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By Ernest I. Miller

November 21, 1957

© 1996 The Cincinnati Civil War Round Table

From a military standpoint the East Tennessee campaigns were of no great significance in the Civil War. Politically, however, the area was important. The entire section of Tennessee east of the Cumberland plateau was predominately Union in its sympathies. The mountain and river valley area along the Upper Tennessee and its tributaries was a region of small farms. Slave owners were rare. Consequently in the state referendum in Tennessee, secession lost by some 20,000 votes-in the eastern counties. A convention was held of representatives from this area and a memorial of the State Legislature was approved-acting legislative consent to the formation of a new state, this state to remain in the Union. Although he was an enthusiastic secessionists, the Tennessee governor wasn't going to have one third of his state withdrawing. His answer to the petition was to send General Zollicoffer and his military staff to Knoxville. There ensued a gradually stiffening military control of the area. Such vocal East Tennesseans as Parson Brownlow and Andrew Johnson were quick to point out that in effect a free state was occupied by rebel forces. In the fall election the three mountain congressional districts elected Union men. These men maintained they were properly members-elect of the United States Congress not of the Confederacy and they set out for Washington to occupy their seats. Only one of the men eluded Confederate authorities.

Washington was not unaware of events in Tennessee. The President was advised that at the entry of a Union army the population would rise up to welcome the liberator. Since a similarly inviting picture, but with considerably less justification prompted Robert E. Lee to invade Maryland it is understandable that Abraham Lincoln was eager to send an army to liberate the loyal mountaineers.

Consequently, the first invasion of the South, west of the Appalachians was to have been through Kentucky, Cumberland Gap and into East Tennessee. At this early period of the war there was military as well as political justification for the action. The railroad line connecting Virginia with Chattanooga and the Southwest could have been cut. Two principal sources of strategic materials, salt and copper could also have been threatened. Saltville, near Abingdon in Southwest, Virginia produced from brine wells most of the salt used in the east. The operations continued until the end of 1864. 1 The second essential resource in East Tennessee was the copper region at Ducktown. Copper mines there produced ninety percent of the Confederate copper. 2

George B. McClellan
An early move into Tennessee did not take place, however. General Buell then in command of the Department of the Ohio was more interested in moving on Nashville. Even after The way was left open by the defeat of Zollicoffer by Thomas at Mill Springs in January of 1862, Buell did not authorize a move into the mountain region. Lincoln wired Buell at this time asking if arms had gone forward to East Tennessee as had been ordered. Buell replied in part ' ... my preparations have had this movement constantly in view ... As earnestly as I wish to accomplish it, my judgment has from the first been decidedly against it". 3 Harry Truman would have fired Buell at this usurpation of authority but Lincoln turned the matter over to McClellan. The Little Napoleon was an old friend of Buell's but he wrote him impatiently as follows; "I was extremely sorry to learn from your telegram to the President that you ascribed from the beginning little or no importance to a movement in East Tennessee."

"My own general plans for the prosecution of the war make the speedy occupation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway matters of absolute necessity."4 McClellan went on to add that Although Buell's Louisville advisors might want Nashville taken, Washington did not regard this as important.

A letter a week later from Buell indicated that he was smarting under this verbal spanking. Not smarting enough to move rapidly, however. He ordered General Thomas who had moved to Somerset after Mill Spring to push on toward Knoxville. But the roads were bad and Thomas, as subsequent events demonstrated was no ball of fire on the offense even if he had few equals on the defense.

Don Carlos Buell
But there was a man of action in the West. The campaigns of Grant in West Kentucky and Tennessee pulled Buell toward Nashville where he wanted to go in the first place. And Lincoln since he couldn't get an army into East Tennessee thought he might help matters with a railroad and urged Congress to provide for one. Nothing happened. A vacuum doesn't exist during war either and the Confederates sent Kirby Smith into the region. It served as his jumping off place on his 1862 march on Cincinnati.

