Abraham Lincoln

Abraham Lincoln's place in history is secure. Nothing can be said or written that at this late date would change the judgment of history upon Lincoln's ability and accomplishments. His remarkable stature both as a person and as a statesman is universally recognized. The countless publications concerning Lincoln are proof enough of the continuing and growing recognition of the essential greatness of the man. When we consider the elements which combined to place Lincoln in the forefront of outstanding Americans there come to mind his major contribution toward the saving of the Union, the Emancipation Proclamation that led ultimately to the freeing of millions of. bondsmen, the now familiar and superbly phrased Gettysburg Address, which more nearly represents the spirit of America than any other document, and finally, Lincoln's martyrdom in the cause of human freedom. Yet, strange as it may seem, not one of these factors which contributed so much to Lincoln's greatness would have materialized had it not been for the intercession of pure chance.

In June of 1863, it was by no means clear that history would eventually so favor Lincoln with the greatness we attribute to him today. As a matter of fact, only a slight change in the course of events that were then shaping might have altered history's verdict. The most crucial period in Lincoln's career came in late June and early July of 1863. This was the turning point, both for him and for the country, in the deadly conflict that was then raging. It was at that time that Lee decided to invade the North again. It was at that time that the decisive battle of Gettysburg was fought,- and won by the Federal Government. Whatever doubts of ultimate victory had existed in the North prior to Gettysburg were dissolved on that battlefield. After that climactic engagement, it was only a matter of how much longer the South could go on before collapsing.

But let us consider the other side of the coin. Suppose that Lee had been the victor at Gettysburg, would Lincoln's place in history then have been the same? It is an interesting speculation, and in order to attempt an answer lot us examine the situation as it existed on July 1. 1863.

By the latter part of June, 1863, the Confederacy had passed the zenith of its strength and Lee was fully aware of the precarious position of the South. Just prior to his thrust North which was to culminate at Gettysburg., Lee wrote to President Davis.

we should not *** conceal from ourselves that our resources in men are constantly diminishing, and the disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies *** is steadily augmenting.

It is altogether unlikely that a rebel victory at Gettysburg would have changed the ultimate fate of the rebellion. But this is not to say that the course of American history would not have been deflected.

The decision to invade the North a second time was a desperate gamble. As a matter of fact, there was probably no other course open to the South. Considering the Confederacy's dwindling resources and the failures of Southern arms in the west, the move had the appearance of necessity. If success, even temporary success should crown Lee's efforts, it was altogether possible that the North would be more prone to listen to overtures for peace. Then again, success might even bring the long hoped for European intervention. From the Confederacy's standpoint there was much to be gained and little to be lost. This line of reasoning was not without foundation. The war, which it was originally assumed would be over in a matter of weeks, was now dragging into its third year. So far as the North was concerned, defeat after defeat had attended its arms in the east. There did not appear to be a federal commander who could stand up to Lee and take his measure. McClellan, Pope, again McClellan, Burnside and Hooker had all tried and failed. The successes in the west, while a welcome relief to the drab picture in the east, were not overwhelming. They gave no cause for hope that a speedy end to the blood-letting was in sight.

Lincoln too was having his difficulties. His own party viewed him with something less than satisfaction. As late as November, 1863, months after the Union victory at Gettysburg, Thaddeus Stevens, one of the most powerful men in the Republican party, expreesed the opinion that Lincoln was politically dead. Upon being finformed that Lincoln was going to Gettysburg to participate in the dedicatory exercises, Stevens exclaimed tersely, "The dead going to eulogize the dead." If this was the feeling that pervaded the ranks of the dominant Republicans after the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, consider how much stronger it must, have been in the period just prior to Gettysburg and after Cliancellorsville. Consider also to what low estate Lincoln's prestige would have fallen if Gettysburg had been a defeat rather than a victory for the North.

Thaddeus Stevens

It may be supposed that even without the Gettysburg Address Lincoln's fame would have been secured by the Emancipation Proclamation, but this is not so. At the time of its issuance on January 1, 1863 the Emancipation Proclamation created some stir, but it failed to satisfy many segments of northern opinion. Lincoln had not authored the document of his own free will and the pressures which had to be exerted upon him in order to persuade him to do so had robbed the document of the elements of spontaneity and high moral purpose. The long months of hesitation which preceded the issuance of the proclamation had irritated many powerful interests in the North. And, when it finally appeared, the proclamation pleased few in the North and created no panic in the South. The abolitionists and their powerful allies in Congress, the Radical Republicans, were disappointed because Lincoln had not based the proclamation upon moral grounds or upon the ground of justice to the Negro. Lincoln's decision was motivated by military expediency and the proclamation so stated. Moreover, the slaves held in the North wore not freed, nor were all of the slaves within the borders of the Confederacy freed for several counties in Virginia and Louisiana were exempted from the operation of the proclamation. Thus Lincoln had emancipated the slaves precisely in those States where he was powerless to effect their freedom. Actually it was the crushing of the rebellion which not only made the Proclamation a living document but apotheosized it. On January 1, 1863, the Emancipation was something less than a generous gesture.

