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by Arthur R. Stone November 16, 1961 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| CONTENTS
Part I: Preface Part II: Encampment At Murfreesboro Part III: Tullahoma Campaign Part IV: Tullahoma To The Tennessee River Part V: Tennessee River To Chickamauga Creek Part VI: The Battle Of Chickamauga Part VII: Leadership At Chickamauga Notes Bibliography
Preface
The activities and events of the opposing armies during 1863 leading up to the battle should not be omitted from an accounting of this sanguinary struggle. It is here that we see flanking activities employed on a grand scale for the first time in the war; deception employed by both sides to confuse the enemy; opportunities for success passed by; complex maneuvering to avoid destruction, and extreme frustration imposed upon a commanding general by his subordinate commanders. In order to bring out these factors entering into the campaign, I am starting my paper with the opposing armies facing each other, early in the year 1863, just south of Murfreesboro, Tennessee.
Encampment at Murfreesboro In the year 1863 the destiny of the Civil War was shaped by three great campaigns which took place in that year. First, the attempted invasion of the North by the Confederate army under the command of General Robert E. Lee. Lee was defeated at Gettysburg, and began an orderly retreat to Virginia on July 4. On the same day Confederate General Pemberton surrendered his army and the City of Vicksburg, Miss., to General Grant. The third campaign, Murfreesboro to Chattanooga, was a continuation of the Union army's drive for possession of strategically important Chattanooga. With the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the whole Central Mississippi River valley fell under Union control and the fighting shifted to Arkansas and the Red River in the West to Eastern Tennessee in the East.
Following the battle of Stone's River, just north of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, which took place during the first week of January, 1863, the Federal forces in that area were reorganized under the command of General William S. Rosecrans after which his army was comprised of three corps commanded by Generals George H. Thomas, Alexander McD. McCook, and Thomas L. Crittenden. General Davis S. Stanley was in command of the Cavalry Corps and General Gordon Granger commanded the Reserve Corps. The reorganized Army of the Cumberland then camped around Murfreesboro for nearly six months. Rosecrans had been steadily recruiting his forces and now had about 60,000 men, of which some 10,000 were cavalry -- a branch in which the Federals had been lamentably weak, but which now had been built up. It was still inadequate. Rosecrans' lad of cavalry had been a disadvantage in gathering intelligence and it prevented him from countering the Confederate cavalry which harassed him constantly.
Rosecrans' inactivity for nearly six months gave rise to much prodding from the War Department urging him to move against Bragg, or to make a demonstration against him, at least. (fn 2) There is little doubt, however, that General Rosecrans was in a getter position to judge his state of preparation and timing for the movement than General-in-Chief Halleck, his superior in Washington. Not until June 23, just 11 days before Vicksburg fell, did Rosecrans get going. Ahead of him, between Murfreesboro and Chattanooga, lay the great Cumberland Plateau -- a mountainous area, rugged, heavily wooded and crisscrossed with streams and ravines.
Tullahoma Campaign Rosecrans began his campaign with obvious skill. With no intentions of driving his forces against Bragg's strongly fortified positions, (fn 3) he feigned with Granger's Reserve Corps and the main portion of his cavalry as if to make such an attack on Shelbyville. At night, camp fires were kindled through the country from Polk's left to the Shelbyville Road -- to give the impression of a big infantry advance from that direction. Instead, rosecrans shifted his main strength to the east, sliding completely around the Confederate right flank. By the morning of the 27th, the whole Federal army had reached Manchester, some 12 miles behind the Confederate lines. On the 29th, Rosecrans closed in upon Tullahoma -- after threatening to cut the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad at Dechard, 10 miles to the southeast. Defense was all that Bragg seemed to think about at Tullahoma. He now considered it imperative to evacuate Tullahoma without delay. This he proceeded to do, hi army reaching Chattanooga the first week in July. In about nine days, Rosecrans had expertly maneuvered Bragg to Chattanooga without fighting a major engagement. (fn 4) It had been made extremely difficult by reason of incessant rains that had fallen since the opening of the campaign. So continuous and heavy were they that the mountain roads were all but impassable. (fn 5)
Tullahoma to the Tennessee River
