, 1861, although seven states had seceded prior to that date. The Confederate Congress authorized the enlistment of an army of 100,000 men. After Fort Sumter's surrender Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers. Four more Southern states then seceded and preparations for war began.

The twenty-two Northern states had a population of 22.,500,000, the 11 Southern states about 9,000,000. Three and a half million of these were Negroes. Even more to the advantage of the North was its industrial potential. Both sides were dependent on citizen soldiers. Virtually all of the enlisted men of the regular army remained with the North but its strength was only 16,000 men. The Regular Navy was very weak too, with 6 frigates and a few sloops and gunboats.

Joseph E. Johnston

It was a colorful battle, if not well fought. Training had been carried on as each commander thought best. There were no standard uniforms. Zouave uniforms were present on both sides, baggy pants, Turkish fezzes, there was even-a New York Highlander regiment in kilts. There were Northern outfits in gray, Southern units in blue. Many Washington residents had driven out to view the well publicized battle. The battle ended in a victory for the South and a rout for the spectators. Some Union units retreated in good order, others simply dissolved. The Confederates who were little better organized., did not pursue the retiring forces.

Casualties were not light. The Union suffered some 2900, the Confederates 2000 Both sides discovered that war was no picnic. If there was a star on the field, it was T. J. Jackson whose brigade was dubbed the Stonewall Brigade for its stubborn defense and its commander became Stonewall. Sherman fought his first battle here as a brigadier general and he led his unit with some skill.

George B. McClellan

At this point it may be well to comment on the differences in Northern and Southern practice in naming armies and battles. The North named its armies after the principal rivers. Thus you have the Eastern force called the Army of the Potomac, Sherman's Army was the Army of the Tennessee, Thomas' command was the Army of the Cumberland. The South attached the area of operation to its armies. Lee's command was the Army of-Northern Virginia, Bragg's force was the Army of Tennessee - named after the state, not the river. The Northern name for battles is apt to be a stream - the Southern name for the same action, the nearest town. Thus the battle of Bull Run was called Manassas in the South; Antietam was Sharpsburg in the South; Stone's River is Murfreesboro in Southern terminology.

With the lull in the East, attention turned to the Western theater. Northern grand strategy in this area centered on opening the Mississippi, thus to cut off the Trans-Mississippi states and to provide water transportation for operations in the Southern tier of states.

Kentucky was endeavoring to remain neutral, a difficult position for a state separating the two warring sections. The Confederates were the first to violate the neutrality when General Polk occupied Columbus, Kentucky on the Mississippi. Grant countered by occupying Paducah. The first real battle occurred January 19, 1862, at Mill Spring nine miles southwest of Somerset where General Thomas defeated a Confederate force under Zollicoffer.

U.S. Grant

Shortly before Shiloh, after three months of preparation, McClellan began to move toward Richmond. Rather than take the overland route., he planned to move his army to Fort Monroe and move up the peninsula to Richmond. The plan had merit but ignored a Federal government sensitive spot, it left open the Shenandoah Valley route to Washington. President Lincoln personally intervened and held McDowell's Corps for the defense of the Capitol. Whether this lengthened the war by years as McClellan later maintained, is doubtful.

Thomas J. Jackson

The actions were -

1 - Kernstown., just outside Winchester - March.23, 1862
2 - McDowell - May 8, 1862
3 - Front Royal and Winchester Banks - May 23-25, 1862
4-- Cross Keys (Ewell held off-Fremont) - June 8, 1862
5 - Port Republic - Jackson defeats Shields - June 9, 1862

The three Union armies protecting Washington; Fremont in West Virginia, Shields in the Shenandoah Valley, and McDowell's Corps before Washington, were placed under the command of General John Pope, who had just achieved a victory in the West. Pope was another engineering officer who had lived in Cincinnati and was then a member of the still thriving Cincinnati Literary Club. Pope took command with the statement that his headquarters would be in the saddle, which prompted the Southern retort that was the place most men kept their hindquarters.