Occupation by Confederate troops did not eliminate Union sentiment in East Tennessee. There was continual bushwacking, bridge burning, and according to Parson Brownlow general abuse of Union men. The Parson himself was ushered out of Knoxville. and the Confederacy. He was sent through the lines at Nashville and came to Cincinnati on the steamer Jacob Strader in the spring of 1862. He was met at the wharf, the Parson reports, "by Messrs. Geffroy and Gibson, the proprietors of the well-kept, quiet hotel, the Gibson Rouse on Walnut Street and (they) kindly tendered the hospitalities of their house as long as ~ chose to remain.~5 He wan then taken to the Merchant's Exchange and after a short speech there he was taken on "a most agreeable drive through Clifton and Spring Grove viewing the most populous city of the west.6

But Mr. Brownlow's vivid account of his imprisonment by the Confederates and the hardships suffered by his fellow loyalists did not liberate East Tennessee. That had to await Union occupation nearly two years later. An estimate by N. 6. Taylor of the number of Union sympathizers killed during Confederate occupation was 2 to 3 thousand persons. This is a prejudiced estimate. The name source gives an estimate of 30,000 recruits to the Union army from this area.

The first Union movement into East Tennessee was a cavalry raid by General William P. Sanders during June 1863. This force of 1500 men struck the railroad at Lenoir City some 25 miles south of Knoxville. and at mile intervals tore up the tracks of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. But the actual invasion devolved on the Union commanders from the Department of the Ohio, and the Department of the Cumberland, Generals Burnside and Rosecrans.

Ambrose Burnside
General Ambrose Burnside came to the Department of the Ohio after a brief and highly unsuccessful career as commander of the Army of the Potomac. He arrived in Cincinnati late in March of 1863 and according to a biographer immediately "saw the necessity of a larger military force than was then in the Department."8 This was hardly a flash of genius since few Civil War commanders on either side ever felt that their commands were large enough to go into action. What Burnside really wanted was the 9th Corps which he had commanded prior to his elevation to an army commander. Two divisions of the Corps under Willcox and Potter were sent to him. Burnside's first action in his new command was a minor engagement at Somerset, a short account of which appeared in our August Newsletter.9

It was not until the end of May that Burnside felt he had civil affairs in his Department well enough in hand to take the field. In justice to him it should be said that he had stirred up things a bit on the home front. The antiwar sentiment in Ohio and Indiana was not to Burnside's liking and he attempted to exercise some control over it. His most newsworthy act was to arrest Vallandigham, the Ohio Copperhead and try him before a military commission. Lincoln, of course, commuted the sentence and dispatched Vallandigham through the Confederate lines.

But to return to military matters, Burnside having worked out a time table with Rosecrans in Nashville left Cincinnati on June 2 to begin his march from Lexington into Tennessee. Literally on the eve of breaking camp at Lexington, Grant's activities again delayed the invasion. The 9th Corps was ordered to Mississippi.

Rosecrans moved from Nashville to Winchester early in the summer. The only other action was the previously mentioned cavalry raid by General Sanders. On the 16th of August, 6 months after he had reported to the Department of the Ohio Burnside moved out from Lexington. There were extenuating circumstances. The raid of General Morgan through Indiana and Ohio to put it mildly disrupted things and the absent 9th Corps was not returned until after the movement into Tennessee was underway.

William S. Rosecrans
The army moved out from Lexington in 3 columns, the center column under Burnside moving down what is now U.S. 25 until Williamsburg was reached. The right wing under General Hartsuff moved on a route equivalent to U.S. 27. Two columns of troops from Central Kentucky marched from Glasgow and Columbia and rendezvoused at Jamestown, Tennessee. Here they joined Hartsuff's wing and at Huntsville all columns were concentrated except the cavalry which marched through Jacksboro directly to Knoxville. The infantry moved on Kingston, 40 miles southwest of Knoxville. This city was occupied in September 1st and on September 3rd Burnside was in Knoxville. The Confederates under General Buckner had evacuated Knoxville. and joined Bragg near Chattanooga. Rosecrans with his army had without a battle maneuvered Bragg out of Chattanooga. East Tennessee was cleared of every major force of Confederates without a major engagement.