Rosecrans remained inactive for six weeks -- July 4 to August 16. Grant was impatient and strongly urged his superiors that he be permitted to advance immediately upon Mobile, while Rosecrans continue to push on to Chattanooga. His superior, General Halleck, had other ideas, and to Grant's dismay he was ordered to send troops to Southern and Western Louisiana, and to send more troops to Missouri and Arkansas. Also, to send troops back along the lines of communications which Forrest and Morgan were raiding so spectacularly. Forrest and Morgan were part of Bragg's army, and free to go on their raids only because Rosecrans failed to keep adequate pressure on Bragg. It was with disgust, therefore, that Grant found his army depleted and his plans for a vigorous conduct of the war disapproved. Three things were needed, Rosecrans argued, for his campaign to succeed. The first was ripe corn which would not be ready before August; the second was the repair of the railroad leading to the Tennessee River; and the third was support for his flanks. He wanted help from both Burnside and Grant for flank protection. After more prodding from Washington, Rosecrans, on August 16, set his army in motion from Tullahoma. This was to be the main effort in the campaign to take East Tennessee from the Confederates and to bring its loyal people back under Union protection. Burnside, with his Army of the Ohio, numbering about 15,000, was to seize Knoxville and Cumberland Gap while Rosecrans was to proceed to drive Bragg out of Chattanooga. Burnside moved out of Lexington August 16 -- the same day that Rosecrans moved from Tullahoma. While Burnside was busy with Knoxville and Cumberland Gap, Rosecrans proceeded to follow out a plan of operations whereby he would cross the Tennessee River west of Northern Georgia with the objective of cutting his opponent's communications and supply lines from Atlanta. Bragg would then find himself shut in between Burnside on the north and east, and Rosecrans to the south and west. It all looked good on paper. But General Halleck had given Burnside authority to operate in East Tennessee as he pleased. Therefore, Burnside did not choose to disturb a good thing by helping Rosecrans. Furthermore, if he did he would then be subordinate to Rosecrans. To deceive Bragg as to the point of crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans sent two infantry brigades, together with Col. Wilder's mounted infantry and Col. Minty's cavalry, some 7,000 men, to make a demonstration along the river north of the city. General Hazen was in command of this operation. Troops were made to appear at many different crossings at the same time; appearance of large-scale pontoon building was given with appropriate sound effects; miles of campfires were made at night -- with much bugle blowing. All of this for the purpose of giving the impression of a large army along the north bank of the river. Also, a vigorous shelling of the city was made by Wilder's artillery. So deceived was Bragg by these misleading activities and racket that he left the crossings below Chattanooga practically unguarded. As a result, Rosecrans and his army, on August 29j, proceeded to cross the river in the vicinity of Bridgeport and Caperton's Ferry in Alabama and at Shellmound, Tennessee. By September 4 the Army of the Cumberland was across the Tennessee River. (fn 6) Some troops had crossed on the rebuilt railroad bridge; others by pontoons, boats, and rafts. Now the vital east-west railroad had been reached.
Tennessee River to Chickamauga Creek When General Bragg learned that Rosecrans had crossed the river and was threatening his supply lines, he abandoned his positions in and around Chattanooga on the 7th of September and retired southeastward some 25 miles to Lafayette, Georgia -- behind Pigeon Mountain. When Bragg moved from Chattanooga, the city all Rosecrans'. All he had to do was to move in. Rightly, he looked to the destruction or capture of his enemy and continued his plans accordingly.
A word about geography seems necessary at this point. Chattanooga lay on the south and east side of a sharp bend in the Tennessee River which then swerves north in its downward course around the north end of Raccoon Mountain. It then flows in a great bend to the southwest some 100 miles before heading back to Tennessee. The river in its southwesterly course is flanked on the southeast by Sand Mountain, a great ridge several miles wide with walls rising at some place 1000 feet, and ending at the north in Raccoon Mountain which fills one of the bends several miles below Chattanooga. Immediately to the east across a narrow valley and southwest of the city is Lookout Mountain -- nearly 100 miles long and some 3,000 feet above sea level at its highest point. At its northern extremity Lookout Mountain juts out in the familiar promontory that overlooks Chattanooga and the river. South of Chattanooga a few miles Missionary Ridge spurs off from Lookout Mountain to the north and east. Still farther to the south several miles, Lookout Mountain throws out from its eastern side a crescent-shaped spur called Pigeon Mountain. The West Branch of Chickamauga Creek which gave the ensuing battle its name flows northward in the valley between Pigeon Mountain and Lookout Mountain. As the valley narrows to the southward, where the mountains join, it forms a natural cul-de-sac called McLemore's Cove -- some six or more miles wide. Farm lands lay in the bend of the cove but mountainous walls rise around it, passable only by widely separated, rough and narrow roads. Dougherty's Gap is at its southern extremity. Pigeon Mountain on the east is crossed at Catlett's , Dug and Bluebird's gaps. Lookout Mountain on the west side of the cove is crossed at Stevens Gap.
