U.S. Grant

And finally, there were the three armies of General William Tecumseh Sherman, located in the vicinity of Chattanooga, Tennessee. These forces opposed the Confederates of General Joseph E. Johnston, arrayed in a defensive position near Dalton, Georgia. Sherman's orders were simple, as delivered by Grant. "You, I propose," wrote Grant on the fourth of April, "to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources."

William T. Sherman

Implicit in these instructions was the assumption that Confederate forces, engaged on multiple fronts, would not be able to reinforce other critical sectors. Fresh in the mind of Grant was the successful transfer of two division of the Army of Northern Virginia, under the command of General James Longstreet, that previous September to the western army of General Braxton Bragg. In the resulting battle of Chickamauga, the Federals came within an eye-lash of annihilation -- much due to the presence and command provided by the eastern Rebel units. Grant wished to minimize the opportunities of the South to use its interior lines of communication to shuttle forces from one theater of operations to another, thus maintaining its numerical superiority on each and every front.

The command structures of the two opposing forces, and the personalities within those commands, are an interesting study. Perhaps at no time during the War was there a more striking change in outlook as the one undergone by Union forces from September of 1863 to May of 1864. Severely routed and saved by the cool command presence of General George Thomas, the aftermath of the battle near Chickamauga Creek left the Federals besieged in Chattanooga, demoralized and starving. General William Starke Rosecrans, who had led the Yankees during the campaign, was replaced by Grant, who proceeded to bring Sherman and his forces east from the vicinity of Vicksburg. Within two months the Union forces retrieved their fortunes with the twin battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge and forced Bragg and his Confederates into the mountains of northern Georgia.

Union command was turned over to Major General William T. Sherman, and was to him that Grant entrusted command of the main western Federal armies. Here we see a man who, on the surface, had not displayed the high level of military talent that one would have presumed for the head of the western army.

A good performance at the battle of First Manassas had been followed by an undistinguished -- indeed, almost career-ending escapade as commander of Federal forces in Kentucky. Accused of insanity by the press, he did exhibit signs of emotional instability. Put in command of the 5th Division of the Army of the Tennessee, it was Sherman who was surprised at Pittsburg Landing in the opening of the battle of Shiloh. His on-field efforts to rally the routed Union troops, however, resulted in citations from both Grant and General Henry Halleck.

Sherman convinced Grant not to resign while Grant was receiving slights and condemnation from Halleck in the aftermath of Shiloh. Notes historian Mark Boatner, Sherman seemed to find himself under Grant's leadership, and seems to have helped Grant in much the same way.

West Point Military Atlas - Northern Georgia

Thus, at the opening of the campaign, Sherman had in no way distinguished himself as had Grant, or for that matter, Thomas. But command he did, none the less. His army was made up of three units. The huge Army of the Cumberland, 60,700 strong, was commanded by Thomas. The 24,000 man Army of the Tennessee was headed up by Major General James McPherson (another Ohioan, a Grant/Sherman favorite without strong battle credentials), while the final unit, the 13,500 strong Army of the Ohio was led by the ambitious Major General John Schofield. By May 1, 1864, these armies stood well equipped, well provisioned, poised and ready to move on Atlanta.

Such was not the case in Dalton, a scant twenty-five miles from Chattanooga. There, the Army of Tennessee, beset with strife, friction, and a general lack of everything, lay in wait for the Federal onslaught.

The problems started in Richmond, Virginia, and had at their heart the leadership and inter-personal skills of Braxton Bragg and Jefferson Davis.

After embroiling himself in recriminations with subordinates over the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns, and eventually losing everything in the debacle at Missionary Ridge on November 25, 1863, Bragg resigned his command of the western army on November 28. True to form, as he wrote his official report he blamed the loss on cowardice and the reputed drunkenness of one of his corps commanders. Completing a career in field command that battles at such places as Perryville, Stones River, Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge proved he was incapable as a battle commander, Bragg was rewarded by his good friend President Davis with the post of military advisor to the president. It would prove to be an unfortunate appointment for Joseph E. Johnston.

Joseph E. Johnston

Joseph E. Johnston took command of the Army of Tennessee on December 27, 1963. It was far from a happy appointment by President Davis.