With McClellan backed up against the James, Lee in August, sent Jackson northward. He met and defeated a part of Pope's army at Gordonsville [the Battle of Cedar Mountain - ed.]. Pope withdrew northward and McClellan's army was hastily withdrawn to reinforce Pope. Jeb Stuart, on a raid around Pope's, captured a copy of the Union general's orders. Lee immediately began a movement to crush Pope before McClellan's reinforcements reached him. He divided his army and sent Jackson around to Pope's rear, a sixty-mile march in two clays time over dusty roads in the August heat. (A year before it had taken the Union Army 21 days to march 20 miles).

John Pope

A victorious army can not stand still and Lee immediately began his first invasion of the North, crossing over the Potomac at White's Ford and marching on Frederick. Maryland was presumed to be strongly Southern in its sympathies but few volunteers joined the Confederate Army. He therefore moved westward, splitting his army in four columns, three of them conversing on Harper's Perry and the fourth column crossing South Mountain. A copy of Lee's order dated September 9 fell into McClellan's hands on September 3. It was found by Union troops wrapped around three cigars in an abandoned Confederate campsite. McClellan should have moved immediately but he Moved leisurely and Lee, learning of the missing order, fought a delaying battle in the passes and hastily reassembled his columns at Sharpsburg an the banks of Antietam Creek. Here the Harper's Ferry columns rejoined Lee and on September 17 was fought the Battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg. This battle, the bloodiest single-day fight, I will later describe in some detail.

After the day's fighting there was a day of calm and at the close of September 18th, Lee withdrew across the Potomac. A lull followed on the Eastern Front. At about the same time that Lee invaded Maryland, Southern armies under Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith were moving, north through Kentucky toward the Ohio River. General Buell pulled back hastily from Nashville and beat Bragg's column moving on Louisville. Kirby Smith moved toward Cincinnati and this city prepared for a siege. General Lew Wallace was placed in command of the city's defense, martial law was declared and all able bodied man called into service to prepare a ring of defenses on the Kentucky hills south of the river. Gun emplacements were placed on Price's Hill, Butcher's Hill which I suspect is the hill above Kemper Lane. Local volunteers were enlisted for the duration of the siege and these home-guards, known as the squirrel hunters, were honorably discharged.

Don Carlos Buell

Perryville is the closest battlefield of consequence to Cincinnati. It is about 15 Miles from Danville. As a tourist spot it is not too rewarding. A small park surrounds a Confederate cemetery that is situated an what was the Confederate right wing. But the terrain is such that the battle lines are difficult to place. When the Cincinnati Civil War Round Table visited the field, we had the advantage of having as guide Dr. Tapp of the University of Kentucky. Tapp is probably the best informed person on the battle action.

Measured against other battles it was not a major action. The Confederate force numbered 15,000 but casualties were quite high, totaling 3400. 'The Union force on the field was given by General Buell as 22,000 men, casualties 4,300. 3000 of these casualties were suffered by McCook's Corps, about one fourth of its effective strength.

Four days before Perryville, Rosecrans defeated the combined forces of Price and Van Dorn at Corinth, Mississippi.

To return to the Eastern Theater, after Antietam Lee withdrew south of the Rappahanock. McClellan followed and his reluctance to do more, prompted his replacement by General Burnside. Burnside did not want the command, was distrustful of his ability and apparently this distrust was shared by the corps and division commanders. The battle of Fredricksburg on December 13, resulted in a decisive defeat of the Union Army. It was a difficult assignment for any general and doubly difficult for a man who didn't want the job. The delay of a month in receiving pontoon bridges gave Lee time to establish himself on the heights at Fredricksburg. Those who have visited the Fredericksburg National Military Park have seen the sunken road and stone wall from behind which Longstreet's command fired with tremendous effectiveness at the Union brigades advancing up a rather sharp slope from the town of Predricksburg. The Confederate loss was 5300, the Union 12,600.

Braxton Bragg

On December 30th, 1862, Rosecrans reached Stone's River (the Southerners termed the battle Murfreesboro) where Bragg awaited him. The following day the battle began. This action I will discuss in some detail later. Rosecrans' army of 45,000 suffered some 13,000 casualties; Bragg with 38,000 had losses of 10,000. Bragg withdrew to the South after the battle, withdrawing from a field on which he claimed a victory.