Under this gross misapprehension, Rosecrans, following the crossing of the Tennessee, arranged his army into three columns, Crittenden's Corps was to move around the base of Lookout Mountain to Chattanooga, leave a brigade there to garrison the town, and then march south from Chattanooga following up the valley of Chickamauga Creek. His objective being to pursue the phantom army of Bragg's. Thomas' Corps was to cross Lookout Mountain at Stevens Gap, some 25 miles south of Chattanooga, and to move east into McLemore's Cove and thence across Pigeon Mountain at Dug Gap to LaFayette. From there, Rosecrans figured, Thomas could strike Bragg's flank as his retreating army came by. McCook's Corps was to cross Lookout Mountain at Winston's Gap, some 45 miles south of Chattanooga, with orders to occupy Alpine, Georgia, several miles to the southeast of Winston's Gap. This movement was for the purpose of heading off the supposedly headlong flight of Bragg. Far from being in disorganized flight, Bragg, from all indications, never intended that his withdrawal from Chattanooga be permanent. He destroyed no bridges on his way out and left standing all storehouses, hospitals and other buildings used by his army while there.
In short order, Thomas and McCook found themselves on a mountain ribbed by ridges and hills. They were some 25 and 45 miles respectively south of Chattanooga, with the flanks of the three columns much too far apart to support one another because of the terrain. On September 9, two of Thomas' four divisions, commanded by Generals Negley and Baird, crossed Lookout Mountain at Stevens Gap. Negley, being in the advance, moved to a position in McLemore's Cove on the road headed for Dug Gap to the east. Negley soon discovered that the Confederates were holding Dug Gap in great force, and also that he was in danger of attack in front and on both flanks. Upon Negley's request, Baird hurriedly, on the 10th, moved forward in support of Negley. Then, on the 11th, the two divisions with Baird protecting the wagon trains, fell back as rapidly as possible. During the retreat the two divisions were under attack until Chickamauga Creek was recrossed. Reaching Stevens Gap they assumed a strong position in its front. The next day the location of Bragg's army -- with Johnston's reinforcements -- was fully determined by the Federal commanders and relayed to Rosecrans at Chattanooga. As late as September 10, Rosecrans had chided Thomas for not having reached LaFayette; and when advised of Negley's withdrawal in the cove he expressed doubts as to the necessity for it. It was not until September 12, however, that Rosecrans awoke from his delusion. Now aware of his peril he feverishly began to concentrate his forces. From Bragg's whole army, poised at LaFayette behind Pigeon Mountain, Thomas was about 12 miles west of Bragg; Crittenden had two divisions at Ringgold, about 20 miles northeast of Bragg, and one division, of two brigades at Lee & Gordon's Mills on the west side of Chickamauga Creek about 12 miles north of Bragg. McCook was about 25 miles south of Bragg at Alpine. Crittenden was ordered to position his three divisions at Lee & Gordon's; Thomas to move northeast toward Crittenden as soon as he was joined by McCook; and Gordon Granger and his Reserve Corps were ordered from Bridgeport, Alabama, to Chattanooga. All of this took "some doing." It took McCook five days of night and day marching to join Thomas, so rugged was the area. Nevertheless, by the night of September 17, and without interference from Bragg, the three corps were within supporting distance of each other. With its left at the mills, the Federal line now extended west and south through McLemore's Cove to Stevens Gap -- a distance of about 12 miles. The locations of the scattered Federal forces, prior to their concentration was well known to Bragg through reports in Northern newspapers which he obtained through a local family at LaFayette.
General Polk had learned that there was a large Federal force in front of him on the 12th, and not just a single division. Hence, he thought only of a defensive attitude. Polk, himself, was in doubt as to where his enemy might be. The reports of his cavalry led him to believe that Crittenden's entire corps, together with Wilder's brigade, was concentrating to the east of his position on the Graysville Road from Ringgold. When Bragg, on the morning of the 13th, at the head of Buckner's Corps of two divisions, went to the front he found that no attack had been made by Polk. There was no enemy there to attack. It was not until noon of the 13th did Bragg definitely locate Crittenden, with his united corps, in his new location on the west side of Chickamauga at the mills. There was yet time for Bragg to fall upon Crittenden in force before he could be joined by either of the other two Union Corps. (fn 10) At this date, September 13, McCook had learned only the night before that he was to join Thomas. Instead of proceeding immediately against Crittenden, Bragg returned to LaFayette. There his forces lay inactive for four days while Rosecrans effected a consolidation of his three corps. Rosecrans, on the 15th, left Chattanooga for the front, joining Thomas' Corps, to hasten the consolidation of McCook and Thomas.
