James Longstreet

This talk is not intended to be a detailed discussion of these battles. The true intent is to review the decisions in command of both Longstreet and Jackson as history has subsequently reported. You will find that my conclusion is that Longstreet has received the short end of military and historical judgment. Jackson, on the other hand, although brilliant in his own right, has been apologized for and had his more mortal moments excused by postwar and modern historians.

Both men were outstanding and yet both men had their faults and made their mistakes. The end product may seem that this talk overly praises Longstreet and detracts from Jackson. Such is not my intent; however, a certain amount of this will be necessary in the course of our discussion.

Many historians note the primary difference in generalship between Jackson and Longstreet as one of offense and defense: Jackson, the offensive genius, he of the brilliant marches and smashing attacks; and Longstreet, noted for his defensive fighting at Antietam and Fredericksburg "Lee's Old War Horse."

And yet, we have ample indication each could reverse the roles and be equally competent. Take the battle of Second Manassas, for example. Jackson stood stubbornly on the defensive for three days while Longstreet first with a well timed artillery barrage, and finally with a crushing assault of his own broke the forces of the blustering John Pope and came close to annihilating the Federal army. And if further proof of "Old Peter's" ability to grasp the offensive is required, one merely needs to turn to two battles not under discussion here tonight, those of Gettysburg and Chickamauga.

So let us set the stage for the opening acts of our discussion it is the just after the Battle of Seven Pines, Joseph E. Johnston has been wounded, and Robert E. Lee has been named to head the Confederate forces around Richmond. Longstreet and Jackson were about to embark on a series of events that would leave them, by the end of 1862, as the two corps commanders in Robert E. Lee's eventual Army of Northern Virginia.

Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson

Longstreet had served at Manassas, but escaped the attention that was to become Jackson 's. He directed the rearguard action at Williamsburg and received favorable marks for his efforts there. His forces were waiting the Federal onslaught in front of the gates of Richmond.

It must be concluded that Stonewall Jackson's star was definitely on the rise after the Valley Campaign, and for good reason. His conduct, on the whole, had been exemplary. He took advantage of the opportunities afforded by his adversaries and used his army to best advantage. And in the long run, it is always results that count. In the Valley Campaign, one could not have asked for more from the Valley Army. And as for Longstreet, he was, in many ways, just another division commander in the army of Robert E. Lee.

The Seven Days

West Point Military Atlas - The Seven Days Campaign

Johnston retreated to the outskirts of Richmond, with McClellan in steady, but certainly not hot, pursuit. Turning at bay, the normally defensive Johnston planned a fairly complex attack on an exposed portion of the Federal forces. The battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, fought on May 31 and significant for the wounding of General Johnston, was a stalemate in significance, filled with blundering on the part of the Confederates, and was possibly the worst fought battle of Longstreet's military career.

Joseph E. Johnston

With Johnston severely wounded, Confederate President Jefferson Davis turned command of the eastern rebel army to Robert E. Lee. Lee immediately began laying his plans to complete the removal of Federal forces around the southern capitol in particular those of George McClellan.

Robert E. Lee

With the Valley Army moved out of the Shenandoah Valley to Gordonsville, Virginia, Jackson set out on June 23 at 1:00 a.m. on a 52 mile, 14 hour ride to meet with Lee's council just northeast of Richmond. The ride is important, for it sets the stage for Jackson's subsequent actions and physical condition during the Seven Days. Following the meeting, he immediately saddled his horse and began return to his army.

Lee's plan for the demolition of Major General FitzJohn Porter's corps of the Army of the Potomac was exceedingly complex for an army command short of adequate staff and dependent upon several independent maneuvers. Perhaps the most complex piece of maneuvering was the action required of Jackson. With Stuart guarding his left, Stonewall was to come down from the northeast and come in on the right rear of Porter's corps the exposed portion "in the air." Longstreet and the two Hills would cross the north side of the Chickahominy. While the other three assailed Porter's front, Jackson would roll up the Federal flank, and with it, the Union forces north of the river.

Interestingly, when it came time to set the time and date for the attack, Jackson, with perhaps too much pride in the abilities of his "foot cavalry," unrealistically stated he could reach his destination the next day, June 24. Longstreet, who could hardly have had first hand knowledge of the conditions of Jackson's march, suggested "Old Jack" give himself an extra day. Jackson acquiesced. In light of his subsequent performance, it would have been interesting to have seen historical reaction to his abilities had this earlier time table been accepted.

The Battle of Mechanicsville, or Beaver Dam Station, opened a series of battles collectively known as the Seven Days. And it did not open auspiciously for the Confederates. With the two Hills and Longstreet in position, they waited word of the arrival of Jackson. But the word never came. You can blame Stonewall, you can blame Lee, or you can blame their staffs, but the two never communicated. And finally, at 3:00 p.m., the impetuous A.P. Hill determined to waste no more time. Hill's subsequent headlong attack, also made without informing Lee, and even with the late arriving support of Longstreet and D.H. Hill, could make no substantial progress.

George B. McClellan

Although he won a tactical victory, McClellan did order Porter to begin withdrawing from the Beaver Dam position. As A.P. Hill began a cautious pursuit, Lee finally met up with Jackson, and the two planned their next steps. Although a staff courier sent to move Jackson's division became confused and caused Jackson's line of march to cross D.H. Hill's, the Confederate forces managed to finally get into line. As the Battle of Gaines Mill shaped up, Longstreet was on the right, his right flank anchored on the Chickahominy River. A.P. Hill was next with the Confederate line forming a half arc around Porter's corps. Jackson was next, with D.H. Hill holding the far left.

FitzJohn Porter

One of the by products of the battle of Gaines Mill was that McClellan was forced to shift his base of supply to the James River, and Lee moved to cut "Little Mac" from that river. On June 29 he set his army in motion. Jackson was to cross the Chickahominy by the Grapevine Bridge while Longstreet and A.P. Hill crossed by the upper bridges (those farthest west) and move around the Union army toward the James.