It is obvious that, at the beginning of July, 1863, Lincoln's chances for a second term were far from bright. The Radical Republicans, their followers and their press, were in favor of a more forceful anti-slavery man than Lincoln. That man was Salmon P. Chase. And this attitude persisted almost until the Republican nominating convention in June of 1864, despite the victory at Gettysburg.

In this unenviable political and military position, the President was beset by a pressing necessity to find a successor to General Hooker who had been vanquished at Chancellorsville. After considering the available choices, Lincoln, on June 27th, 1863, named General George Gordon Meade to the command of the Army of the Potomac. In a letter accompanying the appointment, General Halleck wrote to Meade,

"General:

You will receive with this the order of the President placing you in command of the Army of the Potomac. Considering the circumstances, no one ever received a more important command; and I cannot doubt that you will fully justify the confidence which the Government has reposed in you.

"You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem -proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington, as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will therefore manoeuvre and fight in such a manner as to cover the Capital and also Baltimore,, as far as circumstances will. admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places., it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him, so as to give him battle.***"

George Gordon Meade

The battle of Gettysburg resulted as it did largely due to happenstance, and to Meade's ability to seize the opportunity offered. That a battle was fought at all at Gettysburg and upon the particular terrain occupied by the opposing armies was equally circumstantial. By the merest chance, the position of the opposing forces could have been reversed and the result catastrophic to the North.

Gettysburg was not a planned encounter. Neither Meade nor Lee had prepared to stand and give battle there. When Meade received his orders from General Halleck on June 27th, he wasted no time. Meade's job was to intercept Lee. Time was of the essence and the consequences of delay incalculable. The army was immediately set in motion. On June 30th, a segment of Meade's forces made contact with the Army of Northern Virginia. While Meade was aware of Lee's presence Lee was operating without knowledge of Meade's whereabouts. Unfortunately for him, General Stuart and the cavalry, the eyes of the army, had not yet rejoined Lee. Thus Lee unable to make the necessary reconnaissance which would have appraised him of the proximity of the Federals. While it is true that during the early afternoon of July 1st, Union soldiers occupied Cemetery Ridge, the commanding position in the impending engagement, they constituted only a handful of Meade's army. Had Lee been fully aware of the presence of Meade, it is probable that he would have seized Cemetery Ridge. Masterful tactician that he was, Lee would not have overlooked such favorable terrain or failed to occupy it in strength, for it is clear that whoever possessed that height held the key to victory. However, Meade's occupation of the Ridge was so tenuous that an assault by the Confederates in the late afternoon of July 1st would have dislodged him and thus tipped the scales in Lee's favor. Lee was to have this opportunity. The impetuous General Gordon was convinced that he could take Cemetery Ridge. But he could not proceed without General Ewell's consent. As it was, Gordon spent precious moments trying to convince Ewell of the correctness of his conclusion. Ewell lacked the daring of Stonewall Jackson, he hesitated - he seemed unable to reach a decision. By the time Ewell gave his consent, the opportunity was lost. To Meade's credit, it may be said that he saw the inestimable value of the Ridge, and he lost no time in heavily reinforcing the position. When Gordon at last assaulted the heights, he was beaten off.

So the battle of Gettysburg was fought, with Meade in control of the commanding position and, with Lee forced to fight upon a site and at a time not of his choosing. Chance, pure chance, had been the determining factor.

When we look back upon the events of those few days from June 27th, through July 3rd, the important and decisive factor was Meade's ability to carry out Halleck's orders with a promptness theretofore lacking in Union commanders. It was the speed with which Meade set his army in motion that permitted him to intercept Lee before Stuart rejoined the army. It was this promptness which placed Meade upon the scene and in the commanding positions before his opponent could bring his weight to bear. And it was Meade's expert analysis of the terrain that led him to place his troops quickly and efficiently upon Cemetery Ridge and the two Round Tops. Thus, Meade was alone responsible for victory at Gettysburg as he would have been solely responsible for the defeat had he faied in any of the particulars already set forth.