In the East the Army of the Potomac received another new commander. This time Lincoln elevated Major General Joe Hooker to be a corps commander under Burnside. Hooker, nick-named "Fighting Joe", was a competent corps commander who fought well at Antietam, and delayed at Predricksburg. Burnside accused him of a deliberate lack of cooperation. Hooker's first task was to reinstall morale in the Army of the Potomac, after the bloody defeat of Predricksburg. After four months of preparation and reinforcement, Hooker began his move with an army of 134,000, twice the size of the force Lee had available.

Robert E. Lee

Although I have after Shiloh, ignored Grant's activities during the remainder of 18623 the campaign to open the Mississippi River had continued. In April of 1862 the Navy captured New Orleans. There remained but two Confederate-held points on the River, Port Hudson and Vicksburg. Vicksburg was a strong point, situated on a high bluff; its guns controlled the river. It was protected on the land side to the North by the Yazoo delta., a swamp area stretching for nearly 200 miles. The only way to attack was from the rear. Grant was assigned the job of capturing it. November and December, 1862, and January and February, 1863, were spent in fruitless attempts to bypass Vicksburg by cutting a canal across the neck of the neck of land across the river, and to find a route through the swamp lands at the rear of Vicksburg. Finally Grant and Porter took the bull by the horns. The army was marched down the high ground on the western shore and the navy made a night run past the fort and ferried Grant's troops across. In a rapid series of battles, Grant drove Pemberton back into Vicksburg. The city was invested on May 19. Two bloody attempts to carry the works failed, and a siege began. On July 4. Pemberton surrendered 31,600 men. Grant's forces totaled 759000 at the close of the campaign. Confederate losses were in the neighborhood of 10.,000, Union losses a few hundred less. Port Hudson fell five days after Vicksburg's surrender and the Mississippi was opened for its entire length. Probably more important, one entire Confederate army was eliminated. Manpower, was one resource the Confederates could ill afford to lose.

After Chancellorsville, Lee made his second attempt to invade the North. Second guessers have suggested that the smart thing for Lee to have done was to remain on the defensive and send part of his army to attempt to raise the siege of Vicksburg. Mississippi was a long way from Virginia in those days. Facing an army of 100,000, Lee with 70,000 took the offensive. Jackson's death at Chancellorsville made a reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia necessary since there was no one to whom Lee felt he could entrust Jackson's entire corps. Longstreet kept his old corps. Jackson's was divided under the command of A. P. Hill and Ewell. The Confederate forces began to move northward in June. Hooker, still in command, moved northward parallel with Lee to cover Baltimore and Washington. Jeb Stuart's cavalry division was left as a covering force and was roughly handled at Brandy Station by Pleasonton's Federal Cavalry, the first evidence that this Union branch was building up. When Hooker's forces headed North, Stuart started on his famous ride around the Union Army, an action that has done much to dim the luster of this Southern general.

On June 28th at his own request, Hooker was relieved and Major General George Meade succeeded him. Two days later the best known action of the war, the Battle of Gettysburg, was begun. This battle I will cover in more detail. After his defeat, Lee withdrew slowly toward Virginia and crossed the Potomac on July 13. There was no important action in the East for the balance of the year.

Returning to the West, it is perhaps well to recall that both the Confederates and Federals had two major commands in the field in the West. Grant had eliminated the Confederate army opposing him. The Federal Amy of the Cumberland under Rosecrans was facing Bragg in Tennessee. These two armies had not seen serious action since Stone's River on the last day of 1862. During the summer Rosecrans had maneuvered Bragg out of Chattanooga. Reinforced by Longstreet's Corps, the Battle of Chickamauga was fought on the 19th and 20th of September, 1863. Its result was the decisive defeat of Rosecrans and he withdrew into Chattanooga where he was besieged by Bragg.

Burnside had in September, led an army into East Tennessee and had captured Knoxville and Cumberland Gap. Longstreet's Corps was therefore detached and sent north from Chattanooga to deal with Burnside. The Union army withdrew into the defenses of Knoxville where he was also besieged.

The predicament of Rosecrans did not go unnoticed in Washington. Hooker who had been without a command after Chancellorsville was dispatched to Chattanooga with two corps from the Army of the Potomac. This was a long trip involving changes of train four times because of differences in gauge. There was also a swing of 1500 miles west and south. The movement took a month.