Ambrose Powell Hill

By the 3Oth, Jackson was across the Chickahominy, but McClellan had stolen a march on the Southerners and had his army entrenched behind a marshy bog known as White Oak Swamp. Confederate forces were converging from the west while Jackson and D.H. Hill were to press down from the north. Jackson, by this time, was well on his way to wearing down physically and mentally. He spent a sleepless night on the 29th and "appeared worn down to the lowest point of flesh consistent with effective service." In a predawn meeting with Lee on the 30th he "began talking in a jerky, impetuous way," according to an eyewitness. While we know that some orders were given Jackson, we are unsure what they were but certainly, they did not include the actions that were soon to result.

The Battle of Frayser's Farm was another attempt by Lee to use pincer like movements to trap McClellan's army. The primary, or flanking thrust was to be Longstreet's, supported on the western side by Generals Huger, Holmes and Magruder. Jackson was to pin down the northern most force of Federals and then press southward when the main Confederate thrust under Longstreet and A.P. Hill crippled the Federals.

The plan never came together. The battle, as it subsequently turned out, had Longstreet and A.P. Hill again attacking Federal forces without support close at hand. Huger was dealing with obstructions on the road on which he had to travel, Holmes was his usual inactive self, Magruder had received contradictory orders, and Jackson, strange as it may seem, was inactive actually asleep in front of White Oak Swamp.

The fight was bloody perhaps 20,000 men on both sides participating and resulted in the repulse of the Confederate attack. Lee's army was again plagued by a lack of coordination and response by the six division commanders on the field. McClellan's retreat to an eminence known as Malvern Hill continued, and the morning of July 1 found Lee struggling to get the scattered portions of his army together to confront the Union army.

Daniel Harvey Hill

Now it is time to have some fun. Let us pause and reflect on the actions of both Longstreet and Jackson as they performed during the Seven Days, and let us begin with Longstreet.

During the first two battles, those of Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill, "Old Peter" had offensive positions in support of A.P. Hill. There are, from my research, no indications that Robert E. Lee was relying on Longstreet for superb defensive skills, nor was he in the least bit hesitant in using Longstreet in offensive actions. Although Mechanicsville was primarily A.P. Hill's show, Longstreet arrived in position on time while we will subsequently show Jackson failed in his attempt.

Perhaps one of the more succinct statements about Mechanicsville was made by the eminent historian Douglas Southall Freeman when he said, "Except for the disposition of the cavalry and the arrival of Longstreet and D.H. Hill on the right bank of the Chickahominy, no detail of the plan for action had been executed on time and in accordance with the plan."

The Battle of Gaines Mill, as we have noted, found Longstreet "going in" to support A.P. Hill with an attack on the Confederate far right. Although he met with as little success as Hill had, one must realize that Hill and Longstreet had the unenviable task of attacking the strength of the Federal position. Their's was not intended to be the attack that took the Federal position their's was to hold the forces of Porter in check while Jackson and D.H. Hill turned the Federal right.

Freeman describes Longstreet and his position during the initial stages of the battle. "Longstreet, now in position on Hill's right, was as calm and cheerfully observant as if he had been watching a sham battle. His powerful command was at an angle of almost ninety degrees to the "Light Division" [that of A.P. Hill], but he had a difficult position from which to assault." Said Longstreet in his official report, "I was, in fact, in the position from which the enemy wished us to attack him."

Benjamin Huger

The key to the interpretation of Eckenrode and Conrad's interpretation of Lee's strategy is in the careful execution of all phases of the plan by all parties. As we have noticed, neither Jackson to the north at White Oak Swamp nor Holmes in the Malvern Hill area managed to effectively hold any portion of McClellan's forces in check to set up the success of the flanking maneuver of Longstreet.

Clifford Dowdey, in his The Seven Days: The Emergence of Robert E. Lee. described Frayser's Farm as "a soldier's fight." As noted before, Longstreet and Powell Hill fought unsupported by Jackson and Holmes, and indeed fought much of the time on the defensive. Dowdey notes, "Toward Glendale, in the inexplicable collapse of his trap, Lee watched a ragged battle in which his men had ceased to advance in some areas and in some sectors were fighting on the defense . . . [the] brigades of Longstreet and A.P. Hill had attacked so magnificently and to so little purpose . . . no more than 18,000 men had engaged upwards of 40,000 from first to last."

Perhaps in describing the futility of Frayser's Farm, Freeman wrote, "Tactically this Battle of Frayser's Farm was of encouragement solely because Longstreet and A.P. Hill showed themselves capable of maintaining touch with all their troops through a maze of woodland. To Longstreet went first honors ...

Malvern Hill was a tactical and strategic Confederate disaster, and if there was a saving grace for the men of Longstreet and Hill, it was that they were held in reserve during the battle. The common explanation for why the Confederates stormed such a strong position as Malvern Hill instead of turning it is simply that Lee had his blood up much as he had at Gettysburg on the third day.

And yet, as historians and veterans close to the Army of Northern Virginia tried to figure out how Lee could have so erred in judgment, we find Longstreet creeping to the forefront. There is no doubt Lee, who was justifiably fatigued by this point, used the seemingly inexhaustible Longstreet to reconnoiter the Federal position. This Longstreet did, and so reported that he thought positions could be found for artillery to clear the way for a Confederate assault. Dowdey uses the license of the historian to describe the event, "This was a heady moment for Longstreet. Stimulated by acting in effect as Lee's second in command, he translated the picture in his imagination into reality. Longstreet believed the crossfire from the two positions could throw the Federal batteries into disorder and open the way to an infantry assault . . ." Eckenrode and Conrad go so far as to say, "Lee, having accepted Longstreet's advice to make a frontal assault, asked him to find a position for artillery."