The Battle of Chickamauga
Preliminaries - Friday, September 18. Bragg put his forces into action on the 18th. But he was a day late. His basic strategy was excellent, but Rosecrans had changed the position of his army from where Bragg thought it was. Rosecrans was aware of the movement of Bragg's army to the north -- dust clouds from the marching Confederates indicated a massing beyond the left of his army. Bragg did not seem to suspect that Rosecrans had guessed his intentions, and that he (Rosecrans) was hurriedly moving his forces to support Crittenden and deploying them so as to protect the roads to Chattanooga.
Bragg's army, on the 18th, other than the three divisions across the creek, concentrated facing west on the west side of the creek from Reed's Bridge on the north almost to Lee & Gordon's Mills on the south. Forrest's cavalry held the right flank at Reed's Bridge while Wheeler's cavalry covered the left. As the opposing forces maneuvered for position during the night of ht 18th along a six-mile front, neither army knew the exact position of the other. The area was densely wooded for the most part -- a mass of tangled undergrowth, brambles and thickets. Movement was difficult and observation was far from good. Officers in many instances had difficulty in keeping in touch with their commands. A clash was inevitable soon. The opposing forces were, in some instances, only a few hundred yards apart. The field on which the impending battle was to be fought on the 19th and 20th lay largely between Chickamauga Creek on the east and the foothills of Missionary Ridge to the west. LaFayette Road, the road from Chattanooga to LaFayette, ran through it in almost a straight line from Rossville, where it crossed Missionary Ridge on the north, to Lee & Gordon's on the south, where it crossed the creek. The creek, so deep as to be hardly crossable except at bridges and fords, wound along the eastern edge of this area in an irregular but northeasterly direction.
Bragg did not intend to precipitate a general engagement at this time. He needed another day to ready his forces along the west bank of the creek. The fighting spread and there ensued a regular dog fight along the north front. With each side feeding in regiments, brigades, and divisions as the struggle spread rapidly southward. Bragg thought that he was sending is troops beyond Rosecrans' left, but Thomas had posted his troops farther north than Bragg supposed and, therefore, Bragg's first flanking advance was not successful. By mid-afternoon major fighting had spread along a jagged line some three miles in length. All of the Federal divisions with the exception of Granger's reserves became engaged. The fighting was furious and without much plan. All day long lines of troops of both sides were marching north while the battle was rolling to the south. During this movement north in the forenoon, the Union center was exceedingly vulnerable to attack. (fn 11) Bragg, however, clung tenaciously to his original plan of turning Rosecrans' left, while Rosecrans built up his position against a succession of heavy attacks. Although most of the fighting on the 19th was on Thomas' front, during the afternoon General Stewart's "Little Giants" division struck with fury on the Union center and pushed it back a mile across LaFayette Road. About the same time Hood made a savage attack on Rosecrans' right. The timely arrival of Wood's division coming down the creek from Lee & Gordon's Mills saved the Federal right from being rolled up by Hood. The battle in Hood's sector ended substantially where it began. Probably no fighting along the whole line that day had been more fearsome than here. Confederate General Cleburne's division, after a six-mile march down the stream, also made a heavy attack about sundown on a one-mile front on Thomas' left. Darkness rather than success for either side ended this sanguinary fighting. When the fighting ended for the day, neither side could claim a victory. Bragg had failed to crush the union left. Although badly battered it was still intact, and Rosecrans' hold on the roads to Chattanooga was firm. Losses during the day had been very heavy for both sides, the loss of Southern officers being exceedingly high. General John B. Turchin, of Thomas' Corps, referred to the day's fighting as "a mad, irregular battle, very much resembling guerilla warfare on a vast scale and wherein all the science and art of war went for nothing." As night fell there was little rest for Rosecrans' battle-weary soldiers. Rosecrans brought his army into a more compact defensive line, still interposing his army with logs and rails formed breastworks along his left front. On the Confederate side, during the night, General Longstreet arrived in person with his staff and two more infantry brigades. Four more infantry brigades and all of his artillery arrived after the battle. By evening of the 19th, divisions within the various corps had become so intermingled that command became a nightmare on both sides. Rosecrans arbitrarily assigned Thomas to command the left wing of his forces and McCook to command the right wing, while Bragg gave the right of his army to Polk and the left to Longstreet. This confused jumbling of units would, the next day, have a disastrous result for the Federals.