While Hooker was en route, Grant was elevated to Commander of all forces in the West. Rosecrans, who had been a competent commander, was as Lincoln said, acting like he had been hit on the head with a fish. Thomas relieved Rosecrans and was instructed to hold-Chattanooga. Things were in a bad way in Chattanooga. Only a trickle of supplies came through. Forage for artillery and supply wagons was non-existent and by the time Grant arrived on the scene the artillery was immobilized.

Grant's first action was to open a supply route. Hooker was halted on the railroad until this route was possible.

The supply problem in the Tennessee theater was not a simple one. Although Rosecrans looked bad at Chickamauga and still worse in a siege of Chattanooga, my impression is that he was a competent general. After Stone's River he had maneuvered Bragg out of Tennessee and out of Chattanooga. If territory had been the sole objective Rosecrans would have been eminently successful. But as Lincoln pointed out to his commanding generals, the opposing army should be the real objective. Only Grant seemed to have operated from the beginning under this rule.

But this is aside from Rosecrans' supply problem. Along the Mississippi it had been possible to rely on river transportation. This was true generally on the lower Tennessee and on the Cumberland to Nashville. But at most seasons, the Tennessee was not navigable at Muscle Shoals at Florence, Alabama. This left Rosecrans with the problem of maintaining a railroad from Nashville or relying an heavily guarded wagon trains. The railroad too, had to be heavily guarded. Tennessee was the area where Forrest operated and his activity and threat of activity, kept far too many Union troops guarding supply lines. To illustrate the problem, Grant ordered Sherman, then en route from Vicksburg to Chattanooga, to detach General Dodge with 8000 men to rebuild the railroad from Nashville to Decatur, Alabama and to Stevenson. AU bridges and culverts on the road had been destroyed, all rolling stock destroyed. With entrenched troops guarding his working parties', Dodge's command finished the job in 40 days. They had cut their own timber and made their own tools in blacksmith shops. The operation involved the building of 182 bridges. The Union Pacific job which Dodge directed after the War must have profited from this war-time experience.

William S. Rosecrans

On the Confederate side, Longstreet's Corps had gone north to Knoxville. Longstreet had not been happy with Lee and he was less happy with Bragg. And since Bragg felt relatively secure, the separation probably pleased both commanders. Bragg had every reason to feel secure. He held the heights overlooking Chattanooga-Mt. Lookout should have impregnable. It looks to be today. Missionary Ridge: while pretty well built up now, can still be seen to be a formidable position. Action at Chattanooga covered three days, November 23, 24 and 25. On the first day Orchard Knob was taken by the Federals. The following day Hooker's troops took Mt. Lookout in an action popularly known as the Battle Above the Clouds. Actually Hooker's men who outnumbered Bragg 6 - 1, had no difficulty in taking the heights. On the 25th of November the principal action began with Sherman attacking Missionary Ridge from its north end, or the Confederate right flank. As a diversionary movement Thomas' Corps was to attack the Ridge head-on, and if possible take the first line of rifle-pits. The attack began at sunrise with Sherman running into difficulty. Then Thomas went in and contrary to orders did not stop at the first line in the planned holding action. The troops kept going and carried the Ridge and Bragg's army broke into a disorganized retreat.

During the preparations for the Chattanooga offensive, Washington had repeatedly urged Grant to act promptly to relieve Burnside besieged by Longstreet at Knoxville. Sherman was therefore sent northward immediately. The East Tennessee area had been strongly pro-Union and the Washington administration had promised the loyal mountaineers relief for two years before Burnside's expedition in the summer of 1863. Far more importance than the region deserved was attached to it. The news of Bragg's defeat reached Longstreet and on November 29, four days after Chattanooga, he attacked Burnxide. The Union force was quite well entrenched and the Confederates were easily repulsed. Longstreet then withdrew to the North and in the spring rejoined Lee. In his one independent command Longstreet had achieved little. The battle at Knoxville wound up the 1863 campaigns.

The important thing that marked the end of the year was the elevation of U. S. Grant to the supreme command of all field armies. Grant reported directly to Stanton and Lincoln. Halleck stepped down to Chief of Staff. Halleck previously had nominally been in command of all Union armies but both Stanton and Lincoln had frequently bypassed him. The appointment of Grant was definitely a new deal. Although there were seventeen different field commands under Grant, the two major armies were at the time, the Army of the Potomac under Meade and the Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland now under Sherman. Grant's decision to maintain field headquarters with the Army of the Potomac was an indication that the Eastern front would be an active one.