Having made such a bold statement, obviously implying that blame for the decision to attack rested squarely with "Old Pete", they present no supporting evidence for such a statement. Further, let me paint something of an alternate picture. Imagine if you can the Confederate command on July 1. Its members were exhausted we know Lee was fatigued (and certainly for good cause. He had spent the last week watching subordinates fail to execute critical orders), Magruder was strung out, and Jackson was just beginning to recover from his collapse to fatigue and stress. The army had been fighting and marching for six solid days. And here was this seeming giant (for he stood most likely six inches taller and weighed a good sixty pounds more than the average soldier of the day), having undergone most of the severe fighting, and yet acting as if he had just returned from a thirty day furlough.

Also assume that prior to setting out, Lee had communicated to Longstreet his desire to strike the Federals. Longstreet's sole failure, in my mind, was the mistake in thinking that artillery could soften up the Federal position. Modern historian A. Wilson Greene, choosing an unfortunate set of words, described the pre attack decision philosophy: "A massive concentration of iron crossfired against the Yankees on the hill would soften them up, thought Old Pete, for a devastating infantry assault that would carry the Confederate battle flags over the high ground and down to the James. Lee agreed to try." Sorry, but I find it extremely difficult to believe Robert E. Lee ever abdicated command responsibility to Longstreet. Worse, such a shallow interpretation merely confuses history's view of one of the South's finer generals. Postwar philosophy on Longstreet is full of such innuendoes.

To close our discussion of Longstreet and The Seven Days, how shall we grade his efforts? Quite well, in my estimation. His division, along with that of A.P. Hill, carried the brunt of the fight at Gaines Mill and at Frayser's Farm. William Garrett Piston, in his work, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant. finds Longstreet's contributions in these lights:

Longstreet on consistent praise for his conduct during the Seven Days campaign. The difference between his quick movements and Jackson's sluggish ones did not go unnoticed, and within the army his already high reputation continued to grow. The private soldiers regarded him as a hard fighter, and the sight of his staff officers scurrying about was considered a sure sign of imminent combat.

In contrast, the performance of General Jackson is a study of puzzlement and uncertainty. The reputation, won at First Manassas and enhanced in the Valley, almost came undone on the Peninsula. That the sure, decisive Jackson could perform on a level comparable to the best of mediocrity has caused the supporters of Jackson, and they are indeed legion, to scurry for excuses.

Jackson's start towards the Peninsula did not get off to an auspicious start. Keep in mind, he only reluctantly agreed to an additional day's march after suggestion by Longstreet. On June 25 he had to cover some 25 miles to be in position for a June 26 twelve mile march to join Lee near the Chickahominy. He did not make it. Some blame it on enemy presence, drunken officers and unrealistic orders. Regardless, Wilson Greene notes that at 4:30 p.m. on the 26th Jackson reached his assigned position. Says Greene, "Although six hours late, Jackson had otherwise conformed precisely to his orders." As an excuse, following orders and arriving late left A.P. Hill without support. Quite simply, he failed to execute his orders. Imagine one of Jackson's subordinates failing to execute similar orders and then imagine Jackson's reaction.

Stonewall, hearing the sound of battle to the southeast, inexplicably went into bivouac instead of marching to the battle. Greene notes "it is doubtful that Jackson could have moved his weary troops to Hill's aid five miles on unfamiliar roads obstructed by Yankee cavalry even had he wanted to do so." The Seven Days campaign is full of criticism of much lesser generals Holmes and Huger come to mind who were unmercifully criticized for lack of initiative. And here is Jackson showing blatantly similar characteristics, and excused for it by modern historians.

So Jackson sat out the Battle of Mechanicsville what of Gaines Mill? Jackson's orders again called for his division and that of D.H. Hill to move once more to the left and attempt to get on the Federal flank. Again Jackson encountered delay in getting his men into position, his troops moving down an incorrect road. A.P. Hill and Longstreet continued to batter their divisions against the strength of the Federal position, and finally all of the Confederate units were in place to attack. A bit later Jackson rode up to Lee, and must have been somewhat red faced when Lee greeted him with "Ah, General. I am very glad to see you. I had hoped to be with you before." Clearly Lee was not satisfied with the progress of his lieutenant.

The coordinated assault by the entire Confederate front against Porter's corps finally succeeded, and Jackson's men played an integral part. British military historian G.F.R. Henderson states, "Longstreet's men made a magnificent charge on the right, and D.H. Hill claimed to have turned the flank of the regulars; but it is abundantly evident that the advent of Jackson's fresh troops, and the vigour of their assault, broke down the resistance of the Federals." There is no doubt that Jackson's and Hill's commands helped turn the tide, but the victory was neither decisive nor fulfilling. Darkness did not allow follow up, and one can only speculate as to the extent of the Confederate victory had Jackson's troops been in position several hours earlier.

John Magruder

Dowdey summarizes the actions of Jackson at Savage's Station. "General Lee had acted on his judgment in supporting Jackson to lead the movement that became the Valley Campaign. Since this heralded performance, Jackson had shown Lee nothing to confirm his earlier judgment . . . However, Lee's faith was so little shaken by Jackson's supineness on the 29th that he placed in charge of the pursuit the following day."

Without a doubt, however, the most controversial part of Jackson's involvement in the Seven Days' campaign occurred at White Oak Swamp and his participation, or lack of, in the Battle of Frayser's Farm. Stonewall, by this point in the campaign, was simply worn to a frazzle. His instructions for June 30 were simple; he was to move his forces some five to seven miles, guard the Confederate left flank and press the enemy in his front. Recall he was caught in a downpour the previous evening, and unable to sleep, and went about sunrise to see Lee. Reports on his health at that point are somewhat contradictory, but it does seem abundantly evident he was beginning to run on reserves.