Robert E. Lee

But suppose that chance or fortuity had favored the South during those fateful days at Gettysburg. Lee instead of Meade emerged the victor; with Cemetery Ridge in Confederate hands, Lee now occupied a tactical position similar to that which he had held at Fredericksburg vis a vis the Federal army. After three days of fierce fighting, Meade's army was beaten with fearful losses in men and material. The reports of the battle which drifted back to Washington during the late afternoon of July 2nd were so alarming that Lincoln arranged for a meeting of the cabinet that evening. To this meeting there were invited General Halleck, Thaddeus Stevens and Senator Sumner. It was apparent that the Capital was in jeopardy, and the considered judgment of the conferses was that the Government must be moved to Philadelphia should the situation deteriorate further. The final decision was left to the President and General Halleck. By the morning of July 3rd, it is clear that the Army of the Potomac was falling back, in some disorded, upon Baltimore. Meade's army was no longer an effective fighting force. Washington was uncovered as Halleck had feared it might be; there was now no alternative to the evacuation of the Capital. At two o'clock in the afternoon of July 3rd, the first trains filled with Government workers and files left Washington for Philadelphia. By the 5th, the Federal Government was operating from that city. Such nearby garrison troops as could be mustered were thrown about the enirons of Philadelphia; in addition, the Army of the Potomac was ordered to take up its position on the southern perimeter of the city. Thus, for the moment at least, Philadelphia was deemed defensible.

Washington was now an open city. By late afternoon of July 10th, the advance segments of Lee's army were in the outskirts of the city. The entry into the city itself took place on the 12th. No cheering throngs lined the streets to greet the rebels. Those who could had left the city, and the remaining inhabitants remained indoors behind closed shutters and locked doors, fearful of the looting which they were sure would come. To the credit of the Army of Northern Virginia very few cases of looting occurred during the entire time that it occupied Washington.

Lincoln's difficulties were now multiplied a thousandfold. The Army of the Potomac had been so reduced in morale that it had to be entirely reorganized. The immediate problem here was to find a commander who would have the confidence of the army and the people. Where was such a man to be found? As usual, there was a great deal of gratuitous advice, much of it conflicting and almost entirely worthless. Lincoln's first thoughts were of McClellan. The army had confidence in him. Even his detractors admitted that "little Mac" was a master of organization and detail. And the army certainly needed reorganization. However, Stevens, Secretary of War Stanton, Secretary of the Treasury Chase and Senator Fessenden, as well as other equally important, were unalterably opposed to McClellan. He had had two chances and had failed both times. Besides, he was too politically minded. While the debate proceeded, the problem was solved by McClellan on July 19th, when he let it be known that he would not accpet the appointment if offered. McClellan was said to feel that the adminstration had displayed a total lack of confidence in him in the past and he could not undertake such a difficult task under the circumstances.

George B. McClellan

The debacle at Gettysburg had served other purposes also. All of the dissident forces in the North had now taken up the cry for peace with renewed vigor. In addition, the newspapers were almost unanimous in their demand for Lincoln's resignation. The cry for peace was echoed in the hastily called "Cincinnati Conference." That meeting issued a demand that Lincoln appoint peace commissioners empowered to confer with Confederate President Davis. The manifesto issued by the Conferees at Cincinnati declared that "Peace even at the cost of the loss of the South is better than a continuence of this seemingly endless war." But even on the question of peace there was no semblance of agreement. There were other groups that wanted peace only on the basis of the old Union, and there were those who wanted peace but who were unwilling to sipulate the price.

Those who had occasion to see the President at this time were struck by his careworn countenance. It did not seem possible that one man could continue to stand up under the strain and the confusion. Secretary Wells confided to his diary that Lincoln appeared to have had no sleep for days. "It would not surprise me," wrote Wells, "if the President should give way under the fearful pressures that are being exerted upon him." But despite his near exhaustion, Lincoln would not give in to the importunities of those about him. To a visitor from Chicago, he expressed the firm conviction that the war must be carried on to a victorious conclusion -- that the sacrifices of so many young men must not be in vain.

The reorganization of the Army, the clamor for an end to hostilities and for Lincoln's resignation were not the only difficulties besetting the President. In early August, it was learned that France and England were seriously considering a joint declaration that the Federal blockade of the South's ports would no longer be recognized. Accordingly, on August 19th, Secretary Seward was dispatched to London and Paris to do what he could to forestall the action contemplated by these two powers. This effort on Seward's part was ultimately to prove successful, but for the time being, the threat of foreign intervention posed a serious problem.

Salmon P. Chase

In the meantime, the North had gained a respite. Lee's troops were exhausted. Replacements were slow in coming and when they arrived they were poorly equipped. These were not the men of '61. Lee was fully aware that his success at Gettysburg was of a temporary nature. He had won time for the Confederacy, but he could not go on to further conquest. Lee not only could not spead his available manpower any thinner by a further advance, he could not even hold Washington indefintely. If Gettysburg was to have any beneficial results for the Confederacy, they must be in the form of a piece offer from the North or of foreign intervention. However, by January of 1864, Lee knew that neither of his hopes would be realized. What was more, Grant had reorganized the Army of the Potomac, and with 125,000 men at his command was ready to move. Lee with no more than 70,000 men was in no position to make a stand in the Capital. He could not take the chance of being trapped in the city. When Grant ordered his forces toward Washington, Lee decided to evacuate the city and retire into the Shenandoah Valley. Lee's hope now was that he could outmanoeuvre and defeat Grant in the Valley.