To state that Davis was not a strong supporter of Johnston's would indeed be an understatement. In the month following Bragg's resignation, General William Hardee had temporarily run the army, but "Old Reliable", as he was known, seemed to have a reluctance to assume greater power and declined to assume permanent command. This left Davis with the choice of appointing either Johnston or General P.G.T. Beauregard. Davis was no fan of either man, and most likely made his final decision in light of the strong political support for Johnston that existed in the Confederate Congress, as well as recommendations that came from Robert E. Lee himself.

That the Rebel high command never truly understood the western theater, especially during this time, there can be little doubt. No better indication of this can be found by the immediate game of argument and counter-argument started between Davis and Johnston concerning the strategic role of the Army of Tennessee -- that of offensive or defensive.

Jefferson F. Davis

William J. Hardee

These reports, however, gave Davis the false sense that the base army was intact, and all that remained for the Confederates to do was to merely mount an offensive! To these claims, Johnston began a two-prong theme in his correspondence. First, his army was in no way capable of sustaining an offensive. The enemy was twice his size, he had insufficient wagons and cavalry to support such a strategy, and besides, he could barely support a defensive strategy, let alone an offensive one.

His second point, on the subject of an offensive, was just as simply put: Where and what should he invade? If his general goal was middle Tennessee -- the fertile Duck and Elk River valleys and the cities of Nashville and Murfreesboro -- he had to get there first. Without cavalry support or adequate wagons with which to haul provisions, his army would have to cross the barren Sand-Lookout ranges in northern Georgia and Alabama, as well as cross the Tennessee River. An invasion of eastern Tennessee seemed equally absurd from Johnston's perspective. Again, the key question was where to go? Already, Longstreet's detached units in eastern Tennessee were having serious supply concerns. If middle Tennessee was the goal, the rugged and supply sparse Cumberland Mountains would have to be crossed. Worse, the Federals still held the railroad all the way to Chattanooga, giving the Yankees the true luxury of interior lines of communication.

No, in Johnston's view, an offensive would have to wait. Instead, in Old Joe's eyes, the correct posture would be one of defensive-offensive. He would await Sherman at Dalton, defeat him, and then advance into Tennessee. This stand-off in strategic direction clearly set the stage for communication between Dalton and Richmond -- at least, such as they were.

In the meantime, Johnston set to work improving conditions in the Army of Tennessee. Supplies began to arrive, and a new system of furloughs was put into place -- one-third of the army at a time -- until every soldier had a chance to visit home. Morale did improve, and desertions dropped.

All throughout the winter, the Confederates dreamed and schemed of an advance. A particular pawn in this game was the two-division force of General James Longstreet that was wintering in the Holston River Valley of eastern Tennessee. Sent to Knoxville by Bragg in November of 1863, a result of petty intrigue on the part of Longstreet and other senior Army officers, his force had been effectively taken out of the military picture for several months.

James Longstreet

And finally, at a time when unity of command (something rare and difficult to find in the Confederate western army) was so desperately needed, Johnston began to develop rifts with his three major corps commanders. The situation was unfortunately similar in many respects to the problems encountered by his predecessor, Bragg.

Part of the problem was Johnston himself. Personally committed to the interests of the men of his command, he was unable to cope with superiors, and often, direct subordinates. His dealings with Richmond directly reflected these attitudes.

The chief three commanders of infantry corps during the campaign were to be Hardee, General Leonidas Polk, and General John Bell Hood. Johnston began to immediately develop problems with Hardee shortly after assuming command. Some of it may have been due to Hardee's overly optimistic December reports, and difficulties in which they placed Johnston. As the campaign developed, Hardee became increasingly upset that Johnston did not consult with him on elements of strategy. The bottom line result was that Hardee made little effort to use his influence with Davis on Johnston's behalf.

Things weren't much better with Polk. At the start of the campaign, the bishop-general was serving in northern Mississippi, having been exiled there by Bragg for his Chickamauga performance. Polk was caught in a command-level game of tug-of-war with his command as the prize. Polk was one of those western Confederate generals who were friends with President Davis, but bitter enemies of Bragg. Johnston was a preferred commander over Bragg, but his feud with Davis created problems of harmony for Polk.