The strategic plan for all armies was a concerted drive by Meade, Sherman, General Butler in command of an army on the James River, and by Sigel up the Shenandoah Valley. Grant, committed to the offensive, prepared for the kick-off. Meade in the East and Sherman moved out on the same date, May 4, 1864.

The Confederates and Union armies in the East clashed on May 5 and 6 in the area near Chancellorsville known as the Wilderness. It was a bloody hand to hand fight. The spring was abnormally dry and the woods caught fire, burning the wounded. The fight was a stalemate. Other Union generals after such a checkmate had withdrawn to regroup. Not Grant. The Army moved to the East that is around Lee's right, in an attempt to get between Richmond and the Confederate Army. Lee was able to get across Grant's line of march at Spotsylvania. During May-9 - 20, assaults were made on the entrenched Confederate positions. Two break throughs were achieved but were cut off by counter attack. The battle had interesting tactical features. The Confederate center in keeping its line on high ground, had projected a long narrow salient about a mile toward the Union line. This point., known in accounts of the battle as the Bloody Angle was the object of the major federal attacks and the scene of the two break throughs. The first assault was carried out by a command under a Colonel Upton consisting of three brigades of twelve regiments. The attack formation was four lines in depth. The first line after breaking the Confederate works was to divide and half swing in each direction. The second line would stop at the Confederate works and direct its fire straight ahead. The third and fourth lines were to hold and wait for developments. The first line did achieve its break through but Confederate units counter attacked on both flanks and in the center, The Confederate line was restored. The Union loss was 1000, about 20% of the attacking force.

Grant felt that the failure was due to the lack of support. He therefore, planned a second assault on the following day, involving two corps instead of three brigades. The attack was directed by General Hancock and a novel formation used. Barlow's Division of four brigades was famed in two columns of ten lines each or twenty men deep. By the time the assaulting force had advanced the 1200 yards from its deployment point to the Confederate works, the various units became mixed. A break through was achieved but repulsed and driven out later in the day.

The failure to achieve any decisive result at Spotsylvania prompted Grant again to shift to his left in an attempt to get between Lee and Richmond. But Lee shifted too and confronted Grant at the North Anna River. Here Grant did not attack.

Philip H. Sheridan

Grant moved again by the left flank and the two armies came together at Cold Harbor. Lee's army was entrenched in a front of 6 - 8 miles. The Union attack on the center was repulsed with a loss of 6000 in less than an hour. This action provoked a great deal of criticism of Grant and the label "butcher Grant" was quite commonly applied. Stopped in front of Richmond, Grant crossed the James River in an effort to take Petersburg, a city a dozen miles south of Richmond. Capture of Petersburg would have cut the main railroads to the south and forced Lee out of Richmond. But Beauregard with a few troops and home guards held the Petersburg defenses until Lee arrived. The War in the East then settled down for what became a nine-month siege of Richmond and Petersburg. Only one serious attempt was made to break through the fortifications. In Burnside's sector in-front of Petersburg, a mine was dug under the Confederate lines. The mind worked, blowing a good sized breach in the lines. Unfortunately the follow up was poorly handled. Originally it had been planned to have units of Negro troops attack immediately after the explosion. This was countermanded at the last moment. Burnside allowed the officers to draw lots to see who should lead the attack. The charge was made later that the officer in charge was drunk. At any rate, some 4000 Union casualties resulted with very little loss to Lee's forces.

The siege of Richmond was, of course, a precursor of World War I tactics. Elaborate trench systems were dug. Mortars were much used. Heavy siege guns mounted on railway cars were used for the first time in this action. The lines were gradually extended until by February 1865, Lee was holding a line of trenches extending from north of Richmond to south of Petersburg, fifty-three miles in length.