Shortly before ten o'clock, however, a strong assault was made on Thomas' extreme left by Hill 's Corps which was initially successful, but heavy fire from the Yankee breastworks halted further advances. It was about this time, according to Capt. William Cairnes of General Cleburne's staff, that General Polk said to General Cheatham, "General, move your division to attack at once." Cheatham gave the attack order: "Forward, boys, and give them hell!" Polk, the Bishop General, reinforced the order but skirted the profanity by shouting: "Give 'em what General Cheatham says, boys!" Immediately following the initial attack the assau7lt was taken up successively by the divisions on the immediate left. No appreciable gains were made by either side in subsequent fighting on Thomas' front throughout the morning.
It was at this hour, as Longstreet was poised to strike, that a Federal staff officer rode down the Glenn-Kelly road in the rear of Brannan's and Wood's divisions with messages from Thomas, at Kelly Field, to Rosecrans at Widow Glenn's house which was located west of the Federal right wing. By reason of poor visibility this officer thought that Reynold's right flank was in [the] air and so reported to Rosecrans. Rosecrans alarmingly assumed that there was a wide gap in his line with no troops between Wood and Reynolds. This disconcerting news came at a time of tense activity at Rosecrans' headquarters. Rosecrans, without investigation, issued a direct order to General Wood, rather than through his corps commander, which read: "The General Commanding directs you to close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him." Actually, Brannan was not out of line and Reynolds was not under pressure. Upon receipt of this order, which was ambiguous to say the least, Wood undertook to carry it out by withdrawing his division from the front, and marching it across the rear of Brannan's division to where Reynolds was posted in line. Davis attempted to throw sufficient forces in to hold that portion of the line, about a quarter of a mile wide, thus vacated. As Wood started his march northward Longstreet's column of four divisions stormed in the gap, advancing on a half-mile front. Longstreet's attack struck Wood's and Brannan's divisions on their exposed flanks and drove them northward from the immediate field of battle. The right of the Union army was shattered by Hindman's division which routed Davis' and Sheridan's divisions and one brigade of Van Cleve's division. These forces of the Federal army's right were cut off entirely from the rest of the army and fled northwestward toward Rossville by way of McFarland's Gap. Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden and McCook were caught in the tide of retreating troops. No pursuit of the routed Federals was made by the Confederates. In short order the Federal army lost several thousand prisoners, 40 or more guns, 15,000 small arms and a large number of wagon-trains. Wilder's mounted infantry brigade, on the extreme right, made a valiant stand for a while employing with telling effect the heavy fire power of the Spencer repeating carbine. Wilder did not cease activity until after he had brought in the hospitals from Crawfish Springs as well as saving part of the artillery abandoned on the field by McCook's Corps. During the night following he established a line west from the base of Horseshoe Ridge to the base of Lookout Mountain to prevent Confederate cavalry from circling around and taking Thomas in the rear. The headlong, tumultuous flight of panic-stricken soldiers on Rosecrans' right was probably unequalled in any other engagement of the war except at First Manassas. Furthermore, no other battle involved the actual flight of the commanding general from the field. (fn 13) General Thomas, after the Confederate break-through, was in sole command of all the Federal forces in the field. He formed a new line to his rear extending west on a wooded, commanding ridge, known as "Horseshoe Ridge", almost at a right angle with the Union left. Still being held, the Union left extended in a form of a crescent north and south just east of the LaFayette Road, where it faced Polk's five divisions. The new line facing south was composed of Brannan's division on the far right with units of Wood's, Negley's and Van Cleve's divisions on Brannan's left. From this favorable position the imperturbable Thomas met the onslaughts of Longstreet's troops with such stubborn and determined resistance on that Sunday afternoon that he justly earned the sobriquet "Rock of Chickamauga." (fn 14) After numerous assaults, Longstreet nearly succeeded in enveloping Brannan's right, at which time Thomas' troops were hard hit and short of ammunition. At this moment two brigades of General Granger's reserves marched in from McAfee's Church on the Ringgold Road -- 4500 fresh troops, bring with them 95,000 extra rounds of ammunition. These troops, commanded by General Steedman ("Old Steady", were thrown into action and succeeded in saving Brannan's right. Confederate General Bushrod Johnson's division, aided by Preston's division of fresh troops, made a series of attacks against Brannan and Steedman that continued through the afternoon. Finally, Longstreet pushed Steedman back to the next ridge and occupied the ground to the right of Brannan. The left of the Federal line, around Kelly Field, facing Polk's divisions on the east was relatively inactive during the afternoon. However, about 4:00 p.m. Polk launched a slashing attack that succeeded in enveloping the Federal left. General Rosecrans, now at army headquarters near Chattanooga, sent a message to Thomas about 4:15 p.m. directing him to withdraw his forces immediately. The first division to be ordered out was Reynold's of the left wing which division had the greatest distance to go, to be followed by the other three divisions of that wing. Col. McCook's brigade, left by Granger at McAfee's Church, had in the meantime marched from that location to a companion ridge just north of Snodgrass Hill where it gave protection to Thomas' retreating divisions. Gradually, the battle