John Bell Hood

Sadly for Johnston, he had a corps command to fill. T.C. Hindman had been filling the post for Bragg, but was justifiably censured for his timidity at McLemore's Cove the previous September. General Pat Cleburne was certainly qualified and capable, but his December circular calling for the arming of slaves in return for their freedom killed his chances. Thus, on February 4, Hood arrived in Dalton to assume command. Johnston, unaware of what lay in store for him, saw Hood as an ideal candidate, and justifiably so. He even told his congressional ally Louis T. Wigfall in April that his greatest comfort since arriving at Dalton was the coming of Hood to the army.

So there we have it -- the stage is set for the great drama. Sherman sits in Chattanooga with his two major goals: Johnston's army and the interior of the South, represented by the city of Atlanta. Johnston's job was to hold off Sherman, find an opening from which to defeat him, and strike north to regain Tennessee and possibly even Kentucky. Although not particularly discussed at any great length in the correspondence of the day, time was on the side of the Confederates. The longer the war continued and the closer it came towards the 1864 presidential election, the greater the chance of a negotiated peace.

On the second day of May, 1864, operations commenced for the Federal army. The Army of the Cumberland, under General Thomas, moved to Ringgold, the first gap in a series of ridges that ran in a generally north-south direction in northern Georgia. The vanguard of his troops reached Tunnel Hill, a point where the Western & Atlantic railroad cut through one of those many ridges, and supplied an initial line of defense for the Rebels. General Schofield, with his small Army of the Ohio, supported Thomas on the left flank by moving to Catoosa Springs, from which he would move south on Dalton. General McPherson, with his army, was to move to Villanow and thence to Snake Creek Gap. Once Snake Creek Gap was secured, he was to march on the hamlet of Resaca. The taking of Resaca, sitting astride the Western & Atlantic, would put McPherson directly in the rear of Johnston's army.

The geography of the Dalton-Resaca line is of interest because there were only three practical ways for the Federals to get at the Confederates. With Rocky Face Ridge running the length of the line, the railroad entered Dalton through Mill Creek Gap, a narrow entrance between towering ridges. Several miles south, Dug Gap was available, but was a naturally strong defensive position. Further south, Snake Creek Gap was available to afford an entrance to Resaca. While Johnston initially thought Sherman would attempt to flank him by moving on Rome, Georgia, the Federal commander determined on the more direct approach. Ironically, the same north-south ridges that provided for Johnston's defense also screened Sherman's flanking maneuvers. Poor performance by the cavalry of Confederate General Joe Wheeler didn't help the situation.

On the 7th of May, the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio moved into position around Dalton. Johnston deployed nearly his entire army in defense, using the incredibly strong position at Mill Creek Gap, sometimes known as Buzzard's Roost Gap, as an anchor. Cleburne's division was held in reserve, with a detachment of cavalry holding Dug Gap. Incredibly, no force held Snake Creek Gap. Johnston, meanwhile, had received news of imminent help when Polk's troops under General William W. Loring in Mississippi were ordered to Rome.

Johnston did hear of the movement of McPherson's troops, but continued to assume that the Union threat was to Rome. Since he himself could do little to defend Rome, but could defend Snake Creek Gap, his policy of ignoring Snake Creek is even more perplexing. He did, however, order the infantry brigade of Colonel George Cantey to Resaca as a precaution. His orders did not instruct Cantey to move to Snake Creek Gap, but to merely keep close watch on all routes leading from LaFayette to Resaca.

James B. McPherson

Six miles to the south, the division of Brigadier General John Geary moved on the second of the accessible gaps, that of Dug Gap. Approaching the gap around 4:00 p.m., his division was met by two Arkansas infantry regiments and a Kentucky cavalry brigade, whose men were made up of the remnants of John Hunt Morgan's abortive Ohio raid the previous July. The rugged nature of the gap gave the advantage to the defenders, who rolled boulders on the Federal troops. Reinforcements arrived from Cleburne's reserve division, with many of the infantry hastening their way up the hill by "borrowing" the dismounted troopers' horses that were quartered at the base of the ridge. The defense was successful.