About noon on the 30th, Jackson had accomplished his march and was in position just north of White Oak Swamp. We know that at approximately 1:45 p.m. he opened fire on the Federal forces of Major General William B. Franklin and began to feel out the Federal position. This initial attempt to force the Union position failed; Jackson found the Federal position in his front too strong. At about this time, President Jefferson Davis joined Lee at Longstreet's headquarters, and all likely wondered what Stonewall was up to.

Freeman now describes one of the more bizarre episodes of the war. "These were the four obvious things to do [described as falling back, getting troops under cover, etc.] and they were all that Jackson undertook. Incredibly, almost mysteriously, and for the first time in his martial career, he quit. His initiative died almost the moment of his return from the south side of the swamp. The alert, vigorous Jackson of the early morning grew weary, taciturn and drowsy. Marshy approaches, destruction of the bridge, and the fire from the new Federal position made a crossing impossible. This he concluded and then, exhausted, went to sleep under a tree."

Dowdey found this strange episode a classic case of clinical stress fatigue. Jackson had managed little sleep, his evening rest either disturbed or foregone for a period of seven days. This, however, in a time of war, does not excuse a general for his performance. For his part, Dowdey found Jackson's performance on June 30 a "complete, disastrous and unredeemable" failure.

And yet, almost miraculous as it may seem, some have sought to defend Jackson's inaction through a variety of means. G.F.R. Henderson, the British military historian in his 1890's biography of Jackson, skirts the issue of his exhaustion by a combination of denial and refusal. In comment to A.L. Long's assertion that Jackson was exhausted, he notes, "Apart from the unlikelihood that a man who seems to have done without sleep whenever the enemy was in the front should have permitted himself to be overpowered at such a crisis, we have Colonel Mumford's [who spearheaded the attempted crossing of White Oak Swamp in the morning] evidence that the general was well in advance of his column at sunrise, and the regimental reports show that the troops were roused at 2:30 a.m." The only problem with this argument is that Jackson's exhaustion caught up with him after Mumford's advance was slowed. Henderson then turns with a sense of almost moral outrage. "It is difficult to conceive that his scrupulous regard for truth, displayed in every action of his life, should have yielded in this one instance to his pride."

Why is it so difficult, as viewers of history, to admit that certain actors upon its stage can be subject to human frailty and weakness?

Malvern Hill, as we have seen, was a slaughter of Confederate troops the likes of which had not been seen before and would not be seen again until perhaps the third day at Gettysburg. The Confederate artillery barrage, far from softening up the massed Federal batteries, were softened up themselves. Confederate staff work again fell short as orders were seemingly misinterpreted and the frontal assault begun.

During the battle, Jackson was called upon to support D.H. Hill, who, along with Macgruder, did the bulk of the fighting. Luckily at least for Jackson's troops Hill was retiring and they did not have the opportunity to perform on that fateful day.

Finally, after the repulse at Malvern Hill had ended, and McClellan had retreated further up the James River to his base at Harrison Landing, Jackson began to come back around to his old self. Several night's sleep, certainly including the questionable siesta garnered at White Oak Swamp, had an observable, beneficial impact.

In a meeting the day after Malvern Hill, and in the presence of President Davis, Stonewall proposed continued pursuit of the enemy. After serious discussion, bad weather, muddy roads, and the depleted condition of the army convinced Lee not pursue McClellan. One of those present, R.L. Dabney, described his subsequent interpretation of the events: "Jackson, meanwhile, sat silent in the corner. I watched his face. The expression, changing from surprise to dissent, and lastly to intense mortification, showed clearly the tenor of his thoughts. He knew that McClellan was defeated, that he was retreating and not manoeuvering . . . But Jackson's mind reasoned that where the Federals could march the Confederates could follow, and that a decisive victory was well worth the effort."

The implication is, of course, that Lee had not followed the prescient and intuitively correct, but verbalized, advice of Jackson. It could well be, however, that Lee finally realized he was better to take his gains after all, McClellan had retreated all the way back to his gun boats and transports and prepare the means of further getting at "those people", as he usually referred to Federal forces. And lastly, it could well be he reasoned that one more set of complicated maneuvers, given the past week's performance by his lieutenants, including Stonewall, would perhaps be executed as poorly as they had in the previous week.

So, how shall we reflect on the efforts of Stonewall Jackson in the Seven Days campaign? Perhaps best summarizing the near hero worship of the man, Henderson states, "Lee and Jackson were the special objects of admiration. All recognized the strategic skill which had wrought the overthrow of McClellan's host; and the hard marches and sudden blows of the campaign on the Shenandoah, crowned by the swift transfer of the Valley army from the Blue Ridge to the Chickahominy, took fast hold of the popular imagination. The mystery in which Jackson's operations were involved, the dread he inspired in the enemy, his reticence, his piety, his contempt of comfort, his fiery energy, his fearlessness, and his simplicity aroused the interest and enthusiasm of the whole community. Whether Lee or his lieutenant was the more adverse to posing before the crowd it is difficult to say. Both succeeded in escaping all public manifestation of popular favour; both went about their business with an absolute absence of ostentation, and if the handsome features of the Commander in Chief were familiar to the majority of the citizens, few recognized in the plainly dressed soldier, riding alone through Richmond, the great leader of the Valley, with whose praises not the South only, but the whole civilized world, was already singing."

Wilson Greene concludes it unfair to give Jackson the label of failure for his actions at the Seven Days. "Of course, Jackson at the Seven Days did not operate as an independent commander, as he had earlier, but functioned under direct orders from a superior officer. Lee and Jackson had not perfected the relationship that later bore so much fruit on so many fields."

Greene closes, "Therefore, to admit that Jackson, the new subordinate, did not display the aggressive initiative east of Richmond he had shown beside the Shenandoah should be neither surprising nor tantamount to acknowledging failure. Instead, to judge any officer by the standards Stonewall Jackson established in the valley, or on the plains of Manassas, or at Chancellorsville is to pronounce that officer a relative failure, even if that officer is Jackson himself."