quieted down along Horseshoe Ridge and around Snodgrass Hill as the right wing of the Federal army began to retreat towards McFarland's Gap. General Beatty of Negley's division, was struck by the gloom that pervaded over Thomas' soldiers on their melancholy march through the hills and down the valley to Rossville -- the roadside strewn with the wounded. General Beatty thought that the army was so mixed up and confused that it was no more than a mob, which a single Confederate division could wipe out of existence if it would attack before morning. The losses on both sides were appalling and the percentage of losses to total strength of each side were surprisingly equal. According to Livermore's Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, the total strength of the Federal forces was 58,222, with total casualties of 16,170; whereas, the total strength of the Confederate forces was 66,326, with total casualties of 18,454. Total casualties of each side amounted to 28% of their respective strength. In spite of the disorganized condition of his troops, Thomas, by the morning of the 21st had restored a semblance of organization and had placed his forces at Rossville Gap and along Missionary Ridge in preparation of further attacks from Bragg. Thomas felt uneasy, however, with regard to his right flank and at his suggestion, Rosecrans ordered a withdrawal to Chattanooga. By the following morning all remaining Union troops together with wagons, ambulances, and artillery were in position in the city. Thus came to an end the great battle of Chickamauga, a battle regarding which General-Historian Cist said, "All things considered, the Battle of Chickamauga, for the forces engaged, was the hardest fought and the bloodiest battle of the rebellion." It was, indeed, a Confederate victory. Not a Federal soldier remained on the field. The Army of the Cumberland had been soundly whipped -- but not destroyed. It would be heard from again.
Leadership at Chickamauga Accustomed as he was to defeat, General Bragg apparently did not realize on the afternoon of the 20th that he had won an overwhelming victor. Or he refused to believe it -- disgruntled perhaps because it had not been won the way he had planned it. Generals Longstreet and Polk both urged him to follow up his advantages at once. Bragg would not listen to either. Without authority, his commanders were helpless. True, Bragg's casualties were great, as he pointed out, but the high spirit of the men on the field, from the top commanders to the privates, was something his enemy did not possess. Furthermore, he had fresh troops in Cheatham's division and Wheeler's cavalry. Archibald Gracie declared that "the halt to Confederate pursuit, from a military standpoint, was the most stupendous blunder of the war." General Bragg's patriotism, courage, and personal character were unquestionable. He had a great capacity for organization. But he did not possess the confidence of his army in other respects and to the degree necessary to secure success. His greatest problem was getting cooperation from his subordinate commanders. General D.H. Hill expressed his opinion thus: "The trouble with him was, first, lack of knowledge of the situation, second, lack of personal supervision of the execution of his orders. Another serious trouble with him was the disposition to find a scapegoat for every failure and disaster. This made his officers cautious about striking a blow when the opportunity presented itself unless they were protected by a positive order." Apparently, General Bragg's commanders were reluctant, also, to carry out his orders unless their own information justified the action. (fn 15) Time does not permit of an accounting with respect to the ill-feeling following this battle which erupted, as it did following Stone's River, between General Bragg and his top commanders. Here, a "Round-Robin" petition asking for Bragg's removal was drafted and dispatched to President Davis. In the final outcome President Davis stood back of his good friend Bragg and Generals Polk, Hill and Hindman were relieved of their commands. General Forrest was transferred to an independent command in another military area as a result of his verbally delivered, fiery denunciation of Bragg over what Forrest considered prejudice and persecution to himself at the hands of his commanding general. The Washington War Office and General U.S. Grant concluded that General Rosecrans was not up to his job as commander of the Army of the Cumberland any longer and on October 19th he was relieved of his command and replaced by General Thomas. General Rosecrans -- courageous, gifted, lovable, irritable and peculiar, had brilliantly maneuvered the Confederates out of Tullahoma and Chattanooga, but got himself into trouble, as we have seen, as soon as he became convinced that he had his opponent on the run. However, by a combination of competence, cooperation of his commanders, and plain luck, he brought his army together in the nick of time to prevent its destruction. On the second day of the battle when the unexpected rout of his right wing swept him from the field of battle, and supposing that the rout extended to his whole army, the blow staggered him. Much has been written to criticize or to excuse his behavior from noon until nightfall of that fateful Sunday. Also to ask why, at mid-afternoon, was he at Department Headquarters near Chattanooga instead of being with Thomas on the front? Or why was he not at McFarland's Gap to command and utilize some 8,000 of his troops that were retreating early that afternoon, and in fairly good order, to Rossville? (fn 16) Rosecrans was considerably more broken up than some accounts indicate. Captain Alfred Lacey Hough, staff officer to General Negley, rode to Rosecrans' headquarters at Chattanooga that night and discovered the general crying, despairing and seeking spiritual comfort from his priest. Nevertheless, Henry M. Cist tells us that every soldier in Rosecrans' army felt that he had a personal friend in "Old Rosey"; that his boys in blue never faltered in their devotion to him or lost confidence in him.