At this point we find a thoroughly confused Johnston -- or, if not confused -- a commanding general who has completely misread and misunderstood the general situation. He had a large force in his front, had just turned away a division of infantry attempting to flank a position six miles in his rear, knew about the presence of Snake Creek Gap, but continued in his mistaken impression that the city of Rome was Sherman's flanking opportunity.

His cavalry, under General Joe Wheeler, wasn't much help. Wheeler, the head of cavalry, found the traditional roles of scouting and reporting tedious and lacking glamour. He committed all but one brigade to defense on the Confederate right on the Cleveland Road. Wheeler chose to ignore an order from Johnston to cover all gaps south of Dug Gap, and continued to concentrate on the prospects of a fight on the Cleveland Road.

Joseph Wheeler

Johnston reacted with indecision. On the ninth, he ordered Hood with three divisions to Resaca as a result of Cantey's report of the Federal army's approach. Hood himself arrived at Resaca late on the ninth in time to view the retreating Union troops. Johnston then ordered one division back to Dalton and two of the divisions to halt at Tilton -- halfway between Dalton and Resaca. The Federals, meanwhile, kept up the pressure at Mill Creek Gap, skirmishing strongly on the tenth.

"I've got Joe Johnston dead!" was Sherman's response when he received McPherson's dispatch on the 9th that he was within two miles of Resaca and little opposition had been encountered. All should have been going to plan, with the railroad -- and lifeline -- of the Confederates destroyed at Resaca. When he received word of McPherson's failure to engage at Resaca, his rebuke to one of his favorite generals was somewhat guarded but distinct. "I have yours of last night . . . I regret beyond measure you did not break the railroad, however little, and close to Resaca, but I suppose it was impossible".

McPherson's failure at Resaca forced a re-thinking of strategy on the part of Sherman. The position at Dalton was too strong to carry directly, so he ordered McPherson to fortify Snake Creek Gap. That Sherman was unaware of Johnston's position can be noted in his orders in which he instructed McPherson that if attacked by Johnston's entire army, he was to hold the gap "at all costs."

Do you get a picture of mass confusion -- on the part of both armies? The geography of the area was such that neither general had a clear picture of the other's moves. Johnston was the more baffled of the two, and Sherman's strategic initiative could well have proved decisive had McPherson proved more ambitious rather than cautious.

Sherman determined to maneuver his army so as to flank Johnston out of his strong position. This strategy was not unlike the one used at the same time by Grant when dealing with Lee in the Overland Campaign. He left Major General Oliver O. Howard's IV Corps in place at Dalton and sent the rest of the army towards Snake Creek Gap and the goal of Resaca.

Johnston continued to be unaware of Sherman's goals, and it wasn't until May 12, at mid-morning, that Wheeler reported only two Federal divisions and cavalry in front at Dalton. Johnston immediately ordered Hood to Resaca, where troops under Polk were also arriving. For Johnston's sake, it was certainly well for him that he held interior lines of communication, and those lines reinforced by the railroad! By nightfall on the 12th, the Rebels had managed to throw up a hasty line of battle around the railroad hamlet of Resaca.

Resaca wasn't very much then, and isn't today as well. The major geography features were the two rivers that merged in the vicinity -- the Connasauga, which ran a generally north-south direction to the east of the railroad, and the Oostanaula, which flowed east to west and provided a vital railroad bridge at Resaca.

Because he was late in moving south, Johnston was forced to put his army in the crook formed by these rivers. His position was by no means as strong as that of Dalton, and further, it was in danger of again being flanked should Sherman cross the Oostanaula further to the west. South of Resaca towards Calhoun, the terrain opened up a bit, and it was Sherman's goal to reach this area as quickly as possible.

Oliver O. Howard

The key to Johnston's position at Resaca was the railroad bridge and his potential escape across the Oostanaula. The flanks of his position became the focal points of the battle. Early on the 14th, McPherson's troops crossed Camp Creek and dislodged troops under Polk, who had joined Johnston's army at Resaca. With the taking of this advanced position, Federal artillery had the ability to command the vital railroad bridge. Consequently, Johnston determined to relieve pressure on his left by initiating an attack of his own on the right, using the corps under Hood as the initiator of the attack.