Perhaps. But when one compares the fact that Jackson listened to the sound of guns at both Mechanicsville and Frayser's Farm without supporting Longstreet and Hill, was late in arriving at Gaines Mill, and never supported Magruder at Savage's Station, to the crisp attacks of Longstreet and Hill at Mechanicsville, Gaines Mill and Frayser's Farm, his efforts pale by comparison and can be best termed mediocre. That Lee, however, was disappointed, there can be little doubt.

We now turn to the final series of maneuvers that make up our discussion tonight, the campaign that led to the twin victories of Cedar (or Slaughter) Mountain and Second Manassas. By the time they were over, our two subjects of discussion would each be firmly entrenched as the two leading subordinate generals of the eastern theater.

Cedar Mountain and Second Manassas

West Point Military Atlas - The Second Manassas Campaign

Shortly after the conclusion of the Seven Days, A.P. Hill began a feud with Longstreet that would result in his eventual transfer to Jackson's corps. Feuding was not unusual for Powell Hill, for he immediately got into it with Stonewall, too. But the two, Longstreet and Hill, had done good service together on the Peninsula, and thus would not be repeated, as a team, again.

Lee determined to deal with Pope first. On July 13 he detached Jackson to Gordonsville to counter Pope's reaching Culpeper Courthouse. With Jackson confronting Pope, Longstreet busied himself with improving the Confederate defensive position around Richmond. In the meantime Hill was sent to Jackson, and the direction of the forthcoming campaign began to take shape.

Meanwhile, word reached Gordonsville that two divisions under the command of Jackson's old Valley nemesis, Nathaniel P. Banks, had pushed south to Culpeper. On the morning of August 6, the Confederate forces pushed themselves in the direction of Banks. Jackson was up to old tricks, however, keeping his intent only to himself. August 6 was extremely hot, and the roads so dusty that the men could barely see.

By August 8, after another day of hot, dusty marching, A.P. Hill was getting more and more exasperated over not knowing where his troops were going. That day things came to a head on the 8th. Instructions for the march that morning were given out late the night before, but at some point in the morning Jackson Hill was division changed Dick Ewell's route, but failed to inform Hill. scheduled to await Ewell, and then follow. Winder's ~ would follow Hill. Bright and early in the morning on the 8th Hill waited in vain for Ewell to take the lead. Eventually, troops belonging to Winder appeared, and Hill, rather than disputing passage allowed Winder's division to pass. By the time Hill finally got underway, the march had degenerated into a farce. With the temperature zooming over ninety degrees, Jackson bitterly ordered a halt.

August 9, 1862 found the men of Jackson's command on the road at 2:00 a.m. Ewell and Winder had the advance with Hill bringing up the rear. Early in the afternoon Hill and his soldiers heard the boom of cannon six miles in their front. Stonewall Jackson had opened battle with the Union forces of Nathaniel Banks.

By all accounts, the Battle of Cedar Mountain should have been an overwhelming Confederate victory. How the victory is perceived is entirely dependent upon whomever is writing the history. Outnumbering the opposing Union forces, the Rebels were in a position to crush their opposition. As it turned out, they barely escaped with the victory. As we shall learn, Stonewall Jackson again exhibited his strong tendency to open battle without having all of his forces present on the field.

The Confederates held the better position, even though the Union forces should have taken a stronger defensive posture. An imposing natural obstruction, Cedar Mountain, anchored the right while heavy woods held the left. Banks had his men posted in a valley through which meandered a little stream known as Cedar Run. Jackson moved to the attack, and in a move that must have caught the Confederate commander by surprise, the Federals counterattacked.

The Federal counterattack almost succeeded. To venture to say that the Confederate troops holding the left were surprised would be an understatement. The Union troops ignored the strength of Cedar Mountain and advanced through fields of wheat and corn and outflanked the Confederate left. As the Federals continued their pressure, Jackson's old division, the Stonewall Division, broke, becoming, as Henderson subsequently wrote, "an ungovernable mob, breaking rapidly to the rear, and on the very verge of panic." Jackson himself was on the front lines, attempting to rally his men with his physical presence.

And at that point, and marching to the sound of battle, A.P. Hill and his division reached the battlefield, and began to drive the Union troops. Jackson determined to press the advantage, and ordered Hill to pursue. But after gaining approximately 1 1/2 miles, darkness fell and brought an end to the battle. By Civil War standards, it was a Confederate victory, for Southern troops held the field. From a Federal perspective, it was something of a tactical victory, for the outmanned forces of Banks, so used to being severely abused by Jackson, had stubbornly met and withstood the best Stonewall had to offer.

John Pope

Henderson saw it otherwise, of course. This unabashed admirer of Stonewall Jackson stated "Halleck's reply to Pope's final dispatch, which congratulated the defeated army corps on a 'hard earned but brilliant success', must have astonished Banks and his hapless troops . . . The Federal defeat was more honourable than many victories. But that it is a crushing defeat can hardly be disputed. The two divisions which had been engaged were completely shattered . . ." Henderson goes on, "Southern writers, on the other hand, have classed Cedar Run amongst the most brilliant achievements of the war, and an unbiased investigation goes far to support their view." This implies, in a remarkable piece of debate logic, that a view not supporting Jackson's achievements at Cedar Mountain as brilliant are, by implication, biased.

In conclusion, Henderson sums up the events concluding with the Battle of Cedar Mountain, "But it cannot be fairly said that his enterprise was therefore useless. Strategically it was a fine conception. For the audacity of his manoeuvers was not the least of its merits. For an army of 24,000 men, weak in cavalry, to advance against an army of 47,000, including 5,000 horsemen, was the very height of daring. But it was the daring of profound calculation. As it was, Jackson ran little risk. He succeeded in his immediate object. He crushed Pope's advance guard, and he retreated unmolested, bearing with him the prisoners, the colours, and the arms he had captured. If he did not succeed in occupying Culpeper, it was not his fault. Fortune was against him."