Burnside's march from Lexington to Kingston, some 225 to 250 miles was made in 14 days. Recalling what some of the roads were in Tennessee 25 years ago, I am inclined to think that the average of 15-20 miles a day with an army of 15,000 men was quite an operation. One officer reported it to be the most beautiful march of the war. The official history of the 9th Corps termed it as hard a period of marching as WAS done by any army in the course of the war.

Burnside waited in Knoxville. only long enough to receive the ovations of the citizens. "The-joy-of such a triumph-, says a biographer "might well repay for the disappointment and defeat at Fredricksburg.10 He then pushed on 60 miles in two days to Cumberland Gap. Here General Frazer the Confederate commander surrendered with his 2500 troops.

One of the Civil War stories which my wife's grandmother recalled concerned her uncle, a Confederate artillery major stationed at Cumberland Gap. Rather than surrender his guns he pushed them off the mountain. However, the Major spent the rest of the war at Johnson's Island. She recalled, too, that A dress uniform of this uncle (Major Thomas O'Connor) was carefully concealed in a straw tick at the time of Burnside's entry into Knoxville.11

Cumberland Gap was surrendered on September 9 and for the next month there was little action. Burnside was advised by Halleck that the Army of the Cumberland had occupied Chattanooga, but that Confederate movements indicated that there would be a concentration against Rosecrans. He was ordered therefore to dispatch all available troops toward Chattanooga. Accordingly Burnside pulled back somewhat from the area north and east of Knoxville. This region surrounding the present cities of Johnson City, Kingsport and Bristol was occupied by a number of Confederate units under the command of General Ransom. included in his command was the Fourth Kentucky, a cavalry unit recruited largely from the Ohio River counties. Kentucky Cavaliers the recently reissued history of this regiment has a rather detailed, although somewhat confusing account of the upper Tennessee Valley action. There were numerous cavalry brushes and two days of lively action involving units of the 9th Corps and a brigade under the command of the Confederate general Cerro Gordo Williams. These actions in Blue Springs on October 9 and the following day at Rheatown were victories for the numerically superior Union force. Ransom withdrew his forces slightly to the North and Burnside as mentioned turned hi. attention to the South. Bragg's victory at Chickamauga brought General Grant into the Tennessee area. He was given command of all troops east of the Mississippi and west of the Alleghenies. Grant's first requests of Burnside were that he send cavalry units to cut the railroad lines around Atlanta in order that pressure might be taken off Thomas in Chattanooga. Grant was working from a map rather than from a knowledge of the country. The terrain is such that you can not move directly south from Knoxville. Because of the mountain barrier the Tennessee River flows in a south southwesterly direction and the roads and railroads follow the same pattern. Thus although Knoxville is east of Atlanta (and sixty miles east of Chattanooga) the most direct road swings in a bow toward the west and passes within thirty miles of Chattanooga.

Some of the terminology in Grant's letters to Burnside indicates, too his lack of familiarity with the Area. He speaks of the Confederate advance from Chattanooga as being OR the right wing of Burnside's army. Technically this is probably correct but actually Burnside was deployed along a river valley. He could be attacked only at either end of his line. It is possible that Grant's concept of Burnside's line as a conventional east-west deployment was responsible for a step-up of the attack on Bragg on Missionary Ridge. On November 7, Grant received a report from Burnside of the humiliating defeat at Rogersville of the brigade of Colonel Israel Garrard. Grant took it to mean that Burnside's left wing was smashed. He ordered Thomas to attack Missionary Ridge not later than the following morning. Two weeks later Grant reported to Halleck that it had not been possible for Thomas to carry out the order since the artillery could not be moved. "I have never felt-, said Grant "such restlessness before as I have at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of the Cumberland."12