The Federals probed the center of the Rebel position, but succeeded in accomplishing little other than racking up casualties. It was the Federal left, held by General David Stanley, that was in danger from Hood's attack. The Federal line did not reach the Connasauga River, and was in military terms, "in the air." On the 14th, Johnston ordered Hood to turn the Federal position and take the Union forces in flank and rear.

The attacks accomplished little. Stanley, with the aid of superbly positioned artillery, successfully turned back the Confederate attack in the hilly, wooded terrain. The deep ravines and dense nature of the woods made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Rebels to keep alignment and achieve their objectives.

Joseph Hooker

While all of this was going on, Sherman continued his plans to flank the Confederates out of position. In some ways, it was a mistake on his part, for had he been able to breach the Confederate defense, the position of the rivers would have made a Confederate rally extremely difficult. General Thomas Sweeney's division of the XVI Corps had gone down the bank of the Oostanaula and had crossed at Lay's Ferry. Johnston, learning of this flanking maneuver, determined on the night of the 15th to abandon Resaca.

Thus far Sherman was well on his way to accomplishing one of his objectives -- the penetration of the interior of the South. His other objective, Johnston's army, remained intact and full of fight. As the remainder of the Atlanta campaign unfolded, Sherman turned more and more to maneuver instead of fight, and would receive criticism from modern historians for his alleged unwillingness to close with Johnston.

Johnston himself came into criticism after the war for his failure to engage Sherman and inflict a serious injury on the Federal army, and the criticism is well founded. Much of the historian's objective look at the situation is clouded by the acrimonious dialog between Hood and Johnston after the war. Much of the writing on the campaign is darkened by often contrived remembrances of events by the proponents of each side. Even Sherman close to remember what he chose and ignore that unfavorable in his memoirs.

As the Confederates retreated towards Calhoun, Georgia, such an opportunity presented itself to Johnston. Sherman, in following the retreating Confederates, split his forces. Part crossed at Lay's Ferry while others followed from Resaca. To make things even more tempting, a division of the XIV Corps was sent to occupy Rome. On the 16th, Hardee's troops were skirmishing with elements of Sherman's troops. But the concept of using the Oostanaula to hold the Resaca Yankees in check while the remainder turned on another column never seems to have occurred to Johnston. Indeed, it appears that he had little intent of stopping at Calhoun. In his post-war memoirs, Johnston contended he found the valleys in the vicinity of Calhoun too wide to support a defense -- again, a tacit determination on the defensive as opposed to counter-offensives.

The next stop on the retreat was Adairsville, which was reached on May 17. Lieutenant General Hardee wanted to stop and fight there. Hood disagreed, arguing for a further retreat behind the Etowah River. Johnston had a third plan of action. He knew Sherman had divided his forces, but little did he know how divided they were. His plan was a reasonably simple one -- as most plans are -- and carried a good chance of success.

From Adairsville, the Western & Atlantic Railroad runs to the south to Kingston before turning east to the college town of Cassville. There was, however, a mountain wagon road leading from Adaireville to Cassville. The plan was this: Hardee and his troops would march on Kingston, but not stop there but would swing around and rejoin the army at Cassville. Hood and Polk would march themselves by the direct route. The area around Cassville was rugged and seemed perfect for setting an ambush.

The forces of Sherman were indeed split. Schofield's army had crossed the Oostanaula east of Resaca and was heading towards Cassville on a path parallel to but east of Johnston. McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee swung to the west in order to approach Kingston. Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland, for the most part, took the road from Adairsville to Kingston, but General Joseph Hooker and his corps headed southeast over the wagon road towards Cassville. Sherman was confused, as evidenced in a dispatch sent to Schofield: "All signs continue of Johnston's having retreated to Kingston, and why he should tend to Kingston, I do not see, unless his wagons are escaping south of the Etowah by the bridge and fords near Kingston. In any hypothesis, our plan is right."