Others have certainly been more critical. Burke Davis, another Jackson biographer, states, "It had been a near thing for Jackson, despite the foolhardiness of the enemy. Perhaps he had been too casual, even insolent, in launching his own movement before Hill's men were at hand; perhaps he had not taken precautions on his flanks which were to be expected of a veteran field commander."

Freeman notes a distinct lack of grasp and control on Jackson's part in the management of the action. The picture of Jackson at Cedar Mountain is not the same as one sees at Winchester. He attacked without all of his forces present and, Freeman contends, did not dominate the field. And finally, Jackson had small part in the critical operations of the day.

The image of A.P. Hill marching six miles to battle and arriving just in time to save the rest of Jackson's beleaguered forces does give rise to the contention that Hill repeatedly had to come to "Old Jack's" assistance. Indeed, as part of Jackson's corps at Antietam, it was Hill's blatant disregard for the standard marching orders of Jackson that enabled him to repulse Ambrose Burnside. While he arrived with only a portion of his command, he still arrived and those that made it to the battle were just enough.

Stonewall Jackson at Cedar Mountain again displayed a natural mix of ability and mistakes. That he won the field and routed two divisions, there is no doubt. That he did it at a much greater cost than probably should have been spent is certainly subject to discussion. But that he displayed an almost arrogant lack of concern over his inadequacy of numbers cannot be denied. The eventual outcome, however, was not in doubt once Hill's division was on the field. Stonewall was indeed a human commander of men, and clearly exhibited human strengths and weaknesses.

We now begin to move into the final chapter of our story, which begins with the reunion of the Army of Northern Virginia and in particular, the reunion of Longstreet and Jackson as Robert E Lee's two chief lieutenants. For on August 13, "Old Pete" received orders to proceed to Gordonsville with Lee and join the troops of Jackson.

With Pope now beginning to receive reinforcements from McClellan, Lee determined to headquarter himself with his chief subordinates and hold a meeting to plan further mischief with the forces of Pope. For Lee to be successful he had to deal with the assembled hosts of Pope before he could turn on the forthcoming forces of McClellan. They immediately had an opportunity to attack Pope because the Federal commander had unknowingly placed himself in a perilous position, leaving his army nestled in the crook of a "V" formed by the meeting of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. Should bridges covering a potential retreat be destroyed, unparalleled success might be forthcoming for the Confederates.

A series of plans emerged. The army was to move on August 17 and fight the battle on the 18th. Delays, however, began to accumulate, and by the time Lee's troops were finally ready to move, Pope had beaten them to it. The Federal commander had escaped a trap that could well have resulted in a defeat worse than that which he subsequently suffered. Lee determined, though, to continue to press his advantage as best he could. Longstreet, in command of the right wing of the army, was to cross the Rappahannock at Raccoon Ford, while Jackson. on the left, would cross further upstream.

This began what might well be the most exciting two weeks in the history of the Confederacy. Pope was strung out along the Rappahannock, and Lee determined to try a turning movement around the right flank of Pope's army. This idea had originally been recommended to Lee by Longstreet. Jackson was to take the advance, sliding to the left until he found a reasonably good ford.

J.E.B. Stuart

In order to facilitate this, Jackson was to take the three divisions of Ewell, Taliaferro and A.P. Hill a total of 23,000 men and move around the Confederate left in a wide arc to get beyond Pope. Lee and Longstreet would follow as appropriate. The march began on August 25 at sunrise, and became at once a grueling task as the summer heat and thick dust began to take their toll. But the Confederates reached Thoroughfare Gap, a passage through the Bull Run Mountains on the 26th, and, to their relief, found the pass undefended.

The bone jarring pace continued. At times averaging three miles per hour, in spite of the heat, choking dust, bleeding feet, empty stomachs, fatigue, and the ravages of diarrhea, the forces of "Old Jack" reached Gainesville on the 27th. By the end, the flanking maneuver had covered 54 miles in 36 hours. Stonewall Jackson was only 27 miles from Washington, and had executed one of the great flanking maneuvers of the war.

Having gained access to the enemy's rear, Jackson determined to split his forces further. He sent Ewell to Bristoe Station to burn the railroad bridge over Broad Run, Stuart and two regiments of infantry marched on the supply depot at Manassas Junction, and the third element, under Hill, remained with Jackson and advanced on the railroad junction.

It must have been a scene such as has been rarely seen in war the starved, ragged Rebels as they descended on the Federal supply base. They stuffed themselves on all manner of delectibles. They easily repulsed four New Jersey regiments that arrived to see what was going on, and by the night of the 27th, the remaining supplies were ablaze, and the party was over. Pope was now on the move, determined to bag Jackson for the indignities his supply depot had suffered.

Meanwhile, Lee had determined that it was time for Longstreet to move. They determined to use the same circuitous route "Old Jack" had used, and began on the march on the afternoon of the 26th. By 3:00 p.m. on the 28th, Longstreet had reached Thoroughfare Gap, and found his passage blocked by Federal troops. Pope, in the meantime, was desperately converging on Jackson before he could reunite with Longstreet. Stonewall himself was engaged in a high stakes, military version of "hide and seek". He had taken a defensive position on a ridge north of Groveton and just west of the old battlefield of Manassas.

It was late in the afternoon on the 28th when Stonewall's impetuosity got the better of him. A division of Pope's command under Brigadier General Rufus King passed in parallel to Jackson's line on the Warrenton Turnpike. At 5:30 p.m. Stonewall, unable to resist the tempting, brigade size morsel in front of him, had a battery rumble into position and hurl six shells into the passing Federals. Brigadier General John Gibbon deployed his men quickly and brought up artillery support.