The reverse at Rogersville, mentioned in the preceding paragraph was not A disaster and Burnside did not overestimate it nor an earlier cavalry defeat at Philadelphia, south of Knoxville. Indeed the history of the 79th New York Highlanders reports that this unit was erecting huts preparatory to going into winter quarters near Loudon. This was a bit previous for on November 14 Longstreet appeared below Loudon. It had been rumored for some weeks that a part of Bragg's army was moving against Burnside so the Union force was not caught by surprise. Grant had urged that the Army of the Ohio be based at Kingston. Burnside held out for Knoxville. Charles Dana and Colonel James Wilson representing Grant conferred with Burnside in Knoxville. and approved his plan. In summary this plan provided for the abandonment of Loudon and Lenoir's and the defense of Knoxville. If pushed out of there he could withdraw to Cumberland Gap. Wilson in his dispatch to Grant emphasized that it was not Burnside's intention to abandon East Tennessee.13 The reaction of Halleck and the War Department to the news of the withdrawal from Loudon indicated little confidence in Burnside's intention. Grant was urged to move against Bragg, against Longstreet, or to do something at least that would save Burnside and East Tennessee.

From the vantage point of ninety years, Burnside's handling of the campaign seems able. He did not panic and, as one of his officers pointed out in a later report since the action turned-out favorably the plans followed appeared to be good. Captain Poe, the-Army of the Ohio engineering officer was ordered back to Knoxville as the withdrawal began. He was directed to select the defense lines and to place the troops as they reached the city. Poe had gone over the ground ens was, of course, familiar with the military organization of the Union army. In addition he was apparently a competent man. His detailed report and day-by-day account of the siege is the best single account of the action from November 14 until the lifting of the siege. The compilers of the Official Record also liked it. Poe submitted his report to three superior officers Burnside, the officer in charge of the Cincinnati Engineer's office, and to the commanding general of the Mississippi River division. The Official Record carries All three reports on consecutive pages although they are virtually identical.

Some description of Knoxville may be in order. It is located a few miles below the juncture of the Holston and French Broad Rivers. At the time of the War the river was known as the Holston as far south as the mouth of the present Little Tennessee River. Present day Knoxville spreads out on both sides of the river but in 1863 it lay entirely on the north bank. Its population was confined to what is now the business district. This district, about a mile square, is located on a flat-top ridge which rises rather sharply some 150 feet above the river bed. The ridge which runs continuously along the river for many miles is intersected at Knoxville by three creeks. First Creek forms the eastern boundary of the business district, Second Creek lies about three-quarters of a mile west, and Third Creek a mile to the west of this. At the north edge of the town there drop into the valley along which the railroad line was laid. The town was defensible against the weapons available in that period. All that was needed was a little time and this Burnside proposed to give his engineer. Longstreet should also be credited with an assist. He was moving cautiously.

James Longstreet
On Friday evening, November 13th and Saturday morning November 14th, Longstreet put his troops across the Tennessee River at Loudon. There was some skirmishing on Saturday afternoon and Longstreet's advance units were driven back. However, during the night the Union forces withdrew to Lenoir's. The next day (Sunday) late in the day the Confederate commander endeavored to attack but, to quote the general's report, "the ground was so muddy and the hills so high (almost mountains) we were not able to get one division up and in position until after night."14 By morning Burnside was gone again, this time leaving a few wagons behind.

Heavier action took place the following day at Campbell's Station, a road junction about 15 miles outside Knoxville. Longstreet endeavored to intercept Burnside at this point, sending one of his divisions on the river road in pursuit of the Union forces while McLaws' division was sent on the road connecting with the Kingston Pike. Burnside anticipated the Confederate move and a division of the 9th Corps was thrown across the Kingston Pike beyond this fork. The unit reached the spot fifteen minutes before the Confederate advance guard arrived but held until the entire Union army had passed. For the rest of the day the Union forces held at Campbell's station.

The historian of the 9th Corps terms this the decisive battle of the East Tennessee campaign. Longstreet dismisses the action with two short paragraphs blaming General Laws for not moving up in time for decisive action. The Federal loss in killed, wounded and missing was about 300. General Alexander reported the Confederate loss at174 killed and wounded. These are not heavy casualties in an action with 20 to 30 thousand troops involved. From the Union point of view it was a successful day for the entire army pulled back in order that night into Knoxville. There they were placed into previously selected defense positions by Captain Poe the engineer officer.