The Federal government came back to Washington on February 10th. While there was general relief throughout the North at this happy turn of events, the country's wounded pride could not be so easily assuaged. Lincoln appeared to have lost whatever hold he had had on the masses of the people. The bitterness engendered by the Confederate occupation of Washington was enormous. This change in sentiment toward Lincoln was amply demonstrated by Chase's attitude. He now felt that he no longer needed to foster his chances for the nomination surreptitiously. Chase was now openly campaigning for the nomination and Lincoln was powerless even to dismiss him from the Cabinet.

The Republican convention did what everyone expected it to do. On June 9th, 1864, Chase was nominated on the first ballot. Fortunately for Chase's presidential aspirations, by election day Grant had penned Lee in Richmond. While the election was close, Chase was returned the victor over McClellan, the Democratic nominee. Between election day and March 4, 1865, Lincoln cooperated magnaminously with President-elect Chase. Whatever his personal feelings were, they never came to the surface either by word or see. The press had long since ceased to hound Lincoln. In their view, he was a dead issue.

Horace Greely

In June, peace came to the country at Appomattox. The North was overwhelmed with joy. Chase and Grant were eulogized for having brought the war to a successful conclusion. Although Chase's speech at the dedication f the battlefield of Gettysburg on April 14th, 1865, was fast becoming known as something of a literary monstrosity because of its verbosity and pedestrian prose, this was not important. What was important was that Chase had not nonly brought peace he had saved the Union and freed the slaves. For these things he would be remembered with gratitude down through the years.

As for Lincoln, he had finally succeeded in settling down at Springfield to the practice of law. His friends did what they could to make life easier for him. And, while he never idscussed the past, it was apparent that he was finding it difficult to live with his memories. Outwardly, the years were uneventful for Lincoln. He studiously avoided politics and spent much of his time when no on circuit chatting with friends or taking care of Mary, who had had a breakdown. In 1869, Lincoln became president of the Springfield Union Bank. But unfortunately, the bank failed during the panic of 1873. Shortly thereafter, Lincoln suffered an attack of acute indigestion from which he did not recover. There were those who said that he had died of a broken heart.

Thus at sixty-one years of age, Lincoln passed from the American scene mourned by his family and a few friends.

Typical of the comments that marked Lincoln's passing were those of the New York Courier and the Columbus, Ohio Record. The Courier commented that, "Lincoln's inability to accommodate himself to the conditions of his time was the source of his weakness. His nomination and election in the stead of Seward or Chase in 1860, was a serius mistake for which the country has paid dearly." The Columbus Record noted that, "Abraham Lincoln, aged 61, died yesterday at Springfield, Illinois. Lincoln was President of the United States from 1861 to 1865. His record was uindistinguished. His abilities were too modest for the high post to which he had been called."

Bailey's History of the Civil War, the standard work on the era, expresses the generally accepted view of Abraham Lincoln. "Lincoln was inept and unwilling to take advice of those about him. His place in American history is difficult to assess. He nearly approaches the unfortunate Buchanan for meager abilityes and for lot opportunities than any other American President."

Fortunately for Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg was a Union victory and the alternatives to this victory must remain an interesting hypothesis in the realm of conjecture. Upon how delicate a thread does fame hang. What Lincoln became and what Lincoln might have been in the estimate of history was largely a matter of pure chance. But for Stuart's absence from Lee's Army, Ewell's indecision and Meade's alacrity in obeying orders and his ability to seize and occupy the commanding terrain Lincoln might have been catalogued as an obscure country lawyer whose ambitions were greater than his abilities warranted.

Gettysburg marked the beginning of the end for the Confederacy and the beginning of Lincoln's ascension to the heights of greatness. The man who saved that chance for Lincoln was George Meade. A mistake by Meade in those deparate first days from June 27th to July 3rd, would have been disastrous for Lincoln. It was Meade's victory at Gettysburg that gave Lincoln the opportunity to utter those imortal words of the Address; that lessened the clamor for his political scalp and permitted him to cary the nation to victory and to peace. It was Meade's victory at Gettysburg that permitted Lincoln to stay in office long enough to save the Union. These are the capstones of Lincoln's greatness. Surely, George Gordon Meade was the man who created the historic Lincoln.

Strangely enough, Meade died in obscurity. His sole claim to fame aside from from his command of the Union Army at Gettysburg rests upon his Vice-presidency of the Philadelphia Park Board. The victory at Gettysburg has been the subject of but one book a biography by his son.

Sic transit gloria mundi.