While lines were being stabilized, Lee sent Jubal Early into the Shenandoah Valley to raid toward Washington. Early was unusually successful clearing the Union forces out of the Valley. He crossed the Potomac and appeared before Washington. The VI Corps was detached from Grant's army and sent to the Washington area. The command of all troops in the Valley was then placed under Sheridan and he was instructed to clear Early out of the Valley and eliminate it as a potential resource. Sheridan did the job. He defeated Early at Winchester and Fisherts Hill and then slowly withdrew, devastating the Valley so thoroughly that "a crow flying through the Valley would have to carry his food with him." Sheridan's campaign in the Valley has been much admired. Mr. Starr, who will give the lecture on cavalry tactics, was amazed that I had not selected Cedar Creek as one of the battles to discuss. This, Mr. Starr says, is the perfect example of the combined use of cavalry, artillery and infantry. I find it hard to be enthusiastic about Sheridan.

Action in the West did not get underway until spring. On May 4, three Union armies of the West., the Army of the Cumberland under Thomas., the Army of the Tennessee under McPherson, and the Army of the Ohio under Schofield, moved out of Chattanooga. The armies-numbering over 100,000 men had two objectives; the destruction of Johnston's army of Tennessee, and the capture of Atlanta. Atlanta was second to Richmond as an industrial center.

Joseph E. Johnston who succeeded Bragg as Southern Commander, had served as quartermaster general of the regular army. When McClellan was carrying forward the Peninsular Campaign, Johnston was commander of all Southern units before Richmond. He was severely wounded and replaced by Lee. I do not recall that Johnston ever won another battle after the first Bull Run. But neither did he decisively lose one. He was a master at withdrawing. Of course it must be said that in numbers his army was inferior. When Sherman moved South, Johnston was strongly entrenched near Dalton. Rather than risk a frontal attack, Sherman sent McPherson on a turning movement to the Confederate rear. Johnston pulled out and entrenched at Resaca. Sherman moved against Resaca but the movements were enveloping moves around both flanks. The Confederates again pulled out and moved south to Altoona Pass. At this point, Sherman made a wide swing to the west. At New Hope Church., Johnston intercepted him and for three days there was heavy, skirmishing in this neighborhood. Although-this fighting is labeled skirmishing in the battle accounts, it did result in some 9,000 Federal casualties and 8,000 Confederate.

Sherman again shifted to his left and wound up facing Johnston on Kennesaw Mountain. Here for the first time Sherman decided to try a frontal attack on entrenched positions. The result was, as at Cold Harbor, a complete repulse. Sherman never tried it again and for that matter, neither did Grant try again on the scale of Cold Harbor. I have neglected to give dates for this campaign. Approximately two months were required - May 4 to July 2. On the latter date, Sherman flanked Johnston out of his Kennesaw Mountain line and the Confederates pulled back into the Atlanta fortifications.

William T. Sherman

During the remainder of July and August the Union line was gradually extended to the right and rear of Atlanta. Cavalry, under Stoneman and McCook was sent to tear up railroad tracks on the Macon line. Stoneman requested permission to go on to Macon and Andersonville to free the prisoners held there. McCook was roughly handled and Stoneman and 700 of his troopers captured. Sherman had little regard for cavalry. He decided if you wanted a job done it was better to send the infantry. Accordingly Federal units from Thomas and Howard's commands were pulled and wheeled across the railroads leading south and east. Hood's response was to send Hardee to Jonesboro to drive the Federals from the railroad. Hardee was defeated and Atlanta was evacuated on September 2, 1864. Sherman's men occupied it immediately. The capture of Atlanta was important not only militarily but politically. Lincoln was running for re-election and was opposed by General McClellan campaigning on a peace platform. Grant had driven Lee back into the defences of Richmond but at a terrific cost in casualties. Halleck., the Chief of Staff, wrote to Sherman that he considered the Atlanta campaign the most brilliant of the war. Certainly it was a timely victory.

John Bell Hood

Sherman's artillery consisted of 65 guns divided generally into batteries of four guns. These were also horse drawn. All in all the forage problem was a considerable one. On November 15, began the "March to the Sea" from Atlanta to Savannah. There was no opposition and on December 10, Sherman's army appeared before Savannah having laid waste to an area 50 - 60 miles wide through the heart of Georgia. There was much looting and burning and Sherman's destructive tactics have been said to have anticipated the economic warfare and strategic bombing of World War II.