On the following day (November 18) dismounted Union cavalry under General Sanders fought a delaying action. Alexander termed this day's action "close reconnaisance" The Union force lost General Sanders, one of their few promising young cavalry officers. He was a Kentuckian, graduate of West Point, class of 1856, and a relative of Jefferson Davis. On the 19th Longstreet began the investment of Knoxville.

As in most battles there is no precise agreement as to relative strength of the opposing armies. To illustrate, a contemporary Union account credits Longstreet with having three times as many troops as Burnside. Sherman in his memoirs reports that Burnside had 12,000 troops. Alexander, the Confederate artillery officer, who is trustworthy on most things and even on the size of the enemy force reports that Burnside had 12,000 infantry and artillery plus 8,500 cavalry. The official figures filed by Burnside on November 30th gives 14,300 troops present in the 9th and 23rd Corps plus 10,000 cavalry. But the cavalry was largely stationed in the Upper Valley and Dana reported that 3,000 cavalry were present at Knoxville. A fair assumption is that the Union force defending the city totaled 17,000 men. Longstreet left Chattanooga with a force of 12,000 men. To this was added later-two small divisions totaling 3,500 men. And Wheeler's cavalry, although not a part of Longstreet's command, operated under his orders. This increased the Confederate force surrounding Knoxville by another 5,000 and brought its total to approximately 20,000 men. (Parenthetically I might add that the Confederate commanders have an annoying habit of reporting in detail the units in their commands, together with the officers, but the number of men in the organizations is omitted. Thus Longstreet gives every regiment and battery in his command together with the commending officers but not once could I find the number of men listed.)

Longstreet's army was not a hastily gathered inexperienced unit. It was as Douglas Freeman pointed, out, "the famous First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia."15 Some of its units were among the Confederacy's most renowned. There was Hood's Division now commanded by Jenkins since Hood had been wounded at Chickamauga. In this division were such brigades as Law's Alabamans, Anderson's Texans (which had been Hood's brigade) and Jenkins' brigade of South Carolinians, which included the Hampton Legion. McLaws' Division had equally distinguished units. Among these were Kershaw's brigade, Humphrey's Mississippian's and Wofford's Georgia brigade. Yet this army was to experience a repulse which Freeman termed as complete as was seen in the entire war.

The explanation for this defeat lies to a degree in Longstreet, of course. It would be unfair to give no credit to Burnside. However, the defense lines which Captain Poe had selected and the occupying troops had further fortified were more responsible than either commander for the outcome of the action.

To return to a chronological description, Longstreet as was previously mentioned, had nearly encircled the town on November 19th. The Union lines consisted of strong points on the hills connected by trenches. On the west the line began at the river and ran north along two hills west of the Third Creek. For those familiar with Knoxville, the University of Tennessee campus now covers most of this area. At a rectangular strong point, called Fort Sanders, the line turned east and ran along the crest of the hill overlooking the valley through which the railroad line ran. There is a sharp drop into this valley. On the east of the town the lines ran along Temperance and Mabry Hills to the river. A pontoon bridge had been thrown across the river and a force of dismounted cavalry held the Union line anchored on three hills south of the river. For a part of the time we lived in Knoxville. we occupied an apartment on the central hill south of the river. The entrenchments were at that time (20 years ago) still faintly visible. The area has since been completely built up.

For a week other than "feeling out. defense positions Longstreet did little. There was apparently no intention on his part to undertake a siege. Despite alarming messages that reached Grant, the Union force was never seriously short of provisions. Indeed Captain Poe reported that there were more supplies at the end of the siege than at its beginning. One of the stories which has been handed down is that Longstreet's map showed the French Broad joining the Holston below Knoxville and he ignored the advice of local residents to blockade that river. At any rate food supplies came in quite freely from Sevier and other mountain counties. Perhaps a related point is that at the end of his report on the battle of Knoxville, Longstreet apologized for not being able to secure a topographic map to include with his report.