In conclusion, it may be said that the victory at Chickamauga, a hollow victory though it was, gave rise to Southern hopes which had dropped since Gettysburg and Vicksburg. War Clerk Jones at Richmond wrote in his diary: "The effect of this great victory will be electrical. The whole South will be filled again with patriotic fervor, and in the North there will be corresponding depression. Surely the Government of the United States must now see the impossibility of subjugating the Southern people, spread over such a vast extent of territory; and the European governments ought now to interpose and put an end to this cruel waste of blood and treasure." But this was not to be. The struggle would continue to its bitter end -- one and one-half years later.
(fn 1) Hill was a trained soldier, a graduate of West Point, but a sort of stormy petrol and for some reason, a misfit soldier. He never seemed to find exactly the right niche for his individual talents. Douglas Freeman describes him as a "most tenacious fighter" and says that "few division commanders could get more from a given number of men." This is true, but he was always in some sort of dispute with somebody about something. (Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee) (fn 2) Grant, conducting his Vicksburg campaign, wanted pressure applied against Bragg to prevent a portion of Bragg's army from reinforcing Johnston in his attempt to extricate Pemberton. Breckenridge's division had been sent to Johnston in Mississippi, but Rosecrans had been accretions. Rosecrans, on the other hand, argued that by staying where he was he was keeping Bragg's army up in Central Tennessee, too far from Mississippi to send help to Johnston. (fn 3) Bragg was strongly entrenched behind heavy works thrown up during the six months of waiting. These increased the natural strength of the position, which extended from Horse Mountain on the east to Duck River on the west. Portions of the line were covered by abatis. The position was good for either defense or retreat. (Thomas B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, Vol. I) (fn 4) During these nine days of active campaigning the Army of the Cumberland, with a loss of 560 killed, wounded, and missing, compelled the army under Bragg, to retreat a greater distance and out of far stronger positions than the united armies under Sherman were able to compel the same army with but slight additional strength under General Joe Johnston, to fall back, in four months of active field campaigning, with a very much larger relative loss. The proportion of the forces of the opposing armies during the Tullahoma campaign was far nearer equal than that on (sic) to Atlanta, while the natural and military obstacles to be overcome were largely the greater in the Tullahoma campaign. (Henry M. Cist, The Army of the Cumberland) (fn 5) During nine days of continuous marching, what Rosecrans described as "one of the most extraordinary rains ever known to Tennessee at that period of the year" came down to turn the soil into a spongy quagmire and to make unpaved roads nearly impassable. The rain kept on, hour after hour and day after day, with no letup: "No Presbyterian rain, either, but a genuine Baptist downpour," an Illinois solder called it. Over one especially bad stretch of mountain road an entire brigade of infantry was ordered to stack arms and then take station along the road all the way to the summit to help the supply wagons get up the grade. (Bruce Catton, This Hallowed Ground) (fn 6) Crittenden marched eastward across the Cumberland Plateau to the Sequatchie Valley. Thomas' Corps, constituting the center, moved to Jasper at the foot of Sewanee, now the site of the University of the South. McCook's Corps followed the railroad line to Stevenson and Bridgeport. Not counting the far-flung cavalry, the three corps were now spread out in motion over a front of more than 50 miles. Still Bragg seemed only vaguely aware of what was doing and gave no sign of other plan than merely marking time until the crisis should be right on top of him. (Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee) (fn 7) On September 6, Halleck wired Rosecrans: "You give me no information of the position of Bragg and Buckner. If they have united it is important that you and Burnside unite as quickly as possible so that the enemy may not attack you separately." At this time Buckner was on his way to Chattanooga and Burnside was scattering his forces through the whole of East Tennessee. The following telegram indicates how poorly informed Halleck seemed to be at the time of sending it. 9/11/63 Halleck to Burnside (Cumberland Gap): (fn 8) A few weeks had been enough for Hill to catch the infection of doubting the accuracy of his commander's information and the wisdom of his orders. Hill wrote Hindman that he could not support him, offering the gratuitous comment that Negley's advance was probably "sent out as a bait to draw us off from below" and that Negley, if pressed, "will fall back in the gap and there the matter will end" (Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee) (fn 9) The following dispatch is quoted from the Official Records and is one of Bragg's dispatches which is thought to