Taliaferro's division, supported by two brigades under Dick Ewell, charged the Union position. The attacking Rebels surged down the slope into the Battle of Groveton while Gibbon's men responded with terrific volleys. Halting to respond, the two opposing forces spent the next two hours trading volleys at a mere distance of 100 yards in a brutal, stand up fight. Gibbon's brigade, which became lastingly known as "The Iron Brigade", gave as well as it took. Both sides took grievous losses, including the wounding of Ewell (who lost a leg), Taliaferro, and Brigadier Isaac Trimble. Gibbon's brigade lost a third of their men.

Darkness ended the battle, and the Confederates fell back to their position in the hills. Pope had found Jackson, or at least Jackson had allowed himself to be found. He had, however, very little to show for his efforts.

Longstreet moved out and through Thoroughfare Gap the morning of the 29th. By the time the head of the column had reached Gainesville, his troops could hear the sound of Jackson's renewed battle to their front. Near Gainesville "Old Pete's" troops filed off on to the Warrenton Turnpike the same road Gibbon's men had been traveling the previous day.

Before noon on the 29th, Jackson counted repulses of Federal units under Phil Kearney, Franz Sigel, and John Reynolds. Shortly after midday, Pope reached the field and took command. He determined to make the best of his chance to crush Stonewall. Repeatedly Pope hammered at Jackson with the divisions of Kearney and "Fighting Joe" Hooker. Sigel tried his hand again but with little success.

As sundown approached, it was obvious that for that day, the Federals were finished. Jackson's men settled down to rest after a second exhaustive day of fighting. Longstreet had spent the rest of the day on the 29th bringing his men into position on the Confederate right, and they assumed a front of almost 160 degrees to the line formed by Stonewall. As the hot and dry morning of August 30 dawned, James Longstreet was in position and the Army of Northern Virginia was indeed intact again.

As we begin the discussion of the final day of our talk, we enter into what is certainly one the finer debate topics of the war that of Longstreet's actions, or inactions, depending on the account, on the 29th and 30th of August at Manassas. It is a clever example of how history and historians may take a certain slant to a story and obscure both interpretation and final result to achieve desired result. We will cover more of this in just a bit.

When he reached the front on the 29th, "Old Pete" immediately set out to examine the ground in his front. With the extreme angle at which his troops were set to those of Stonewall, any substantial reserve force of Pope's could have the opportunity to roll his forces up if they attacked without proper support and reconnaissance. Part of the 29th was spent in such a review. It is unclear if he located such a concentration, but we do know forces under Major General FitzJohn Porter were on the Federal left. Interestingly, Porter was subsequently court martialed, cashiered from the army and after the war acquitted for his reluctance to advance into the jaws of Lonstreet's half of Lee's army.

Eckenrode and Conrad comment on Longstreet's performance on the 29th, "That the right wing of the army held off for a day while the left wing was being pounded by the enemy is surely one of the strangest situations in military history. That this occurred was due to Longstreet's extreme reluctance to advance." While much of the previous statement is, on the surface, contrived nonsense, it was not a "strange situation", and certainly not in terms of military history. As a matter of fact, it sounds suspiciously like Jackson's actions at Mechanicsville and Frayser's Farm, except in this case Longstreet had his commanding general on hand and in support of his actions.

Even with Longstreet in position on the morning of the 30th. Pope was unaware or chose to ignore his presence. Accordingly, he again set out to finish Stonewall off. But he proceeded in something of a leisurely fashion, and, in addition, he erroneously concluded that Jackson had abandoned the field the previous night. It was not until early afternoon that the Federal onslaught came again.

Several assaults were made against Jackson's position; one assault was repulsed when the men had to resort to throwing stones. Jackson, with his men running low on ammunition after their third battle in three days, and the Federal assault assuming new proportions, called for help. Longstreet, who had alertly positioned himself in the angle between his forces and Stonewall's, had notified Colonel Stephen D. Lee to bring his artillery battalion forward in anticipation of supporting Jackson. It was an incredible chance for artillery, and they made the most of it.

Longstreet countered a suggestion of Lee's to send a division to Jackson with the comment, "Certainly, but before the Division can reach him, the attack will be broken by artillery." And broken it was. Pope's second and third lines were blasted into disarray. Formation lost, with its support on the left melting away, the Union forces in front of Jackson began to retreat.

Lee now saw his opportunity to finish off the enemy, and directed Longstreet to advance. But the order was a fraction late, for Longstreet proudly replied his forces were already moving to do exactly that. The pursuit turned into something of a race, with Pope the pursued and Longstreet the pursuer. The direction of the pursuit lay in the same direction as that of First Manassas Washington, D.C. There was some confusion as Jackson's men naturally overlapped with the charging men of Longstreet. The Federals fought well in the rearguard action, and an approaching storm brought an early darkness. The Confederate pursuit ended, but not until the result was a clear cut Confederate victory.

Both Jackson and Longstreet had fought magnificently at Second Manassas, and in general during the entire campaign. In reviewing their decisions, let us begin, reversing our earlier pattern, with Jackson.

Jackson's flank march through Thoroughfare Gap and his descent on Manassas Junction was a thing of beauty. It is full of anecdotes a sure sign that something important had taken place. We have Stonewall, described as bareheaded, peering at the sun disappearing behind a mountain. When his men sought to cheer him, he quickly evoked silence. Undaunted, his men raised their caps in silent tribute. Commenting to his staff, Jackson remarked, "Who could not conquer, with such troops as these?"

The flank march of Jackson has been called "two of the longest and hardest days of marching any 23,000 soldiers ever did." His movements completely befuddled Pope, whose lookouts spotted the upstream movement, and the swing the west had the Northern commander convinced that Jackson was headed to the Valley for another Confederate high level version of hide and seek. Freeman called the two day march "one of the great marches of history . . ."

G.F.R. Henderson, as should be expected, found little to nothing wrong with the tactics of Jackson. "For three days", he wrote, "he had complete control of the strategic situation." And while I know I have been fairly hard on Henderson throughout this talk, one can hardly blame him, for until such time as Stonewall opened on Gibbon's troops at Groveton, little in the way of complaint could be expressed.