By the evening of May 18, the elements of the ambush were in place. The army was aligned on a series of rugged hills just south of the town. Hardee was arranged on the left, covering the approaches from Kingston. Polk covered the road from Adairsville, and Hood was on the right. It was upon Hood -- he of the magnificent fighting record -- that the trap would be sprung.

The night of the 18th found the Confederate army strangely jubilant. The hot and muggy weather had broken and turned cooler. The army had been informed that a fight would take place the next day, and set to work building entrenchments on both the female and Baptist colleges in the town. Johnston himself issued a stirring battle order to the troops.

Alas, for missed opportunities. Early on the morning of the 19th, the plan appeared to be coming together. The vanguard of the Union troops was approaching Cassville from Kingston, and the Federals from Adairsville -- the intended victims of the ambush -were reported to be approaching also.

Leonidas E. Polk

Like Bragg on the morning of the second day at Chickamauga, he waited in vain. About 10:20 a.m., he sent out his chief of staff to urge the attack. The chief of staff, General W.W. Mackall, found Hood in the process of retreating. Hood claimed that staff officers had found the enemy approaching his rear on the Canton Road, and he was falling back to cover the approaches of the road. Johnston could scarcely credit the story, but allowed that were it true, Hood was taking the correct path. Summoning Hardee, Polk and Hood, Johnston announced at noon that the attack was off.

Post-war recriminations have clouded our historic view of the situation, but several things seem reasonably clear. The force Hood found in his rear was a cavalry reconnaissance, for which he had failed to adequately provide coverage. Worse, he unilaterally called off the attack plan without orders and without informing Johnston. Hood later claimed that his attack orders were discretionary, and that he had found no enemy on the Adairsville Road to attack. These allegations appear to be as frivolous as many of Hood's post-war claims.

Falling back to the prepared defensive position south of the town, the Confederates prepared to receive the attack of the Federals. The position was strong, with the exception of the flanks. A portion of Hood's line could be enfiladed by artillery fire, and Hardee's position on the left was not anchored. Other than that, the position was strong defensively.

But not strong enough for his subordinates. Polk and Hood spent the afternoon and evening planning how to approach Johnston and argue the position should not be held. At dinner that evening, the two corps commanders provided strong argument that the line was untenable, and that a retreat across the Etowah was absolutely necessary. Johnston at first argued the counter-point, but finally relented. To add further command level confusion to the issue, at this point Hardee arrived, and in turn argued in favor of defending the position. One can only wonder at such a turn of events occurring in the Army of Northern Virginia, and a general such as Lee allowing them to happen!

Regardless, the decision to retreat was made again, and the Confederate army fell back behind the Etowah River on the 20th of May, leaving Sherman's band of invaders in charge of northern Georgia. In less than two weeks he had penetrated the interior of Georgia some thirty miles, making up over half the distance from Dalton to Atlanta. True, the Confederate army was still intact and reasonably unbloodied, a fact that could not have gone unnoticed by Grant, whose army was considerably bloodied after the fierce fighting at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House.

And how had the two commanders performed? In the first place, both deserve a bit more sympathy for their efforts on account of the terrain in which they operated . . . especially Sherman. There were no major roads in the area in that day -- certainly not of the standard found in middle Tennessee or Virginia. Operating on exterior lines, the logistics of movement had to be difficult for the Federal units. Signal stations were of minimal value, and line-ofsight communications ended when the troops passed over the next ridge.

The criticism for which Sherman comes under the greatest fire, however, is the strategy into which he slipped as the campaign progressed more and more -- that of using Atlanta as the ultimate objective and using turning movements to force Johnston out of strong defensive positions. Recall from Grant's earlier letter that Sherman had two objectives for the campaign -- to strike at the interior of the South, which he had done -- and the crippling of Johnston's army, which he had not yet begun to accomplish.

The great opportunity missed by Sherman was at Resaca. Johnston was caught with two rivers at his back, the railroad bridge -- his escape route -- within range of artillery, a lodgement obtained on one of the flanks bounded by one of the rivers, and yet Sherman persisted in turning the Resaca position and never lined up his men for one of those "Grant-like" hammer blows that were being seen in the East.