have alarmed and confused Hindman. It was sent from Bragg at Dug Gap to Hindman at midnight of the 10th and received by him at 4:20 a.m. of the 11th. "General:" (fn 10) General William B. Hazen of Palmer's division (Crittenden's Crops) wrote in his book, A Narrative of Military Service: We actually put ourselves in a position so false that for four days we were entirely at the mercy of the enemy; that we were not totally destroyed by detachments was due to an equally great mistake on his part." (fn 11) Rosecrans had a gap of varying widths ranging up to about two miles in the center of his army, between Wood's Division at Lee & Gordon's Mills and Thomas' concentration at the Kelly farm. Across this gap columns moving in procession to Thomas' support might have been taken in flank. Wood at Lee & Gordon's and those portions of McCook's Corps which had not yet come up from Crawfish Springs could have been severed from Thomas during the morning of the 19th by any sort of determined thrust by Bragg midway between Kelly's and Lee & Gordon's. (Glenn Tucker, Chickamauga) (fn 12) General Hill says that after the fight of the 19th he rode from the battle field to the point designated by Bragg in his battle order as the place where he could be found. Neither General Bragg or Polk were there and he heard nothing of the proposed daylight attack till next morning "sometime after sunrise" when he was giving his men their breakfast. (Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee) (fn 13) The breakthrough is graphically described by a Federal eye-witness, General Gates P. Thurston: "All became confusion. No order could be heard above the tempest of battle. With a wild yell the Confederates swept on far to their left. They seemed everywhere victorious. Rosecrans was bourne back in the retreat. Fugitives, wounded, caissons, ambulances, thronged the narrow pathways." He concluded that the whole line had given way, that the day was lost, that the same tide of retreat, seeing only rout everywhere, shared the opinion of Rosecrans." (Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee) (fn 14) Archibald Gracie in his book, The Truth About Chickamauga has this to say of General Thomas: "Our standard of truth, the textbook from which we quote, plainly indicates that Thomas was the grandest figure of the Federal army; a monument of strength and inspiration to the courage of his soldiers, who had rallied in the woods and on the heights to which they had fled, and where they had been posted under the orders of their commanders -- Generals Wood, Brannan, and John Beatty." (fn 15) General Bragg's good qualities were nullified by serious personality defects. Regarded in the U.S. Army as a hard taskmaster, a martinet, he lacked the magnetism of personality required for leading individualistic Southern soldiers. He suffered from dyspepsia and chronic migraine headaches which made him harsh and irritable and at times almost incapacitated him for vigorous warfare. Given independent command, he displayed vacillation and a tendency to evade responsibility -- among the worst faults of a general. He seemed to dread precipitating a great battle, and above all, he never followed up his victories. His officers and men, consequently, lacked confidence in him and became almost openly mutinous. (Clement Eaton, History of the Southern Confederacy) (fn 16) After the troops had been displaced on the right and were in motion toward Chattanooga, it was possible for them to have joined General Thomas in time for participation in the final conflict. Generals Negley, Sheridan and Davis met on the Dry Valley Road near the opening of McFarland's Gap; and there were sufficient troops with them, in all probability, to have changed the issue of the battle had they been thrown against the left flank of the enemy at Villetoe's. Not far from McFarland's house there was a gap opening eastward through which a road passed to the rear of General Thomas' line. Most of the divisions, in the withdrawal in the evening, passed through this lateral gap . . . There was no general officer of high rank on the line of retreat to comprehend the situation and provide for its possibilities . . . Colonel Thurston of McCook's staff had borne a request from General Thomas that they (Negley, Sheridan, and Davis) move to his right flank. (Thomas B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland) General John B. Turchin has pointed out emphatically that (t)here was an organized force, estimated by him to have been not less than 8000 men with adequate artillery whose commanders deliberated at three o'clock in the afternoon on what was best to be done. Turchin further commented that after the conference the whole lot moved toward Rossville. Col. Thurston caught up with the retreating column and gave the message from Thomas to them. Sheridan went back by a roundabout way by way of the LaFayette Road, Negley went on the Rossville. Only Davis faced back. In the end they all found their way to Rossville. The efforts that were subsequently made by Sheridan and Davis were too late to be of any effect.
James R. Sullivan, Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields
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