In recapping the campaign, I described the attack of Jackson at Groveton as "impetuous". The question that readily comes to mind is whether or not the attack was necessary. Eckenrode and Conrad state, "Jackson decided to attack this division [the men of Gibbon] and thus draw on him the various units of Pope's army before it could be reinforced by McClellan". More likely, Jackson just could not resist a chance to wallop a division-sized tidbit passing across his front that had no knowledge of his whereabouts. Freeman felt, however, that tactically the action taught nothing. Indeed, when one considers the loss of Taliaferro, Trimble and Ewell, the cost of the engagement may have been too severe.

During the two day engagement at Second Manassas, Stonewall Jackson displayed his ability as a defensive commander. His choice of ground was good, and certainly was the best under the circumstances he could have adopted. That he stubbornly held off what were some of the better division commanders in the Federal army stands much to his credit.

In summarizing his analysis of Jackson's actions during the Second Manassas campaign, Henderson notes that after Jackson's death Lee never again attempted "those great turning movements which had achieved his most brilliant victories. Never again did he divide his army to unite it again on the field of battle. The reason is not far to seek. There was now no general in the Confederate army to whom he dared confide the charge of the detached wing, and in possessing one such general he had been more fortunate than Napoleon."

If there is criticism to be handed out for the Confederate effort during the Second Manassas campaign, it generally falls to James Longstreet. The criticism usually comes in two manners: the first, that somehow his march with Lee to rejoin Jackson at Manassas was slow, and second, that Longstreet was either responsible for or deliberately slow in coming to Jackson's aid on the field of Second Manassas.

You will recall it was Longstreet's task to hold the Confederate position on the Rappahannock and keep Pope's army occupied while Jackson took off around the flank of Pope. Jackson's two day march was built for speed Longstreet had the rest of the army and all of the assorted baggage that goes along with it. Eckenrode and Conrad note that by the end of the second day's march Longstreet was far short of Jackson's second day bivouac. What they do not explain, of course, was that Longstreet's first day march started about 3:00 p.m. while Stonewall was off at sunrise. Freeman contends that "in marching to support Jackson, it has been recorded that his infantry made as good time as had the renowned "foot cavalry" of the former Army of the Valley."

The allegations of delay on Longstreet's part generally starts with his arrival on the field late on the 29th. You have already heard Eckenrode's comments as to his inability to perceive how Longstreet could not have immediately come to the support of Jackson. He later described Longstreet's reconnaissance as "leisurely", although there appears to be little to support such an allegation. That "Old Peter" wished to reconnoiter the field and avoid a piecemeal attack across unknown ground and against unknown enemy strength appears much more prudent than rash. Certainly, in retrospect, it is highly unlikely that the final result of a 29th attack could have had the same success as that of the 30th.

Eckenrode and Conrad keep up the pressure on Longstreet on the 30th. Interestingly, Cadmus Wilcox and John Bell Hood reported about midnight that a daylight attack on the Federal position was inadvisable. Hood, for one, was certainly no slouch at, or adverse to, making attacks. Once Pope's attack on Jackson started, Longstreet's biographers contend that Lee was somehow under the influence of Longstreet. Finally, once the attack was made, they note that "when he did attack, Longstreet was splendid."

In point of fact, he was outstanding. His timing, first with the artillery barrage of Colonel Lee, and finally with the massive counterattack that broke Pope's army, was not duplicated again until Jackson's attack at Chancelloreville. To state, as his biographers inexplicably continued to maintain, that he had no grasp of the offensive, seems to border on the absurd. As I noted at the outset, two of the grander charges of the war were delivered by Longstreet at Second Manassas and Chickamauga.

Conclusions

So what can we conclude about these pivotal months of the first full year of the American Civil War as they applied to Thomas J. Jackson and James Longstreet? Clearly, both men established themselves as the two most capable lieutenants in the eastern theater, and arguably in the Southern armies. Neither was remotely close to perfect, as we have noticed. But in the overall context of the early stages of the war, they clearly demonstrated their right to be promoted to lieutenant general and named to corps command shortly after Antietam.

Before I conclude, I should say a few words about James Longstreet, Lee's "Old War Horse". I tried to warn you, and I am sure that you have noticed, that I feel that Longstreet has received the short end of history's stick. As William Garrett Piston points out, Longstreet was more than favorably reviewed by immediate postwar Southern historians, including several of those who became bitter opponents such as Jubal Early and John B. Gordon. It was not until the period of time after Robert E. Lee's death, when Longstreet's postwar politics became evident, and the proponents of the "Lost Cause" began to look for places to lay blame, that James Longstreet emerged as the prime scapegoat of Southern history.

In researching this talk, I have little used Longstreet's excellent memoirs, From Manassas to Appomattox. Written thirty years after the war and following twenty years' battle with his former comrades in arms, it is not surprising that inaccuracies and exaggerations crept into the narrative. It is sad, however, to find writers such as Eckenrode and Conrad use Longstreet's attitude in the 1890's to explain his attitude and actions in the 1860's. For those reasons, I have tried to stay away from extensive reliance on the writing of James Longstreet.

Douglas Southall Freeman perhaps wrote the best summary of the two campaigns we have just discussed. In reviewing the events of the Second Manassas campaign, he states, "The special satisfaction of Lee was in the evidence that the Army at last had what every Army requires, capable corps commanders. Both Longstreet and Jackson, he felt, now were qualified to handle large numbers of men and throw the entire force simultaneously into action. Could the contrast of two months have been more incredible? June 30, Frayser's Farm; August 30, Second Manassas the dates recorded a swift revolution." Robert E. Lee had a tandem of corps commanders whose capabilities were perhaps second to none in the land. That the Army of Northern Virginia was never quite the same after Jackson's mortal wounding at Chancellorsville is not only a reflection of the value of Stonewall, but also a reflection of the strengths that both men brought to the army.