While Sherman was marching to the sea, Hood was marching north through Tennessee toward Nashville. He narrowly missed intercepting Schofield with the two corps which Sherman had sent to Thomas from Atlanta. One of Schofield's columns passed during one night within 800 yards of Hood's encamped army. On the following day Schofield entrenched at Franklin, was vigorously attacked by Hood. But Hood made the same discovery that Grant had made at Cold Harbor and Sherman made at Kennesaw Mountain. An entrenched force was well nigh impregnable. Schofield did not turn and fight merely for the sake of a fight. It was a delaying action while the Union column bridged and crossed the Harpeth River.

A cleared slope reminiscent of Cold Harbor led up to the Union line. Forrest advised against a frontal attack suggesting instead, crossing the Harpeth below the town and attacking the column on the flank. The temptation to attack a numerically weaker force backed up against a river was too strong for Hood. He threw 18,000 men into a mass frontal attack. This was 3,000 more than Lee used in Pickett's charge. It was 3 o'clock when Hood deployed to attack. At 9 o'clock the fight was over but Hood had lost over 6,000 men. The loss of officers was particularly heavy. Pat Cleburne who has been called the Stonewall Jackson of the West, was killed in this battle.

Hood should have retreated at this point. Instead, on Schofield's withdrawal, the Southern general followed him to Nashville where Thomas had been gathering an army. Thomas was not a man to act impetuously. Grant urged him to attack, ordered him to attack, and then sent General Logan to relieve him. But Thomas attacked on December 15 and drove Hood back. On the following day he renewed the fight and for all intents and purposes eliminated Hood's command as a fighting unit. It should be mentioned that in this battle the Federal cavalry under young General Wilson carried on the most effective cavalry pursuit of the war. It was this action that made sure that Hood's army did not reassemble.

With this battle the war in the West ended. It is true that General Kirby Smith still had an army, in the field across the Mississippi but this was a side show.

On January 1, 1865, Grant's Army of the Potomac was still in the trenches before Petersburg and Richmond. Sherman began his search northward through the coastal swamps., a remarkable accomplishment. On February 17, Sherman entered Columbia, South Carolina, and by the end of the month was near the North Carolina border. The last action of consequence for Sherman's army took place at Bentonville, North Carolina on March 19. Here Johnston had pulled together Hardee's force, the residue of Hood's Army of Tennessee, and Wade Hampton's force. In the record, Bentonville does not loom large, but it was embarrassing to Sherman who thought all organized resistance had collapsed.

Lee was still holding on before Richmond-and Petersburg. On March 25, Lee made one final attack at Fort Steadman. There was a temporary break through, but the Union troops restored the line. On April 1, Grant sent Sheridan around Lee's left. Sheridan's force was met at Five Forks by Pickett. It was a Federal victory and decisive in its effect. Lee could no longer maintain a line of 53 miles. Longstreet was pulled out of the Richmond line. In an endeavor to join up with Johnston, Lee abandoned Petersburg and pushed toward Danville. Sheridan cut across the line of retreat at Appomattox and on April 7, 1865, Lee surrendered to Grant.

The war officially ended in the west when General Taylor surrendered to the Union general, Canby, on May 4. General Wilson had defeated General Forrest at Selma on April 2. The last army to surrender was that of General Kirby Smith who surrendered his Trans-Mississippi forces to Canby on May 26.

What were the innovations in the Civil War? For the first time the steamboat and the railroad were available and were used extensively on both sides. Supplying such operations as McClellan's Peninsular campaign or Sherman's Atlanta campaign would not have been possible without these improved transportation forms.

New means of communication and observation-were available: the balloon, the telegraph and signal units. Weapon wise, there were train-borne siege guns, rifled artillery, long-range rifles and breech loaders toward the end of the war.

Defensive warfare saw the rapid development of the use of the trench, land mines, and perhaps most effective, the great increase in fire power afforded by breech loaders.

In battle tactics this was the last American war in which massed formations were used. There was a gradual changeover during the war from the formal dressed line attack to skirmish lines. The real changeover became impossible with the breech loader. It was really necessary to remain upright to load a muzzle loading rifle.

A principal change in the American Civil War was its approach to total war. Sherman's March to the Sea and Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley campaign with the planned destruction of civilian property was inaugurated.