McPherson, of course, missed the great opportunity of the campaign when he debauched from the hills of Snake Creek Gap with his army corps, and faced Resaca, which was defended by a brigade of infantry and some cavalry. Considering the nature of the terrain, lack of communications, uncertainty of the situation, it is not incomprehensible that McPherson reacted with overwhelming caution upon approaching Resaca. Indeed, it seems likely were a Stonewall Jackson in charge of McPherson's army, a different posture would have been taken. But there were few Jacksons in either army, and the war is full of missed opportunities of this sort. Sherman put a capable plan into place; only the execution was lacking.

George B. McClellan

Johnston's handling of the initial aspects of the campaign are clouded in confusion and mix-interpretation. His mix-reading of Sherman's flanking maneuver to Snake Creek Gap, as well as his lack of coverage at Snake Creek, almost allowed Sherman to end the campaign in early May. Were it not for the timidity of McPherson, the Army of Tennessee might well have been cut off in Dalton. Having ample knowledge of McPherson's whereabouts, Johnston still vacillated and came awfully near to disaster.

His delay in retreating to Resaca forced him to defend the railroad with a pair of rivers at his back, a tactical decision of dubious quality. He escaped disaster because Sherman blew an opportunity, not because of any appreciable tactical brilliance.

In retreating from Resaca, Johnston missed another opportunity to strike at Sherman. As discussed earlier, Sherman's divided forces were available to be attacked in turn, but Old Joe evidently had no intention of attacking at that point.

His final missed opportunity came at Cassville, when he plans to ambush a portion of Sherman's forces was lost, partially due to the lack of aggression on the part of Hood, and partially due to Johnston's handling of the matter.

As opposed to their counterparts, the Confederates, at a point in time when harmony at senior command levels would have been the most desirable, saw friction and politics play important roles in the lack of success of the Army of Tennessee. Perhaps only Robert E. Lee himself could have pulled the factions present in the army together to meld them into a cohesive unit. It seems, however, that even the great Lee could have done little to overcome the battlefield command capabilities of some of the subordinates. The western Confederate army was plagued before, during and after the Atlanta campaign by poor generalship -- certainly by no means as good as that of the Rebel eastern army of Lee.

There are two nagging questions that we can ask ourselves even at this early stage of the campaign -- after all, only two weeks have passed since the opening gambits by Sherman. Was the avowed strategy of Joseph E. Johnston, that of defense-offense, the correct one for the Rebels? And second, did Johnston intend to counter Sherman at all during these phases of the campaign?

I feel Johnston's strategy, as he stated it, was indeed the correct one. Successful execution of the strategy, however, necessitated the locating of the opportunity and counter-attack by the Confederates. As we have discussed, there were several distinct opportunities for Johnston that he chose to ignore by the time he reached the Etowah. During these early stages, Johnston was not particularly interested in attack -- in spite of the fact that he chose to believe that Sherman's flanking maneuver was going via Rome, Georgia, which would leave a depleted army sitting in front of him.

At Cassville, Johnston determined to attack Sherman, but he chose to hit a small, isolated unit of the Federal army. The net result of the engagement, had Hood carried out his instructions, would have been the crippling of a small portion of Sherman's army, but not likely to have seriously impaired the Federal force's fighting ability.

In short, I do not think that up to the time he chose to fall back across the Etowah, Joseph E. Johnston ever seriously intended to do significant damage to Sherman. His intent, I think, was to wait for Sherman to commit the serious blunder by frontal attack and put himself in a situation where the counter-attack could be devastating. Sherman, of course, did not supply the opportunity.

So thus you have it. In two weeks William T. Sherman had forced Johnston out of three outstanding defensive positions and advanced into the heart of Georgia. If Johnston's army was not seriously hurt, the campaign was proceeding well. But the imposing Allatoona Mountains stood facing Sherman, and the all-important railroad disappeared up into those rugged hills. The pesky Johnston was sitting behind another set of imposing earthworks, and the problem for Sherman was the same as the one that had faced him the entire campaign. How to get around the Rebels and force them to fight out in the open was the question of the day. The solution, for Sherman, would be more turning movements, and for Johnston, more defensive maneuvering to keep his army between the Federals and the city of Atlanta.