Longstreet revealed during the week of November 20-27 the indecision that haunted many Civil War commanders. He couldn't make up his mind if, when, or where to attack. Be waited first for Gracie and Johnson to join him and they arrived on the night of the 26th. On the same evening General Leadbetter, Bragg's chief engineer arrived and with the Confederate commander spent the 27th viewing the defense works. There was agreement among Longstreet's officers that the most promising point for attack was Fort Sanders. Leadbetter first disagreed, then agreed and urged that there be no further delay in launching an attack. The attack was therefore planned for the following day, the 28th of November but a steady rain caused a postponement until the following morning. The forces chosen for the attack were two brigages of McLaws division, Wofford's Georgians and Humphrey's Mississippi brigade. Fort Sanders, the point to be attacked was a rectangular fortification 125 yards by 95 yards in dimension with earthen walls on three sides. A ditch some twelve feet wide and eight feet in depth had been dug in front of the walls. The slope in front of the fort had been cleared of trees and telegraph wire strung from stump to stump. This sounds like a formidable point to attack and indeed it proved to be. The Confederates viewed the spot favorably because due to a break in the slope running down to Third Creek, it was possible to bring a considerable body of troops within 150 yards of the fort before exposing them to fire. At most points, Alexander reported the Federal guns had a clear sweep of a mile.

Braxton Bragg
Rumors had reached Longstreet that Bragg had been defeated and that Sherman was marching to Burnside's relief. It was clear that if he were to attack it could no longer be postponed. Accordingly, at the first sign of daylight signal guns were fired and after a brief artillery barrage Wofford's columns advanced. There was trouble immediately. The wire entanglements had not been anticipated and the men had no axes or tools for clearing. The slope was icy and slippery and the columns ran into each other and finally massed in the ditch before the Fort with no way to get up the twenty foot walls. Benjamin's battery was stationed in the fort and since it was not possible to fire cannon into the ditch, shells were lighted and thrown into the ditch as grenades. An intense enfilading fire from the adjoining trenches as well as from the Fort resulted in severe casualties among the Confederates. Longstreet receiving an alarming report, ordered a withdrawal. In his autobiography, written thirty years later the General spoke favorably of the attacking brigades and blamed himself for the failure. The recall order he thought had been given too soon. A look at the casualty table seems to indicate that Longstreet acted properly. The Confederates lost 813 men, 129 of them killed, in what Alexander estimated was a 20-minute fight.

When the firing stopped Burnside proposed a truce so that the wounded and dead might be removed from the ditch and slope before Fort Sanders. Longstreet gratefully accepted. The truce extended to nightfall and no further attack was made.

On the Union side casualties were light. The total force in Fort Sanders consisted of less than 200 men from the 79th Highlanders, a New York volunteer regiment, the 2nd Michigan Infantry and two companies from the 29th Massachusetts Infantry were on the flanks. The total casualties for the day, Burnside reported as 20, of whom 8 were killed. Four of the dead and five of the wounded were from the Highlander regiment in the point of the Fort.

The attack and repulse of the Confederates marked the end of significant offensive action in East Tennessee. On December 4th Longstreet on the approach of Sherman's columns began a slow withdrawal northeastward toward the Virginia border. Sherman arrived in Knoxville on the 6th of December expecting to find a starved garrison. Instead he was Burnside's guest at a turkey dinner served with silver, linen, and all the niceties of home. This was the first time in the war that he had been so served, Sherman reported.

A pursuit of Longstreet was ordered and a brief but bloody fight occurred at Bean Station. The winter quarters established by the Confederates at Greenville were not seriously molested by the Union forces. In the spring Lee ordered his absent corps to rejoin him. A campaign into Kentucky proposed by Longstreet was not approved. Needless to say the Tennessee campaign did little to enhance Longstreet's reputation. Freeman comments that in Tennessee Longstreet had done poorly in all the actions he had directed independently. In summarizing this period of Longstreet's career Freeman said of him, "He personified the familiar danger to effective organization of an army, the danger that a competent executive officer will destroy his usefulness by regarding himself as a great strategist."16

Knoxville marked the high spot of Burnside's military career. He had come West after the defeat at Fredricksburg had ended his usefulness in the Army of the Potomac. His delay at Antietam may have saved Lee from a humiliating defeat. His role in the Battle of the Crater was, as Joe Stern has reported, scarcely marked by leadership qualities. Grant, asked for his opinion of Burnside commented that he was a generous and loyal soldier who should never have been assigned an independent command. This weakness wasn't peculiar to Burnside. As a test name a half-dozen general officers on either side who demonstrated the capability of commanding an army in the field.

Curiously, had transportation been adequate Burnside would have missed the crowning action of his career. He had experienced a recurrence of an old disability and had asked to be relieved of his command. The order directing General John Foster to relieve Burnside as commander of the Army of the Ohio was dated November 14. However, Foster did not reach Knoxville until December 11. By that time Burnside was an established hero. He and his army were thanked by the President for their victory and Congress passed a resolution of appreciation.

The occupation of East Tennessee for several months by two armies produced a good bit of hardship among the citizens. The stories of Unionist suffering during the Confederate occupation was responsible for the establishment of the East Tennessee Relief Association which collected and expended over 252,000 dollars. Most of the money WAS collected in New England and Pennsylvania but the Association purchasing agent was stationed in Cincinnati so it may be assumed a good bit of the money ended up in our city.

There are few visible evidences in Knoxville of the Civil War days. On the corner of Clinch and 16th there is a monument to the New York Highlanders and on 17th and Laurel, two blocks away the U.D.C. erected a monument to all of the Confederate participants. A national cemetery adjoins the Old Gray cemetery on North Broadway, and a Confederate cemetery is located in the eastern part of the city. The Armstrong house where Longstreet had his headquarters still stands. The Fort Sanders Hospital stands several blocks west of the fortification for which it was named. Political reminders of the Civil War are two Republican representatives in the United States Congress. The Second District which includes Knoxville. has been represented continuously by a Republican since the readmission of Tennessee to the Union. Not so visible but still evidence of the East Tennessee campaigns is a considerable literature. There are two books devoted to it and, of course, mention is made of it in the histories of the units involved. Despite this, it is not a well known action, certainly not in the area in which it occurred. This probably proves that my opening statement was correct, "From a military standpoint ..... the campaigns were of little significance.

Read before the Cincinnati Civil War Roundtable November 21, 1957


1-Miller, D.L. Vulcan and the Confederacy. 1957. Unpub. mss. p.ll
2-Ibid. p.20
3-Official Record 7, p. 527
4-Ibid, p. 531
5 - Parson Brownlow's book. 1862. p.399
6 - Ibid, p. 400
7 - Humes, T. W. The loyal mountaineers. 1888. p. 307
8 - Woodbury, A. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside and the 9th Army Corps. Providence, 1867. p.262
9 - Cincinnati Civil War Roundtable. Newsletter, Aug. 1957
10 - Woodbury, Agustus. op. cit. p. 309
11 - Conner, Lula Price The O'Conner-Conner-Simmons Families. Southern Pines, N. C., 1941. p. 24
12- Official Record, V. 31, pt. 3, p. 216
13 - Ibid V. 31, pt. 1, p. 266-67.
14 - Ibid, V. 31, pt. 1, p.457.
15 - Freeman, D.S. Lee's lieutenants. Scribners, 1944. v.3,p.297
16 - Ibid, v.3, p.314


Alexander, E. P., Military memoirs of a Confederate, New York, 1907.
Freeman, D. S., Lee's Lieutenants. New York, 1944. v.3, p286-314.
Humes, T. W., The Loyal Mountaineer of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1888.
Moagrove, G. D., Kentucky Cavaliers in Dixie, Jackson. Tenn., 1957.
Poore, Ben Perley, The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside. Providence, 1882.
Rule, William, Standard History of Knoxville, Tennessee, Chicago, 1900
Temple, Oliver P., East Tennessee and the Civil War, Cincinnati, 1899.
Todd, William, The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders, New York Volunteers, Albany, 1886.
Williams, K. P., Lincoln Finds a General, New York, 1952. v. 3, 109-112; 132-144; 162-167.
Woodbury, Augustus, Major General Ambrose Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps, Providence, 1867.
Burrage, H. S., Burnside's East Tennessee Campaign, In Commager, Henry - The Blue and the Gray. p.914-919.
Longstreet, J., From Manassas to Appamattox. Philadelphia, 1896.

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